George Kennan's Long Telegram Analysis

As the Soviet Union continued to spread communism throughout the eastern part of the globe, the United States was determined to contain the economic ideology and prevent it from reaching the States by any means possible. The American’s fear of communism prompted changes in domestic policy, most notably with the attempt to remove power from anyone with communist ties and the platform to influence others. Document one, a passage from one of President Truman’s executive order signed in

‘For Marshall Planners, it (economic growth) was...the key to social harmony, to the survival of private-enterprise capitalism, and to the preservation of political democracy’ , additionally, by setting up European economies in the image of America’s capitalist, free-market economy, it became far more difficult for Communist beliefs in the state controlled market to prevail in the struggle for power that consumed many European countries. An analysis of America’s foreign policy by Nikolai Novikov, Soviet Ambassador, shows that the Soviet Union also saw the Marshall Plan as an attempt to impose America’s political views on the peoples of Europe ‘obvious indications of the US effort to establish world dominance’ . Novikov suggests that America is trying to become the leading world power ‘The foreign policy of the United States... is characterised in the post-war period by a striving for world supremacy’ , and emphasises the role of the American military to impose the policies of the White House on the world, ‘indications of the US effort to establish world dominance are also to be found in the increase in military potential in peacetime’ . This view is expressed by Soviet deputy foreign minister Andrei Vyshinsky where he states to the UN General Assembly that the Marshall Plan is an American attempt to ‘impose its will on other independent states’ . There was a strong feeling in the Soviet Union

The Soviet Union’s communist attitudes made the U.S. suspicious of its intentions. After the Russian Revolution and the Bolshevik takeover,

Tucker strengthens the argument that the USSR was not the only major power driven by ideology. He states “Constantly seeking to extend the orbit of American hegemony, the US had been the most expansionist of all great powers impelled by the inner drives of American capitalism” [7] . Tuckers view is correct and is supported by the Novikov telegram, the Soviet version of Kennan’s long telegram – both depicted the other side as driven by an instiable urge for world domination… Novikov worried about America’s global reach, and described the USA as trying to reduce Soviet influence in neighbouring countries in order to hamper the progress of communism there and to create conditions for the penetration of American capital into their economies. ADD EXTRA

George Kennan's containment plan is a radical shift in the U.S foreign policy when the Policy of the United States towards the Soviet Union prior, and during the World War II is considered. The containment policy marks the shift of American foreign policy towards the Soviets from alliance to deterrence. Kennan's states in the Long Telegram, "USSR still lives in antagonistic "capitalist encirclement" with which in the long run there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence." (Citation needed) only two years after the end of World War II, a war both the U.S and the Soviet Union fought side by side for a common ambition. If the aspect of radical shift in the U.S foreign policy is seen from a post-Cold War perspective, another radical change can

George Kennan did not make any detailed policy recommendations in the Long Telegram of 1946, although he made it clear that he did not regard the Soviet Union as the same type of threat as Nazi Germany. He opposed the ideas of National Security Council Memorandum 68 (1950) as a hysterical overreaction, and thought that global containment was a serious strategic error, especially in peripheral regions like Indochina. Unlike Hitler, Stalin's aggression and expansion were unplanned and opportunistic, and its leaders did not wish to risk a general war with the West. For this reasons, the Soviets were highly sensitive to the "logic of force" and would retreat if confronted with resolution (Kennan 1946). Internally, it was a police state ruled by a Communist Party oligarchy and bureaucracy, but one that was always insecure in its power. Although Marxism had no real emotional appeal to the masses, the elites were guided by the assumption that the imperialist powers were always attempting to encircle the Soviet Union and that the contradictions within capitalism would always lead to wars. They would attempt to exploit these differences within the capitalist nations, while at the same time attempting to weaken their hold on the colonial areas. Kennan was well aware that the main problem in Western Europe was war-weariness and economic insecurity, and the U.S. would have to take the lead in reviving these countries or the "Russians certainly will" (Kennan 1946). In this case, though,

Truman believed that if Russia got Greece and Turkey it would then get Italy and France and the “iron curtain” would extend to western Ireland and to the United States. Arnold posits that Truman’s views were excessive. Stalin never challenged the Truman Doctrine or western dominance in Turkey, which was under U.S. military guidance, and Greece. Arnold states, “ [Stalin] provided almost no aid to the Greek rebels and told Yugoslavia’s leaders in early 1948 to halt their aid because the United States would never allow the Greek Communist to win and break Anglo-American control in the Mediterranean” (221). Arnold believed that President Truman more often than not narrowed rather than broadened his options. Truman’s insecurity also reinforced his liking to view conflict in black-and-white terms, to categorize all nations as either free or totalitarian, to demonize his opponents, and to ignore the complexities of historic national conflicts. In sum, despite Truman’s claim to have “knocked the socks off the communists,” he left the White House with his presidency in tatters, military spending at a record high, McCarthyism rampant, and the United States on Cold War footing at home and abroad.

