Essay on Defining Voluntarism

Obedience to people in authority is a deep-rooted trait that we all possess by virtue of our upbringing, and as Milgram put it, “it is only the person dwelling in isolation who is not forced to respond, with defiance or submission, to the commands of others” (Milgram 1974). This trait is exhibited every day in family circles, workplace and school. People are most likely to obey instructions from people they perceive their authority to be legal or moral. We see people obeying their pastors, leaders in various societies and other people they see as higher to them; and they obey anything they are being told even if it involves killing another human being. They justify their actions, however wrong, on obedience to authority.

In this article, “Just Do What the pilot Tells You” Theodore Dalrymple and “The Genocidal Killer in the Mirror” by Crispin Sartwell express two different viewpoints expressed towards obedience. While both authors are addressing the issue of disobedience, Dalrymple approaches the issue, stating, “Some people think a determined opposition to authority is principled and romantic” (Dalrymple 3) while on the other hand, Sartwell emphasizes that authority, especially hierarchies are the most “evil” thing in our society. Despite the well-executed argument of the two author's, Dalrymple takes a self-centered approach, forcing the reader to agree with his opinion.

Individuals often yield to conformity when they are forced to discard their individual freedom in order to benefit the larger group. Despite the fact that it is important to obey the authority, obeying the authority can sometimes be hazardous especially when morals and autonomous thought are suppressed to an extent that the other person is harmed. Obedience usually involves doing what a rule or a person tells you to but negative consequences can result from displaying obedience to authority for example; the people who obeyed the orders of Adolph Hitler ended up killing innocent people during the Holocaust. In the same way, Stanley Milgram noted in his article ‘Perils of Obedience’ of how individuals obeyed authority and

A choice issues from, and can be sufficiently explained by, an agent’s character and motives, then to be ultimately responsible for the choice, the agent must be at least in part responsible by virtue of choices or actions voluntarily performed in the past for having the character and motives he now has (295).

In society, obedience to authority is ingrained in humanity from an early age, causing some individuals to blindly obey orders without contemplating the credibility of the source. In psychoanalyst Erich Fromm’s article “Disobedience as a Psychological and Moral Problem,” he explains that throughout human history obedience has been associated with virtue and disobedience with sin (Fromm 127). Fromm suggests that our conscience is an internalized voice of authority (126). Fromm claims individuals need to distinguish the difference between rational and irrational authority because obedience is effective when individuals want to obey, instead of fearing to disobey (127). Two other authors who examine obedience are Herbert C. Kelman and V. Lee

We are prone to obey because when we are obedient to an authority it makes us feel safe and protected. We can’t make mistakes because the authority decides for us. We can’t be alone, because the authority watches over us. So, no matter what our behavior is, it can be justified on the ground that we are only following orders, doing what we’re told from above. We can easily be brought to view ourselves as an instrument for carrying out another person’s wishes, and so we no longer feel responsible for our actions. Unfortunately, that can make us feel responsible to the authority, instead of the content of the orders the authority is giving. Morality is still there, but the focus is changed. We feel the need to perform well, out of obligation or duty, to those who are in authority.

In this paper, I hope to effectively summarize W.K Clifford’s (1879) argument on the ethics of belief, followed by a summary of William James’ (1897) argument on the right to believe, and finally, provide an argument for why W.K Clifford’s (1879) argument is stronger by highlighting its strengths while simultaneously arguing against William James’ (1897) argument.

The second major part of Mackie?s article convincingly undermines the plausibility of the realist belief in independent and objective values. Mackie attacks the belief from two major angles, the origin of objectivity-laden morals and the supposed nature of objective values, each of which is really a two-pronged approach.

