Edwin P. Hoyt continues his military history of the Pacific War in this sequel to his Storm over the Gilberts, which described the invasion of Tarawa and Betio. His present study can be divided into three sections: the invasions of Kwajalein, Eniwetok, and the other islands of the Marshalls which provided an advanced base for invasion of the Marianas group; the carrier battles during the Marianas invasion; and the struggle to capture Saipan, Tinian and Guam. This secured the Marianas as a base for long-range B-29 attacks on the Japanese homeland. The struggle to capture what sometimes amounted to only a few square miles of coral atoll was essential to a grand strategy that had evolved by 1943. Because most American resources were being stockpiled in Europe in anticipation of D-Day, the Pacific had secondary priority. General MacArthur wanted to push from the south through Indonesia to the Philippines, but his campaigns of 1942 in New Guinea and the Solomons were slow. Therefore, it was decided that the major American offensive would strike directly across the Pacific to the Marshall Islands and then to the Marianas, to penetrate the Japanese “Inner Empire.” Since Micronesia had hundreds of islands in a three million square mile area, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, decided to take only essential islands and ports which could serve as unsinkable carriers and protect the advancing American naval forces from the air. The costly Marine
Beginning of the year in 1941, FDR decided that the Pacific Fleet would move to Hawaii from San Diego in the hopes of discouraging the invasion of the Japanese. Negotiations between Washington and Tokyo had been going on for several months without a resolution. On July 2, 1941, the Imperial High Command was tired of negotiations with the United States and needed to proceed with their development within Asia even with the embargo in place and meaning it would be at a high risk of war with the US. [4] Therefore, the Japanese had deceived the United States, ignored the arbitration, and moved forward with their plans. The United States had hoped that this restrictive embargo would halt Japan’s assault as negotiations had continued well into November.
The war in Europe was finished and America was still fighting Japan in the Pacific. The American people’s will to continue the war effort was falling and the government had to think of a way to end the war. They needed to take some of the Pacific to be able to get close enough to Japan to finish the war. They started by taking islands but ran into heavy Japanese resistance; soldier’s that were almost all willing to die for their emperor. That included fake surrendering, making and then hiding in elaborate cave systems, and killing other Japanese who were trying to surrender. This weighed heavily on the soldiers and made fighting incredibly hard. Even when they had an island there were Japanese who had hidden and still tried to kill the
Despite all the success Japan had early in the war, they did not do as much damage to the United States Pacific fleet as they would have like to have done. This gave America a false sense of security at the time when Japan was preparing to take stronger action. Rear Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s plan was to draw in the remaining American ships into an area where they could be attacked and destroyed by a much greater number of Japanese vessels. Admiral Yamamoto thought that if Japan captured valuable territory like the Midway Islands that the United States could not afford to give up, he could destroy the remaining American ships with ease because the Americans would have no supply chain.
Samoa, and other small islands. Japan was very vulnerable to a naval attack by America and
Q5. The Japanese were attacking everything in their path when it came to the war in the Pacific. First, they had made the mistake in bombing the United States of America at Pearl Harbor. After such a bloody attack, the United States would surely declare war on Japan. However, this did not faze the Japanese as they continued attacking in Asia and the Pacific. The Japanese drive for a Pacific Empire was surely beginning. After many Japanese raids, the Allies would eventually fight back using a specific strategy created by General Douglas MacArthur, called island hopping. This strategy would prove to be extremely effective on the Japanese.
Prior to the upcoming Coral Sea battle, a number of Japanese military messages had been intercepted by the U.S. Navy signals intelligence unit. The first, dated March 28, 1942, was encoded as stating “The objective of MO will be first to restrict the enemy fleet movements and will be accomplished by means of attacks on the north coast of Australia.” (“Battle of the Coral Sea”) Subsequent messages were intercepted that provided allied forces with updated details concerning IJN fleet progress, as well as elements of IJN plans that included battleship and carrier logistics. This resulted in the U.S. Navy’s deployment of a cotillion of numerous warships and support craft, and also the carriers Lexington and Yorktown (“Battle of the Coral Seas”). In the upcoming battle, these ships would do battle against a superior IJN force comprised of far more battleships, submarines and support craft, as well as aircraft carriers.
In the beginning of war, Japanese victory in Pacific terrified West Cost Americans. Partial victory for Americans appeared when Japanese capital Tokyo was bombed. It was less of a material loss but huge in terms of psychological attack. It was followed by the Battle of Coral Sea in May 1942 and after that the decisive Battle of Midway Island took place. U.S. aircraft carriers destroyed three out of four Japanese carriers that sabotaged their further plans of invasion and they adopted a defensive strategy.
