Floyd Case Summary

Eyewitness evidence has always been considering critical information when it comes to court trials and convictions. But how reliable are eyewitnesses? Scientific research has shown that eyewitness’s memories are often not accurate or reliable. Human memory is very malleable and is easily changed by suggestion. Relying on eyewitness evidence instead of scientific data often leads to wrongful convictions. Scientific evidence is much more reliable, and should be more important in court cases than eyewitness evidence.

In the case of Wong Sun v United States, in consideration of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine the Court excluded the admission of evidence in the trial court due to the violation of defendant’s Fourth Amendment Rights when the derivative evidence was obtained. Therefore, in this essay, I am going to discuss if the exclusion of evidence contributes in an important way of supporting the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment or should the derivative evidence be admitted because police officers could not have anticipated the discovery of derivative evidence.

Defendant, Preston G. Holmes, III and Matthew D. Jones, by and through counsel, Vernida R. Chaney and Eugene Gorokhov, and respectfully move this Honorable Court to exclude inadmissible hearsay evidence that the government may seek to introduce at trial. Specifically, the defendants move to exclude the records and contents thereof (1) U-Haul, (2) Sharifa Shuler’s cellphone, (3) automatic license plate reader, and (4) gun manufacturers.

In the case of Fare v. Michael C., the police arrested the sixteen-year-old Michael C. under the suspicion of murder, and he was transported to the police station for a custodial interrogation (Elrod & Ryder, 2014). Furthermore, before the interrogation began Michael C. was advised of his Miranda Rights, and Michael C. specifically asked to consult his probation officer, and not a lawyer (Elrod & Ryder, 2014). Consequently, the police refused to allow Michael C. to speak with his state probation officer, and they continued to question him about the murder (Henry-Mays, 2007). Michael C. continued to answer the investigator’s questions and he drew sketches, which ultimately implicated him in the murder (Henry-Mays, 2007). Now that we understand the general facts of the case, let us examine the key facts and issues, which lead to the Supreme Court’s decision.

The Joseph Hurtado v. People of California case (110 U.S 516) began on January 22, 1884 and was decided on March , 1884, was between the plaintiff, Joseph Hurtado, and the defendant, California. Hurtado appealed against the conviction proclaiming that he was not indicted by a grand jury based on due process in the Fourth Amendment. The question presented was, “To what principle, then, are we to resort to ascertain whether this process, enacted by congress, is due process?” The amendments that being trialed was the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment.

Judge Simon Skinner and Judge Leslie Tiller are judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota, respectively. Each judge has an involved history with Minnesota’s governor, Joyce Cooper. In this paper, I address whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause bars Skinner and Tiller from hearing two unique cases to which Cooper is a party. I conclude that, for both judges in both cases, it does not.

Issues: Throughout the trail process on behalf of the court the inquiry for exceptions to the charge inaccuracy developed regarding instructions. The appellant was seeking a claim based of the defense of his

Woods filed a K.S.A. § 60-1507 motion for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed; res judicata barred his claim, and even if it did not, “Woods failed to overcome the strong presumption that his attorneys sufficiently investigated [the witness’s] proposed trial testimony.” Woods filed a second § 60-1507 motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that “a colorable claim of actual innocence” required the district court to reconsider the merits of his

When I was present, the plaintiff and defendant were each giving their precedent. The plaintiff’s representative talked James King sent a threatening letter to Judge Seel’s house. In which, he explained descriptive evidence on how King made “threats” to Judge Seel in his argument. James King, on the other hand, was a man with a lot of “problems”. He stated that he was not in the right state of mind when he made the threat to Judge Seel. Also

: 1) the testimony about Ms. Fergile’s identification of Mr. Tulin during the FBI photo array should not have been permitted; 2) the cumulative weight of the evidence does not support a judgment of guilt; 3) Mr. Tulin’s counsel should have been allowed to make observations and arguments to the jury about Ms. Fergile’s courtroom demeanor, which included waving and smiling at Mr. Tulin; 4) despite the court’s ruling on a motion in limine precluding testimony about the rape of Ms. Fergile’s niece, testimony to that effect came out and was heard by the jury, tainting the trial with undue prejudice;, and 5) the government’s arguments in closing shifted the burden to the defendant, thus prejudicing Mr. Tulin and violating his rights to fair trial.

The trial court erred and abused its discretion in granting the State’s motion to admit evidence of prior uncharged incidents of domestic violence, because the evidence denied Mr. Davis of his rights to due process of law as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 10 of the Missouri Constitution, in that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative because it was too remote in time to be relevant to the charged crimes and had a prejudicial effect.

Whether the circuit court erred in denying Loftin’s motion for judgment of acquittal for insufficient evidence. the evidence legally insufficient to support Appellant’s conviction?

It is the right of every citizen in this nation to have his or her case decided by a fair and impartial jury. The selection of the jury panel is one of great importance and one that can have a great effect on the outcome of the case. Therefore, it is obvious that the attorneys have a

On May 6, 2015, a motion to transfer pending actions to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California was filed by a plaintiff on behalf of himself and others who paid $99.95 for the Pay-Per-View boxing match between Floyd Mayweather and Manny Pacquiao. The defendants in these cases are the two boxers, as well as Mayweather Promotions LLC, and Top Rank, INC. The plaintiffs filed suits after it was revealed the Manny Pacquiao, who was thoroughly dominated by Mayweather, failed to disclose a major shoulder injury before the match. The plaintiffs claim they would not have purchased the match if Pacquiao had disclosed of his injury, and are including all persons residing in California who purchased the fight in a subclass of plaintiffs.

The hearsay rule is based inherently on the concise definition of hearsay. In this regard, hearsay can be defined as any statement other than that made by an individual in the process of testifying at a hearing or trial, which is offered for purposes of affording evidence of truth pertaining to a particular matter. According to the Cornell University Law School (2014), the hearsay rue is the rule that prohibits out of court statements from being admitted as evidence at a trial. B and large, the hearsay rule is motivated intrinsically by the understanding in the belief that hearsay is unreliable. For example, if a witnessed stopped at a scene of a car accident and a survivor intimated to him or her that the driver caused the accident, this statement cannot be admitted as evidence to prove the same. It is imperative to understand that the hearsay rule, according to the Cornell University Law School, bars all such evidence, whether oral or written.