The history of Commonwealth bank of Australia goes back to 1911when the government laid the foundation of one of country’s major financial institutions. By 1970, the bank has branches all over the country, first bank to introduce Bankcard (1974) and continued upgrading itself through the use of latest computerized electronic systems. Today, the bank has 1010 branches all over the country with 3200 ATMs, over 3800 agencies and the online services provided by bank reaches over 2.5 million customers. (Anon., n.d.) The bank has four business divisions: (Anon., n.d.) • Retail banking services • Premium business services • Wealth management • International financial services The Commonwealth bank of Australia has received number of recognitions …show more content…
The main culprit in this case is Don Nguyen who was working as financial advisor at CFP. Jeff Morris, branch financial planner at CFP, along with other bank employees in 2010 sent an anonymous fax to ASIC about the fraud taking place and how that is being covered up by CBA. According to the report of inquiry by Senate, it is reported that Commonwealth Financial Planning Limited financial advisors’ were using unethical means to fulfil their own interests, they were neglecting their duties and most of the acts were under professional standards. Following are the main findings of the committee: (News, 2014) • The advisors of the company were doing illegal acts including the forging of customer signature, breach of their professional duties and unethical behaviour. • Australian securities and investment commission (ASIC) and Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) were working together, supporting each other’s corruption. They did not take in account any fraudulent activity reports taking place at CBA. Due to this, financial advisors who were not even eligible to work at higher positions in the bank, continued working and one of them got promoted as well after he (Don Nguyen) was suspended. The bank has given 52 million dollars to more than 1000 customers as compensation so far. But according to Jeffery Morris, the whistle blower, this
The organizational structure of Phar-Mor was ineffective and lacked many control activities including: segregation of duties, authorization, documentary and IT controls. As a result, Phar-Mor’s president had a stronghold on certain upper level management and executives which gave him the opportunity to control the fraud and hide it from other members of the organization and supposedly Phar-Mor’s auditors, Coopers and Lybrand LLP.
Two of the three partners of the firm that performed the audit for the district had 55% ownership in the company that sold the district its financial management software “finance manager”. The partners’ role as vendors violated the general standard of independence under generally accepted government auditing standards. Also the auditors received a commission from the sale of another software called “student manager” and receiving commissions is prohibited by the AICPA. Also there were fundamental problems with their audit planning and efforts to test financial records. The CPA firm work that was so flawed and so far below professional standards that it failed to identify the millions that were stolen.
Over the past five years Wells Fargo employees opened 2 million phony accounts for customers without their knowledge. The phony accounts helped employees reach sales goals while leaving customers with monthly charges from the false accounts. Since September when the fraud was discovered Wells Fargo has paid fines, stopped employee incentive initiatives and CEO John Stumpf forfeited his performance pay (Merle). The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) created after the financial crisis issued Wells Fargo the largest fine since its creation in 2011. (Talton). The CFPB hit Wells Fargo with a $185 million fine, the largest in their history and is being scrutinized for being an amount that is easily payable by Wells Fargo and will not be
Obviously, linking the content of the 2014 Global fraud study with Birkenfeld evidence against his former employer was accurate due to the fact that UBS, as a financial institution, effectively displayed all fraud patterns discussed above. Moreover, the whistleblower was someone who was very aware of the bank’s misconduct and decided to redeem himself by revealing the scheme. Unfortunately, Birkenfeld lack of integrity ended up costing him more than the masterminds behind the secrecy of UBS banks.
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio rendered an Order for Final Judgment against John R. Bullar and a Consent Order against his company, Executive Management Advisors L.L.C., requiring that restitution be paid by Bullar and Executive Management Advisors, L.L.C. in excess of $6.2 million. Additionally, Bullar and Executive Management Advisors L.L.C. are required to pay civil monetary penalties in excess of $24.8 million for fraud, misappropriation, embezzlement, and operation of a Ponzi scheme. They were illegally posing as Commodity Trading Advisors (CTAs) and Commodity Pool Operators (CPOs) but had not registered with the CFTC. Permanent trading and registration bans were also imposed prohibiting them from committing
On Thursday, September 8, 2016, federal regulators found that over two million fake accounts were created in a scam from Wells Fargo (Dugan). According to the New York Post, it has just been discovered that the Wells Fargo former senior executive vice president, Carrie Tolstedt, is linked to the scamming of Wells Fargo customers (Report). The many other employees were fired since the scam was discovered in 2011, however, according to the New York Post, Tolstedt was praised by Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf, allowed to leave, and not lose any of her compensation (Report). This incident was highly unethical and resulted in customers and employees losing their trust in Wells Fargo.
As the scandal made national headlines, the Department of Justice opened an investigation which resulted in Wells Fargo former CEO John Stumpf testifying before the U.S. House of Financial Services Committee, where he avoided questions as to how the bank would help customers it harmed and whether it would recover income from executives. According to Rucker, Stumpf took full responsibility for “all unethical” practices for the Senate Financial Committee (2016). After testifying before the committee, Stumpf submitted his resignation after 37 years with the company due to his reputation being tarnished. Wells Fargo continues to suffer from the fake account scandal as several states and municipalities continue to end business relationship with
Australia is a member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Working Group on Bribery and a party to the key international conventions concerned with combating foreign bribery.
The FDIC ordered Carrasco to repay $73 million. The bank wrote off $66 million and even offered a $10,000 reward for information leading to his arrest. But to this day, he remains a fugitive. (Marquet, 2010)
Discuss the impact to the company or brand as a result of the fraudulent activity.
o MCI auditors, failed to report the anomalies found during their audits, it was their intrinsic responsibility to advise the audit committee and shareholders which they never did, allowing
The internal control practice of separation of duties failed to prevent the fraudulent reporting since various players were committing the scam. The CEO plus the CFO of the Automation Company were both aware of the controller's false revenues. The company had separation of duties meaning that one person was not doing all the financial reporting for the entire finance department. Nevertheless, more than one individual was checking the financial revenue statements reported to the stakeholders. However, no one did anything to stop the fraudulent information from being disclosed. Regardless of the distasteful outcome business ethics was not enforced nor was the consideration of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
Peter H. was also occupying a position of authority and trust in the eyes of his clients. He used this position to personally benefit from it- a clear breach of Accounting Professional & Ethical Standards.
The Australian Security and Investments Commission (ASIC), is an independent government body that acts as Australia’s corporate regulator. The organisation is responsible for regulating Australian companies, financial markets, financial services organisations, and professionals working in investment, superannuation, insurance, deposit taking, and credit . ASIC administers a number of laws, most notably the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act and the Corporations Act , from which it derives the majority of its powers. According to the ASIC Act the organisation should strive to improve the performance of the financial system, promote the confident participation of investors and consumers within that system, and administers the laws that authorise its functions and powers effectively and with the least possible procedural requirements . However ASIC achieves only partial success in fulfilling its organisational goals, and thus only fulfils its role in society to a limited extent. For example, ASIC was slow and unproductive in handling allegations of fraud and incompetence amongst financial planning advisers working for the Commonwealth (CBA). Although ASIC was able to identify negligent parties, the processes of ASIC’s investigation were long-drawn-out and enforcement action did not adequately account for the scope of misconduct suggested by their investigation. Situations such as this indicate ASIC’s inability to work effectively as a corporate regulator.
Fraudulent index arose from both internal and external panel banks . To be exact, the submitted rate to the BBA was adjusted by the incitement of traders inside a panel bank to the Libor submitter but represented as the requests from other traders in different banks . These rigging orders were generated via email, online chatroom or in person .