The book effectively builds context for the Pacific War, discussing the political and military background from both American and Japanese perspectives. Nonetheless, Spector does not reveal any new information. Corroborating evidence in this piece serves the purpose of summation rather than radically modifying current academic perceptions of World War II, but Spector makes choices in his writing that certainly challenge cultural mindsets surrounding the war. Rather than categorically highlighting successes of the Americans while neglecting the strengths of the Japanese, Spector unambiguously discusses strengths and weaknesses for all actors throughout the conflict. In fact, he criticizes American exceptionalism in his description of the two-pronged advance by General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz, contending “…the adoption of this course of action was less due to strategic wisdom than to the army and navy’s reluctance to entrust their forces to the command of an officer of the rival service” (p. xiii). The facts that Spector cites throughout Eagle Against the Sun do not divert from other historical texts analyzing the war. Rather, Spector’s ideological interpretation of these facts reflects his distinct purpose to convey the truths of the Pacific War while filtering
Japan had Admiral Yamamoto’s plan Operation MI. His plan was the reduction of Midway and to make Admiral Nimitz to show his carriers. Japan was
They would start by capturing Port Moresby in New Guinea, then attack Midway and the Aleutians to gain a decisive victory. Thanks to Allied progress in deciphering JN-25, Japan’s plan to press south to Moresby was identified. The US navy was able to thwart the invasion of Port Moresby in the Battle of the Coral Sea on May 7, 1942. “For the first time in the Pacific war, American intelligence had been able to give adequate warning of enemy plans” (Bath 178). This was due to collaboration among agencies to decipher codes, and the newfound dedication of the agencies to report their findings. The trend was to continue in the Battle of
“Before we’re through with them, the Japanese language will be spoken only in Hell,” explained Admiral William F. Halsey in response to seeing the damage inflicted upon Pearl Harbor by the Japanese. The United States entered World War II in December 1941 bearing a hostile attitude towards the Japanese and immediately focused forces in stopping Japan’s aggressive Pacific expansion. In pursuing power of the Pacific, the United States secured crucial victories at the Battle of Midway and Guadalcanal. As the United States sought control of the Marshall Islands to advance forces on Japan, the Gilbert Islands stood as the avenue of success in the Central Pacific Campaign. Operation Galvanic arose as the plan to take these islands, which
The intention was to occupy the islands of Saipan, Guam and Tinian from Japanese control. Thus, in June of 1944 the US launched an operation was then termed as the ‘Operation Forager’ with Admiral Chester Nimitz of the Pacific Fleet as the overall campaign commander. The Operation Forager intended to attack Marianas through the Central Pacific with Saipan as the first target then Guam and Tinian to be assaulted thereafter.
At the Conference, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, along with the Combined Chiefs of Staff decided to concentrate on increasing their efforts on the war with Japan. Derived from the conference, War Plan Orange planned for the Marshall Islands as the first U.S. target. As the United States gathered more intelligence on the Marshall Islands, the original war plan did not seem logical. The Japanese had four major installations within the Marshall Islands as well as eight airfields, all which were easily accessible from Truk, the Japanese major base in the Pacific. After gaining this intelligence, the United States altered the original war plan to focus on the Gilbert Islands. The Tarawa atoll was one of the first recommended targets in the newly created plan. The United States needed to take control of the Tarawa atoll to ensure success of Operation Galvanic. This in turn would lead to the seizure of the Marshall Islands which was crucial in mobilizing the United States Pacific Fleet to easier attack Japan. If left under Japanese control, Tarawa would threaten communication lines and could impede on supply routes with Hawaii. Controlling the Tarawa atoll was essential to the United States Pacific Campaign as it blocked the allies’ path in accessing the Marshall Islands which was a major stepping stone in winning the war with
American involvement with the war in the Pacific may have begun with the bombing of Pearl Harbor, but it quickly escalated to the shores of the Philippine islands. Battles were hard won and bitterly lost throughout the push in the pacific. Yet, one loss carried significantly more agony for General Douglas MacArthur than all the others. MacArthur was forced to abandon the Philippine islands under direct orders from President Franklin Roosevelt in March 1942 (History 2010). With bitter disappointment MacArthur vowed he shall return. As the war raged on it became clear that the Philippine islands was key in the strategy to penetrate the Japanese hold in the Pacific. However, another defeat in the Philippines would have crippled the momentum of the Allied forces in the pacific.
On Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, at 7:55 AM the Japanese Empire led a surprise attack on the US Naval base Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, that would leave millions of Americans in shock, and heartbroken. Before the attack, the United States kept a low profile on International affairs, and concentrated on the domestic affairs at hand. This tragic moment in American history forever remembered. It is a mournful day for the American people, although, for the Japanese Empire it was an honorable day, one they would call a victory. People believed that the Japanese Empire attack on Pear Harbor was deceitful, treacherous and for no reason at all. Yet, there is a reason behind their attack, it was a strategy accomplished by the Imperial Japanese Navy, directed by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto and several other men. (Henretta, Edwards, & Self, 2014)