For the reasons articulated in Parts IV(A), supra, this Court should dismiss or stay this matter because Defendants are entitled to arbitration. Assuming, arguendo, that this Court is the proper forum to resolve this dispute—it is not—Defendants are nevertheless entitled to a partial dismissal of Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim. Indeed, the only claim for which the allegations in the complaint—as supplemented by the actual document referenced therein—could possibly sustain is a claim that Billion breached its obligations owed to XALT, MI under the supply agreement. The complaint, however, alleges no facts sufficient to state a claim that HKG breached a contract to any party, or that any party other than XALT, MI, was aggrieved by a breach …show more content…
Upon identifying the agreement between the parties, we move to interpret the terms of that agreement. Only after we interpret the terms of the agreement will we apply the agreement.” Kaye v. Wilson-Gaskins, 277 Md. App. 660, 676 (2016). “[A] complaint alleging a breach of contract ‘must of necessity allege with certainty and definiteness facts showing a contractual obligation owed by the defendant to the plaintiff and a breach of that obligation by defendant.’” RRC Northeast, LLC v. BAA Md., Inc., 413 Md. 638, 655 (2010) (quoting Continental Masonry Co., Inc. v. Verdel Constr. Co., Inc., 279 Md. 476, 480, 369 A.2d 566, 569 (1977)). Moreover, in order to make a prima facie showing that there was indeed “a contractual obligation owed by the defendant to the plaintiff,” id., the Plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show some objective manifestation of mutual assent to be bound by an agreement. Cochran v. Norkunas, 398 Md. 1, 14 (2007) (“Manifestation of mutual assent includes two issues: (1) intent to be bound, and (2) definiteness of …show more content…
Indeed, the Plaintiffs have declared by fiat that they are all entitled for relief by employing the guise that they are conflating their identities as a mere matter of convenience. (Complaint 1, fn 1.) Irrespective of whether these pleading deficiencies are disingenuous attempt to exaggerate the scope of a putative contract, or are merely attributable to sloppily draftsmanship, Defendants are entitled to a dismissal of the Plaintiffs’ claims brought by Townsend and XALT As articulated in Part III (B), supra, this Court is justified in looking to the authentic documents that are integral to the Plaintiffs’ complaint when considering Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Leichling, 842 F.3d at 851. To be sure, the Plaintiffs have pleaded sufficient facts to make a prima facie showing that a contract exists with regard to the supply agreement. An objective reading of the supply agreement, however, imposes no obligation owed by HKG, nor does it afford any right to Townsend or XALT, LLC. Rather, the supply agreement that is the subject of this dispute provides that it exists: between XALT ENERGY MI, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, with offices at 2700 S. Saginaw Rd., Midland, Mi 48640 (“Seller”) AND Billion Energy Holding Limited, a Hong Kong limited liability company, with offices at Rm 1407-8, 14/F, Great Eagle Center, 23
Mr. Slim Jim verbally submitted an offer to Mr. Potbelly who proceeded to accept Mr. Slim Jims’ offer unequivocally (pg. 122). The “Basic Requirements of a Contract” (pg. 107) were completed. In this bilateral contract (pg. 107), “Communication of Acceptance” (pg. 123) was evident as Mr. Potbelly responded “Sure I’ll take it” when Mr. Slim Jim submitted an offer for the pottery and enthusiastically replied “I’ll take it!” when Mr. Slim Jim gave him an offer of cash for his home. As a result of this, Mr. Slim Jim is suing for the “right to obtain specific performance” asking that the agreement be upheld. Also, according to “admissions” (one of the “exceptions to the statutes of frauds” (pg. 175) Mr. Potbelly’s agreement should be upheld.
Case 3: “Henry Gifford, et al. v. United States Green Building Council (USGBC), et al., 10‐7747 (filed October 8, 2010)”.
The plaintiff (Southern Prestige Industries, Inc.) initiated an action against the defendant (Independence Plating Corp.) in a North Carolina state court for a breach of contract. The plaintiff alleged that defects in the defendant’s anodizing process caused the plaintiff’s machine parts to be rejected by Kidde Aerospace. The defendant being a New Jersey corporation and having its only office and all of its personnel situated in the state filed a motion to dismiss citing lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion and the defendant appealed arguing that there were insufficient contacts to satisfy the due process of law requirements
Plaintiff is ignorant of the true names and capacities of Defendants sued as Does 1 through 10, inclusive, and therefore sues these Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff will amend this Complaint to allege their true names and capacities when ascertained.
The Supreme Court has deemed it acceptable to use the death penalty in certain situations. Many states have a problem with this punishment although it was upheld as fair application in some instances by a court that is above theirs. In applying this punishment, there is due process to ensure that no innocent citizen should be wrongfully accused for a crime that they didn’t commit. As in any court case that ends up punishing someone, due process is an important and death penalty is a viable punishment as any other.
