Global Financial Crises and the Future of Securitization

The financial collapse of 2008 devastated many families and caused many people to lose their jobs and homes. It became the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The financial collapse began in 2007 when sky-high home prices in the United States finally turned decisively downward, spread quickly, first to the entire U.S. financial sector and then to financial markets overseas (Encyclopedia Britannica 1). The Securitization Food Chain is what sent the mortgage business into a downward spiral causing thousands to foreclose on their home and many even needing to file bankruptcy. When giving out high mortgage loans to middle or lower class families they are being set up to have future financial issues when their payment rate increases. The Securitization Food Chain had a major influence on the Financial Crisis.

The financial crisis of 2007-2009 resulted from a variety of external factors and market incentives, in combination with the housing price bubble in the United States. When high levels of bank and consumer leverage appeared, rising consumption caused increasingly risky lending, shown in the laxity in the standard of securities ' screening and riskier mortgages. As a consequence, the high default rate of these risky subprime mortgages incurred the burst of the housing bubble and increased defaults. Finally, liquidity rapidly shrank in the United States, giving rise to the financial crisis which later spread worldwide (Thakor, 2015). However, in the beginning of the era in which this chain of events took place, deregulation was widely practiced, as the regulations and restrictions of the economic and business markets were regarded as barriers to further development (Orhangazi, 2014). Expanded deregulation primarily influenced the factors leading to the crisis. The aim of this paper is to discuss whether or not deregulation was the main underlying reason for the 2007/08 financial crisis. I will argue that deregulation was the underlying cause due to the fact that the most important origins of the crisis — the explosion of financial innovation, leverage, securitisation, shadow banking and human greed — were based on deregulation. My argument is presented in three stages. The first section examines deregulation policies which resulted in the expansion of financial innovation and

This paper is about how did “Shadow Banking” precipitate the financial Crises. Then discusses the impacts of the crisis on the major financial institutions.

In 2008, one of the worst financial crises since the Great Depression occurred. The severity of this collapse cannot be understated as demonstrated by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the fourth largest investment bank in the US, and with many other financial institutions such as Merrill Lynch and the Royal Bank of Scotland having to be bailed out. In addition, the Global Banking System was within a whisker of collapsing and if it where not for the trillions of dollars invested in the system by national banks then this banking collapse would have lead to economic catastrophe. Therefore, in order to avoid such a calamity from occurring again, it is important to ask the question why did this financial recession occur and what factors contributed towards this downfall? Although there are many reasons as to why this recession occurred it could be argued that securitized lending and shadow banking played the largest role in this economic crisis. It is therefore important to understand what securitized lending and shadow banking means. Securitized lending is the process by which a financial institution such as a bank pools illiquid assets, such as residential and commercial mortgages and auto loans (by which the bank receives from the public through house mortgages and loans), and loans these newly formed short-term bonds to third party investors in exchange for cash or collateral. Since its creation in the 18th century, securitized lending was increasingly popular and very much

“There are many factors that led to the build up of the crisis. At the top of the list is excess liquidity, resulting in too much credit and weak underwriting standards. The vulnerability of the banking

Asset backed - securities, which is the name for securitization of mortgages, is where sub-prime mortgages and securitization had a major role in the 2008 financial crisis. After the year 2000 banks became a lot less strict on who they would grant loans to mainly because they wanted to make more money. Banks standards decrease a lot so if someone wanted to apply for a loan and buy a house they would not even have to document their incomes one hundred percent, the client could just state it without full verification. Subprime loans, where banks mortgage loans to people with good or bad credit, is exactly what happened between the years 2000-2006. When the big private corporate companies are mentioned, those are the banks that essentially contributed to causing the crisis. Once the recession finally struck in 2007 those loans as subprime loans that were given out to the citizens with bad credit, they defaulted on those loans eventually leading to the foreclosure of their homes. The banks used securitization during this time to liquidate the mortgages and put all the pressure on the private investor so they would not have to take the hit once the homeowner defaulted. Because banks kept relaxing on the loans, mortgages became in demand so citizens kept applying for loans but they did not realize they all that these corporate banks were

The definitive effects of the securitization of subprime mortgages on the financial crisis accentuated the prominent failure of institutions to follow proper risk management and investment guidelines. Financial institutions, failed to aligned company goals with risk management practices and instead fueled greed by issuing monetary incentives based on the quantity of subprime loans issued or securities sold, rather than concentrate on the quality. Investment banks such as Lehman Brother, Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch all participated in risky investment practices, which compounded the institutions risk and involvement in the securities. In 2006 Merrill Lynch doubled their endeavors in mortgaged backed securities and by the

Since the onset of the financial crisis 2008, the sovereign debt crisis in western economies and the new financial regulation with Basel III coming up, the financial industry faces the challenge of reinventing itself. The ring-fence for Commercial and Investment Banking, and new economic and regulatory capital requirements will determine the kinds of products banks will be able to distribute. It will have a huge impact in the Investment Banking business, which will suffer tough regulation and supervisory procedures. At the same time, credit risk models will be reviewed because they have failed to predict the crisis of 2008. The current financial and economic crisis doesn’t have any precedent in the past.