In The Sources of Soviet Conduct, George F. Kennan explained “Containment was the central post-war concept of the United States and its allies in dealing with the Soviet Union”. To contain communism, the United Stated strategy was to have a strong

This caused the US to believe that Soviets had mainly expansionist aims. The US was “not prepared to see the opportunity for future investment [in Eastern Europe] foreclosed” (Crockatt 67) and this belief sparked the development of the containment policy directed by George Kennan, outlined in the Long Telegram (Lightbody 5). In addition, “the west had to oppose the Soviet Union for its own survival” (Lightbody 5) as the nuclear race between the US and USSR ensued and the USSR strived to equal the already well-established program of the US. This tension did not recede as Soviets sent spies into the US Manhattan Project, the nuclear development program (Lightbody 5). When the Soviets refused to join the Baruch Plan – which controlled nuclear weapon development – the USSR became even more openly viewed as a threat to US security. The growth of communism in Asia within the countries of Korea, Vietnam, and China along with tensions between the “Iron Curtain,” or divide, between Eastern and Western Europe also contributed to increasing threat towards capitalism and the Cold War’s inevitability.

George Kennan, the architect of the Long-Telegram, was one of the leading voices, publishing the traditionalist viewpoint both privately in the Long Telegram of 22 February 1946, as well as publicly in the anonymous article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" in the July 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs (McCauley 9). Soon after, most of the Western world joined Kennan in the view that: "at the bottom of the Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity"(McCauley 131). Kennan warned that, "they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it" (McCauley 131).

The traditional, orthodox interpretation places the responsibility of the Cold War on Stalin’s personality and on communist ideology. It claims that as long as Stalin and the authoritarian government were in power, a cold war was unavoidable. It argues that Stalin violated agreements that he had made at Yalta, imposed Soviet policy on Eastern European countries aiming at political domination and conspired to advocate communism throughout the world. As a result, United States officials were forced to respond to Soviet aggression with foreign policies such as the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Yet revisionists argue that there was “no proof of Stalin promoting communism outside Russia” and that Stalin’s decisions were first and foremost, pro-Soviet and not of communist intentions. Up until 1947, it is evident through Marshall Plan as well as statements and interviews made by Stalin that he was still thinking of cooperation with the United States, Britain and France. Despite post-war conflicts and instability of Soviet-American relations, the USSR’s initial embrace of the Marshall Plan at its announcement expressed

Within theories and finding, The Truman Doctrine was established and on March 12th, 1947. Truman speech pledged “American support for free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures” (Simkin, n.d.) Congress also agreed to give economic aid to the military to help fight Greece against communism as he felt that the political stability was threatened. With Greece in trouble Truman as concerned the other countries would fall into Communism and was known as the ‘domino theory’. If it was not for Truman then Greece and Turkey could no longer afford to fight the rebels. “Truman said that the Cold War was a choice between freedom and oppression; Therefore, Americans would have to abandon their decisions not to get involved in European affairs; America was OBLIGED to get involved” (Clare, n.d.). The Truman Doctrine was an American challenge not only to Soviet ambitions but also through a policy of containment.

The historian’s belonging to this school see the Truman doctrine from 1947 as the point when the Cold War started. They put the responsibility for the Cold War on the Soviet Union and its expansionist policy. According to them, this is the reason, why Soviets broke promises from the negotiations during the World War II, especially the Yalta agreement. On the other hand, the U.S. politicians wanted to continue the cooperation between the Allies even after the defeat of the Axis. They put a lot of hope to the newly created organization – United Nations – and the principle of collective security. However, the U.S. needed to react to the Soviet aggression in Europe. They adopted the policy of containment. The orthodox scholars view this policy as necessity because without it “the Soviet Union would have become the master of all Europe, instead of only the eastern Europe” .

The Russian Revolution is a widely studied and seemingly well understood time in modern, European history, boasting a vast wealth of texts and information from those of the likes of Robert Service, Simon Sebag Montefiore, Allan Bullock, Robert Conquest and Jonathan Reed, to name a few, but none is so widely sourced and so heavily relied upon than that of the account of Leon Trotsky, his book “History of the Russian Revolution” a somewhat firsthand account of the events leading up to the formation of the Soviet Union. There is no doubt that Trotsky’s book, among others, has played a pivotal role in shaping our understanding of the events of The Revolution; but have his personal predilections altered how he portrayed such paramount

Firstly, background to the rise of the Soviet Union is examined. Keenan states that the Communists rose to power on ideas which denounced capitalism and