In the case of Kennedy V. Louisiana Patrick Kennedy was found guilty in raping and sodomizing his eight-year-old stepdaughter in a Louisiana courtroom. Mr. Kennedy refused to plead guilty and stated the crime was committed by two young boys from the neighborhood. He was convicted sentenced to death 2003. On March 2nd 1988 the victim sustained severe injuries; the injuries required emergency surgery because the rape was so brutal. Louisiana law authorized capital punishment for the rape of a child twelve years and younger. Mr. Patrick Kennedy challenged his sentence under the eighteen amendments as cruel and unusual punishment. The Louisiana Supreme Court declined the challenged that the death penalty was not too harsh for such a wicked crime. In a Supreme Court decision Coker v. Georgia 1977 the United States Supreme Court concluded that capital punishment for rape of an adult women was not applicable if the victim is a child and if it did not result or contemplated in result of a death. The court discussed a number of Supreme Court case related to child vulnerability and the death penalty. In the case of Roper V. Simmons the court ruled that the death penalty could not be applied to a person if the crime was committed when they were under the age of eighteen. In another case, Atkins V. Virginia the death penalty could not be placed on a mentally ill person. The petitioner Kennedy argued that in all these cases they do not establish conformity.
This case was one of the most talked about case since it touched on the eighth and the tenth constitutional amendments at the same time. This was a case that had a long running course of trial and at last a Louisiana convicted Patrick Kennedy as being guilty of raping an eight year old stepdaughter. The rape caused gross damage to the vaginal section, the cervix and the anal parts of the little girl. According to the Louisiana laws, there is a provision for death penalty in the event that a person rapes a child below 12 years of age. This was exactly the sentence that the prosecutor sought in this case and the jury handed down exactly that penalty (Oyez Inc., 2011). However, Kennedy appealed and this is where the greater interest lies.
§ 9913(b)(5), provides that an arbitration award will be vacated if there is a finding that the arbitrator acted with a manifest disregard of the law. In Berger v. Welsh, the appeals court held that the record reflected that the arbitrator did not ignore the language of the release agreements and therefore there was no disregard for the law. In comparison to our case, there is no evidence that the arbitrator was not aware of the information in the contract or that she ignored the specifics relevant to the suit. In McGill Homes, Inc. v. Weaver, the court held that McGill Homes’ claim of manifest disregard of the law (supported by contractor and employee affidavits), was nothing more than unreviewable factual issues. In our case, there was no opportunity to review specifics of a written contract, but the facts of the agreement are clearly stated. Heather’s verbal response regarding the Statute of Frauds indicates that she understood the law and that regardless of the absence of an actual signed contract, she used her judgement and applied the exceptions of the law based on Greg’s
Meredith was born in Kosciusko, Mississippi, on June 25th, 1933. From 1951 to 1960 he served in the American Air Force. After this, Meredith studied at Jackson State College for two years. Following this, he applied to start a course at the University of Mississippi. He was rejected twice. Meredith filed a complaint with the courts that he had been rejected by the university simply because he was black. His complaint was rejected by a district court, but on appeal, the Fifth Judicial Circuit Court supported him and ruled against the district court stating that the University of Mississippi was indeed maintaining a policy of segregation in its admissions policy.
In this case of Superior Dispatch Inc. prevalent claims in its objection that Inscorp neglected to give notification of the one-year contractual constraints procurement, as needed by segment 2695.4, subdivision whenever and that Superior had no genuine learning of the procurement. These charges identifying with notification of the strategy terms concern the nondisclosure of realities, instead of legitimate conclusions.
5-1, p. 32)—is similarly “broad enough to encompass [Plaintiffs’] claim that both execution and acceleration of the consulting agreement itself were procured by fraud.” Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 406. Curiously, Plaintiffs ask this Court to undertake a Prima Paint analysis while declining to refer it to the contractual language at issue. Rather, Plaintiffs petition this Court to entertain the tautological argument that this Court must try the issue of Defendants’ alleged fraudulent conduct to assess whether it “relates to” the supply agreement. The sort of analysis advanced by the Plaintiffs is precisely the analysis that the Congress and subsequent judicial authorities have admonished, and would undermine “the federal policy favoring arbitration, and [resolving] ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself . . . in favor of arbitration.” Aggarao, 675 F.3d at 368 (quoting United States v. Bankers Ins. Co., 245 F.3d 315, 319 (4th Cir. 2001)); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985) (the strong policy favoring arbitration “applies with special force in the field of international
C. G. Blake Co. v. W. R. Smith & Son, Ltd., 147 Va. 960 (Va. 1926) "…If by mutuality of obligation is meant, as some courts have suggested, that there must be an undertaking on one side and a consideration on the other, the necessity for its existence cannot be questioned. But if, as other courts have said, mutuality of obligation means that a contract must be binding on both parties so that an action may be maintained by one against the other…”
The Lowe’s Defendants also assert a cause of action for breach of contract against Groundtec claiming that it breached paragraphs 23 and 26 in the Agreement. See Exhibit A, at ¶¶ 23-28.
The company begins to receive various requests to court on the basis of invented reasons. In this way, the applicant seeks to obtain the documents from the company, which could not be obtained from other sources. The complainant refers to certain documents held by the defendant and asks the court that the defendant presents them. In this case, the information obtained is far more important than the costs which will subsequently arise.
What is at stake in this litigation for the parties in the case and more broadly? (500)