Gulf Refinery Fire

The flame was at least three stories tall and you saw the fire department on standby with the hoses ready. I was sitting 20 yards away and I could feel my eyebrows wicking together from the heat. At that moment I decided to not rush my project too fast because I still had 4 years to finish.

     The fire spread from the O’Learys’ barn to the yards nearby. Soon it was spreading throughout the neighborhood. William Lee, a neighbor a block away, saw the fire and ran to Bruno Goll’s drugstore to turn in the fire alarm. Bruno Goll refused to turn in the alarm because he said the fire truck had already gone past. So instead of arguing, Lee went home to his family. At the courthouse the lookout on duty saw smoke, but thought nothing of it, thinking it was just Saturday's fire and there was no reason to be alarmed. Then he looked up and noticed it was a different fire and had his assistant strike the Box 342 for the fire department. Soon fire trucks were at the scene and attempted to put out the fire. The fire department’s Chief Marshal, Robert A. Williams got the engines to circle the fire to contain it. They got as close to the fire as they could until their arm hair was being burned and their

This tragic fire demonstrated how the fire inspections and precautions were noticeably lacking safety for these workers even though “a little more than five months before the tragedy Firemen Edward F. O’Conner made a routine inspection and said the Asch Building was ‘good’ and the building was ‘fireproof’”(28). The fire finally died down with over one hundred dead bodies piled along the streets. Sunday morning “thousands of people began to form into a slowly moving parade around the city blocks”(89). The people were walking in honor of these workers and would go around trying to identify the bodies and confiscate any items the bodies my have possessed for reminiscences. On the other hand, the departments felt immediate quilt for not stepping in to fix the Asch building before, because the departments knew of the horrible safety and health precautions the Asch building had but nobody emphasized the problems. “But who was to blame?” (113). Chief Croker was quick to blame

Depending on the source, and the perspective of the author, there are two main theories or justifications for the fire. One is that the fire was caused and intentionally fueled by arsonists inside the compound. The other theory is that the fire was caused as a result of the FBI throwing tear gas into the partially destroyed building where residents were firing and receiving active gunfire. The areas where tear gas, a flammable component, was introduced were very heat sensitive because of the constant gun fire that was occurring. The cause of the fire is important because if the residents started and fueled the fire then they were responsible for the fire, but if the fire was caused by the FBI then the eighty deaths are in the hands of the

Smoke and flames were spewing out of gaping holes bored by American Airlines’ Boeing 767 that crashed between the 93 and 99 floors on the North face of the 110- story building. Each of the North Tower floors were roughly an acre. The top 20 floors engulfed in flames, he was staring at a 20- acre fire raging 90 stories above. He thought in his head that, This is the most unbelievable sight I’ve ever seen. Meldrum parked the fire truck on the West Street in front of the

On the afternoon of March 25, 1911, a fire broke out in the 10-floor Asch Building, a block east of Manhattan's Washington Square. This is where 500 mostly young immigrant girls were producing shirts for the Triangle Shirtwaist Company. Within minutes, it spread to consume the building's upper three stories. Firemen at the scene were unable to rescue those trapped inside: their ladders weren't tall enough. Exits were locked, and the narrow fire escapes were inadequate. Panicked, many jumped from the windows to their deaths. People on the street watched in horror. The flames were under control in less than a half hour, but 146 people perished, 123 of them women. It was the worst disaster in the city's history.

On October 15, 1910 the factory has a mandatory fire inspection and they pass. A month later, a fire in Newark kills twenty-five workers. This stimulates fire prevention efforts in buildings but again, this warning is ignored. January 15, 1911 is the last time prior to the fire that garbage is taken from the factory. On March 16, another report warning of improper safety standards in New York buildings is published. However, like previous warnings, it is again ignored. Nine days later, at 4:45 PM, just before workers would be released, a fire breaks out on the eighth floor. This fire will take the lives of a 146 unfortunate victims. Most of these victims are those of young woman. Six minutes later, the New York Fire Department (NYFD) arrives on site. By this time, the fire is spreading up to the ninth and tenth floors, which also belong to the Triangle Shirtwaist Company. Those on the eighth floor quickly head down and those on the tenth floor flee to the roof. However, most workers who were on the ninth floor are stranded, unable to move up or down. By 4:47 PM, the last of the bodies from the ninth floor land on the sidewalk, falling from the ninth floor ledge. It is not until 5:05 PM, that the fire is finally taken under control and ten minutes later is described as “all over.” (Stein. Triangle Fire) NYFD fighters head to all the top floors of the building finding many severely burned bodies. Mobs of

One man saw the fire and tried to get someone to use the fire box to get the fire department to send a fire truck. Sadly he had no such luck in notifying them. Fire boxes were boxes located on the street corner for people to use to alert the closest fire department, because telephones were not commonly available at that time. The other man just insisted that a fire truck had probably already been called and was on its way. The fire was so destructive because there were many mistakes and dangerous