In “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives”, Philippa Foot argues against Immanuel Kant, that morality exists in hypothetical imperatives rather than categorical imperatives. For Kant, categorical imperatives alone serve as moral commands, and it would be impossible for a moral system to be based on hypothetical imperatives because such imperatives serve as means to ends and result from maxims that cannot be universalized into perfect duties. Despite this, Foot holds that acting on many hypothetical imperatives can be morally praiseworthy and can even serve as the basis of moral judgments. Although I agree with Foot that hypothetical imperatives can have moral worth, in this paper, I will argue that a morality based on the purposes that hypothetical imperatives are directed toward appears to be circular. To do this, I will explain Foot’s theory of how morality is known and binds. Then, I will argue that this theory is insufficient to explain the moral purpose that hypothetical imperatives must be directed toward, thus begging the question of what is the moral basis of the purpose directed toward in the hypothetical imperative.

There are some questions in the religious domain that reason cannot answer because there are situations in every religion that cannot logically be explained. Religions are not rational; therefore, reason alone is not adequate enough to validate religious truths. In this paper, I will demonstrate how reason and faith aren’t separate entities and how both are needed in order to explain all religious truths by examining the ideas of Kierkegaard and Pascal. I will also give a detailed explanation of fideism, show examples of irresponsible fideism and responsible fideism and then argue in favor of responsible fideism; faith fills in the gaps that are left void by reason.

Born in 1845, William Clifford was a mathematician and philosopher famed for his philosophy of science and quest for answering ethical questions through scientific evidence (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2014). Clifford recognized several difficulties in Emmanuel Kant’s argument related to philosophy, which inspired him to begin a search for answers related to innate belief, personal responsibility of guilt, and overall creation. In the Ethics of Belief, Clifford asserts that it is always wrong to believe based on insufficient evidence, a theme that would follow his opinion on every issue he chose to tackle.

In her work, The Sources of Normativity, Korsgaard is critical of a number of acclaimed philosophers, Anscombe among the bunch. The structure of her criticism is, however, is largely unclear and somewhat indefinable. She recognizes that in Anscombe’s views about moral ideas of ‘ought’ and ‘obligation’ are connected to a divine law conception of ethics and without that connection to God and God like Sovereign, lack sense. Korsgaard mentions this particular view that Anscombe has because Korsgaard seeks to disarm that very notion. Korsgaard defends the concept of obligation without connecting it to divine law. She believes that even without divine law, people will still act with obligation. She believes and defends the idea of an agent

“There is no possibility of thinking of anything at all in this world, or even out of it, which can be regarded as good without qualifications, except a good will.” (Kant, pg.7 393). No other thing that may appear good can be unqualifiedly good, as even “Talents of the mind…Gifts of power…[Other] qualities…Have no intrinsic unconditional worth, but they always presuppose, rather, a good will, which restricts the high esteem in which they are otherwise rightly held.” (Kant, pg.7 393-394). So Immanuel Kant introduces the public to his Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, which results not in simply a grounding work, but one that is utterly groundbreaking. This opener, wholly devoted to the establishment of the importance of will and intention, notes the guiding characteristics of a good will. As enumerated previously, Kant recognizes the plausible potential positivity of plenty concepts, but remains of the mind that none of these are good in themselves without the efforts of a good will to guide and restrict them in a manner that perpetuates their positivity.

In this essay I will explain why I think the strongest position of the free will debate is that of the hard determinists and clarify the objection that moral responsibility goes out the door if we don’t have free will by addressing the two big misconceptions that are associated with determinists: first that determinism is an ethical system, and secondly that contrary to common belief determinists do believe in the concept of cause and effect. I will also begin by explaining my position and why I believe that the position of the indeterminist does not hold water as an argument and the third

I assert that for a moral system to be necessary and applicable, there must exist a moral agent who possesses both the desire and the ability to choose. By denoting certain actions or ways of being as better, a moral system implies that there are also other potential actions and ways of being that are worse. The individual must choose between them. Without this element of choice, an action has no moral qualification. For example, a computer acts, but it does not choose its action. Consequently, while a computer can be judged better or worse in its ability to carry out an action, it cannot be judged responsible for the action. Rather, the person who uses or creates the computer is in fact responsible, for it is that person who chooses for it to act in a particular way. In a moral system, choice, responsibility, and the viability of judgment are linked inextricably.