We all know from our course that leverage and liquidity risks of financial institutions are vulnerable to the crisis. The financial crisis that emerged in 2007 had many and varied causes, but one of its most

Demand became so aggressive that too many securitizers and lenders believed they were able to create and sell mortgage backed securities so quickly that they never put their shareholders’ capital at risk and hence did not have the incentive to evaluate the credit quality of what they were selling. Pressures on lenders to supply more “paper” collapsed subprime underwriting standards from 2005 forward. Uncritical acceptance of credit ratings by purchasers of these toxic assets has led to huge losses. It was the failure to properly price such risky assets that precipitated the crisis. In recent decades, a vast risk management and pricing system has evolved, combining the best insights of mathematicians and finance experts supported by major advances in computer and communications technology. A Nobel Prize was awarded for the discovery of the pricing model that underpins much of the advance in derivates markets. This modern risk management paradigm held sway for decades. The whole intellectual edifice, however, collapsed in the summer of last year because the data inputted into the risk management models generally covered only the past two decades, a period of euphoria. Had instead the models been fitted more appropriately to historic periods of

The recent financial crisis has a huge impact on systemic Important Financial Institutions; it’s distressing effect can be felt in almost every business area and process of a bank. A fairly large literature investigates the impact of financial crisis on large, complex and interconnected banks. The great recession did affect banks in different ways, depending on the funding capability of each bank. Kapan and Minoiu (2013) find that banks that were ex ante more dependent on market funding and had lower structural liquidity reduced supply of credit more than other banks during crisis. The ability of banks to generate interest income during the financial crisis was hampered because there was a vast reduction in bank lending to individuals and

In early 2008, policy-makers in the United States needed to deal with the frightening after-effects of what had appeared to be a glorious housing boom. The most immediate problem was a wave of foreclosures, which a Senate report predicted could reach 2 million by the end of 2009. Lawmakers sought to relieve the resulting pain and to preserve the longstanding dream of raising the US homeownership rate. Amidst a sea of lawsuits and recrimination, they needed to figure out where the US system for financing home purchases had gone wrong and how it could be fixed. To do this, lawmakers needed to understand what had happened, particularly because housing had until then seemed

In the first part of our report, we investigate if a 35 basis points yield spread represents mispricing of two bonds, both with the same maturity but one with a coupon rate of 10.625% and the other 4.25%. Our investigation also determines if the yield spread represents an arbitrage opportunity. In our investigation, we calculate the theoretical yield spread between the two bonds and compare the figure with the observed yield spread. It is cited in the case that the observed yield spread could be due to different liquidity premium for each bond or simply due to different durations. Through our calculations, we discover

This chapter is about the background of 2007-2008 financial crisis. The 2007-2008 financial crisis has a huge impact on US banking system and how the banks operate and how they are regulated after the financial turmoil. This financial crisis started with difficulty of rolling over asset backed commercial papers in the summer of 2007 due to uncertainty on the liquidity of mortgage backed securities and questions about the soundness of banks and non-bank financial institutes when interest rate continued to go up at a faster pace since 2004. In March 2008 the second wave of liquidity loss occurred after US government decided to bailout Bear Stearns and some commercial banks, then other financial institutions took it as a warning of financial difficulty of their peers. In the meantime banks started hoarding cash and reserve instead of lending out to fellow banks and corporations. The third wave of credit crunch which eventually brought down US financial system and spread over the globe was Lehman Brother’s bankruptcy in August 2008. Many major commercial banks in US held structured products and commercial papers of Lehman Brother, as a result, they suffered a great loss as Lehman Brother went into insolvency. This panic of bank insolvency caused loss of liquidity in both commercial paper market and inter-bank market. Still banks were reluctant to turn to US government or Federal Reserve as this kind of action might indicate delicacy of

Typically, financial markets in developed countries are liquid; however, in the US during the Global Financial Crisis [GFC], many homeowners were unable to sell their houses due to declining prices and falling demand, so the housing market became illiquid (Currie, 2011). The GFC demonstrated how volatile liquidity can be and that “liquidity disruption could be system-wide,” seen by its global effect (Bessis, 2015). During the GFC, there was also a systemic bank crisis. At a bank’s perspective, liquidity is the