At 03:17 am, Engine 2 arrives on location and reports that he has heavy fire showing from the first and second floors, and requests a full first alarm assignment. One minute later he reported that he had fire all the way to the roof in a 6-story building, 60’ x one city block. He then requested a full second alarm assignment and notified the dispatch center to prepare for the third alarm. Around 3:30 am, before most 2nd alarm companies arrived on the fireground. the first of many collapses occurred. A large section of wall collapsed from the upper story on the York Street side and crashed on to the street. By 4:01 am, this fire would grow to a five-alarm response. With the arrival of Engine 2 and other arriving companies, command was established, and the fire scene was divided into four geographic divisions (A, B, C, D) to manage this defensive fire. Command was passed from Engine 2 to the Battalion Commander, then to the Division commander and lastly to the Deputy Commissioner. As the fire intensified, the command structure grew to include an operations section, logistics, safety and an exposure group lead by a Battalion Chief. For over two hours the approximately 45 apparatus and over 150 firefighters and paramedics fought to contain the fire to the original complex and protect the surrounding neighborhood. The weather that night brought 17 mph winds, with gusts over 30 mph. These winds, combined with the heavy fire load

For example, workers of any age were permitted, as long as they worked (Staff, par. 2). Before leaving the building, workers had to pass through the only backdoor, which was down a narrow passageway, which was supposed to prevent robberies (Staff, par. 2). There were also many safety hazards that the owners slyly kept away from the eyes of the City Council members. There were only two slim fire escapes while there should have been three wide ones, and there were only a couple buckets of water given to throw at the event of a fire(Leap for Life, Leap of Death, par. 6). At the time of the fire, the fire department realized that there was a lot more that the owners could have done to prevent this accident. As an after effect of the fire, many rules were put into place in New York to prevent fires from happening in similar circumstances. A major law that was put into place is the Occupational Safety and Health act or OSHA (Korasick, par. 1). This law states that employees working in factories should not be exposed to anything harmful, should not have terrible working conditions, and that workplaces of factory employees need to be sanitary (Epa, 1). If the fire had not occurred, factories would still, under many circumstances, be

The crew was not prepared for the fire when it suddenly arrived. A wave of fire, heat, and smoke over took them by surprise, Eight of the crew deployed their shelters on the road and the two civilians took shelter with one of the crew members. The squad boss was high above the road in the rock scree watching the fire. He ran down towards the road but couldn’t get there before the fire arrived, He turned around and ran back up the slope were the other four crew members and the crew boss was.

At 2215 hrs, on November 28, 1942, Fire Alarm Headquarters from Box 1514, situated at Stuart and Carver streets, received an alarm. When the responding apparatus arrived they found a small car fire at the corner of Stuart Street and Broadway. After the fire was extinguished the firefighters were about to return to quarters when their attention was called to smoke emanating from the Cocoanut Grove Nightclub a few doors away. Upon their arrival at the entrance of the Broadway lounge on Broadway they encountered numerous people leaving the premises admidst the cries of “fire”. The chief in charge immediately ordered that a third alarm be sounded from Alarm Box 1521 which the alarm was received by fire alarm headquarters at 2223 hrs. A

That evening, nearly 600 workers were working in the 10 floors of the Asch Building. Near closing time on March 25th, 1911, the fire broke out on the top floors. Oil that was spread all over the floors and tables of the sweatshop helped to increase the volume of the fire rapidly. The chaos that ensued created a crowded, dangerous pandemonium. One of the main disregarded safety features that lead to nearly 50 deaths was the locked stairwell doors. The doors had been locked by Blanck and Harris as a “safety procedure” to keep employees from stealing. During the fire, workers fled to the stairs, only to find they were trapped inside. In addition, out of the four elevators located in the building, only one was operational, and that elevator broke down after just four trips. In a desperate attempt to flee, girls waiting for the elevator plunged down the shaft to their deaths. The old and rusted fire escape on the eastern side of the building collapsed after it was overcrowded. Other girls who did not make it to the stairwells or elevators began jumping to the sidewalk. As firefighters arrived to fight the fire, bodies landed on their firehoses, making it difficult to extinguish the flames. Firefighters also brought ladders that only reached up to the 7th floor. The water pressure of the firehoses was not powerful enough to reach the burning levels of the building, and the nets brought to catch jumping women ended up ripped and torn after only a few uses, leaving girls with nothing to catch them apart from the concrete sidewalk. Those in the floors above the fire, including both Blanck and Harris, escaped the inferno to adjoining buildings from the rooftops. Remarkably, after just 18 minutes, the crisis was over. 49 workers had burned to death or were suffocated by the smoke, 36 were dead in the elevator shaft, 59 died from jumping to the concrete sidewalks. 2 later

For years if not decades, firefighters have responded to a reported structure fire that turned out to be a fully involved single room. This fire scenario requires a core set of fire tactics and skills to control and extinguished the fire, but is it this simple? Perhaps twenty years it may have been, but new dangers are lurking in every scenario and may have detrimental outcomes for unsuspecting and unaware firefighters and victims. The National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) agency along with the Underwriters Laboratory (UL) have been conducting research to understand fire behavior and fire dynamics. This research is providing firefighters with new information about how and why

The greatest lesson learned from this tragedy was the need for planned fire drills and accessible fire escapes. If the employers would have made it mandatory that all employees become familiar with the buildings layout, practice fire drills and know their closest fire escape, it would have aided the employees in the hour of despair. The biggest cause for death in this fire was a result of poor pre-fire planning. The building may be fire proof, but the people and contents inside are not.