Legal Validity Of The Law Of Recognition Essay

Sanctions are only appealed to in the event that there is a breach. It therefore follows that the opinion of Hart is that various form of law cannot be explained in a single expression as orders backed with threats of sanction. Thus, in contradiction with Austin’s viewpoint, Hart formulated a dual system which contains two types of rules, primary rules (duty-imposing) and secondary rules (power-conferring). Primary rules are generally duty-imposing, which embodies non-optional rules of obligation. It often concerned with standard of behavior as requirement to do or to abstain from performing an act. On the other hand, secondary rules are ancillary to primary rules the former conferring right to introduce, to vary the primary rules and to determine the mode in which their violation could be determined (judicial process). Such secondary rules are rather regulatory or facilitative than coercive in nature. In short, Austin’s catch all theory of seeing law as command back with sanction leave no room for right, privileges given to subject of Sovereignty which does not constitute non optional

PHL 612 Philosophy of Law [Calendar Description]: What is law? What makes something a legal norm? Should

Neil Boyd said in this book that in any lawmaking, a law is a power with a political compromise. He further says the law is a prize that various political actors seek within a terrain of social, political, and economic conflict. It is honest that while describing sources of legal philosophy, three backdrops such as struggle, compromise, and councils must consider (Boyd 2015 p. 50).

ad 1. The first premise cannot be questioned, because its truth seems incontestable. However, this is true only insofar as the first premise is related to the second one. It is assumed that the second premise ("Laws are just") is correct. Indeed, respect of unjust laws must be morally doubtful, which means that the claim for their observance must be based on some other, additional reasons, of which one of the most frequently quoted was that "even the worst legal system is still better than no legal system at all." A statement like that seems to be based on the fear of anarchy which might be produced by disrespect of laws and legally based decisions. This, however, is also relevant for unjust decisions, which contributes

The contrast between Natural Law and Legal Positivism is a necessary starting point for those who wish to understand the relationship between law and morality, and the most varied manners in which it influences society to this day. When it comes to analyzing which theory offers the most well-rounded idea of law, one can argue that Legal Positivism provides the best definition of what law is at its essence. However, because Legal Positivism came to exist as a critique to what was proposed by Natural Law theorists, it is significant that both are explored in depth as means to support such argument.

Therefore, it is plausible to conclude that Hart’s belief that “[l]aw without sanctions is perfectly conceivable” paints a more accurate portrayal of a modern legal system.

This paper will demonstrate how Hart’s account of the relationship between law and morality shows an understanding of how they both work together yet can also work as separate entities. It will take a specific look into the internal point of view to aid the understanding of why

The relationship between law and morality has a substantial degree of interest; but, the controversy between law and morality still remains unclear. This paper articulates that Devlin is correct and the state should be ready to purpose to some definite “harm” in order to justify law’s intervention. Both Devlin and Mill are discovered through the context of harm in their theories of good and bad and what they believe and sharing its strengths and weaknesses of strictly relying on harm as the main and by legitimate justification for state action. Therefore, harm is shown through cases by Labaye and R. v. Butler by discovering through examples by exogenous substances, religion and socioeconomic statuses.

Arguably one of the most influential legal theorists of the 20th century, Ronald Dworkin’s dealings with law’s interpretation and integrity has lead to inevitable contradictions with that of positivist ideology, with his work essentially revitalising a method of thinking that had long been considered dead and buried. Perhaps most notoriously, Dworkin combated the positivist theory of his former teacher and predecessor as Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford University, H.L.A. Hart. When comparing the two, it is apparent that Dworkin and Hart disagree on a plethora of issues, however there exist several

The expectation from our judges that they will always act objectively in making their decisions is correct but only to a certain extent. By using the theories of interpretation and judicial decision-making of both Dworkin and American Legal Realism, it is evident that a balancing act occurs between objective judgments and interpretation and subjective judgments and interpretation. Often, subjective judgments are the most dominant to a large extent. One must look at the ideas of Dworkin in terms of considering that judgments have aspects of both objectivity and subjectivity. One must also look at the ideas of American Legal Realism where subjectivity plays a gigantic role in judgments leaving objectivity with little or no influence

There has been a long drawn out debate on whether CSR should be catered for by law or one that should be left to individuals and organisations’ notion of morality. Law, a coercive order, seeks to bring about a specific mode of human conduct by force, whereas morality which is a persuasive system appeals to the conscience of the individual required. A rule is a one of morality if by common practice of the community, it applies only to the conscience of the addressee for ultimate compliance, but a rule is a one of law if by the common practice of the community it will eventually be enforced by a power external to the addressee, i.e. the state or community. The extent to which law can be used to enforce morals has been the subject of expression in some decided cases. In England, Lord Denning in Shaw v D.P.P. (1962) A.C P.220 advocated the view that the society reserves the right to use criminal law to preserve morality in the same way as the society uses criminal law to preserve anything it considers essential for its survival . Prof Hart in Knuller v. D.P.P. (1973) A.C. P.435, on his part suggested that that it was wrong to enforce morality through the criminal law without first ensuring that failure to do so will endanger the social fabrics . Their divergent views aside, both writers agree that moral values are very important to the society and that there is need for law to uphold some moral position in the society

Book II introduces new philosophical approach to justices, stating that legalities is justices so neutral laws are formed to enforced and developed for the mutual protection of citizens of a state so fabrication of the state to prevent civilians

This article discusses the conceptions of legal normativity, both moral and “strictly legal” conceptions. According to Spaak, regarding the normative force of legal justification, legal positivists can still embrace the moral idea and not be in conflict with their generally held belief in the “strictly legal” concept of law. In Torben Spaak’s opinion, there is a reason to desire legal positivism; he explains this through introducing the concept of jurisprudence. When discussing the nature of law, Spaak states, “that while the moral conception is what is likely favored on a smaller scale, the strictly legal conception is more appealing because it is broader,” (478). Spaak is arguing, his belief that “validity-based explanations come nearer to the truth,”(483) rather than belief-based explanations. He concludes that we are to prefer legal positivism over natural law theory. “That is why in this article I have been concerned with the law itself rather than our views about it.”(483)

Law and morality can be defined by the interpretation of the individual who is referring to it. If the natural law theorists interpret the connection between law and morality a certain way then legal positivists will interpret it another way. So this means that they will never have the exact same view, it could be slightly similar but never the same. Every philosopher, no matter if they are a natural law theorist or a legal positivist theorist they will think what they want to believe because they have a certain vision of what law and morality are. It is all about the interpretation of the words that are presented to you and if you do not understand them correctly it can lead to a misinterpretation of their view. This essay is going to discuss two sides of a debate over the nature of the connection between law and morality from the view of natural law theorists and legal positivists. By discussing the two sides of the debate, it will lead to an argument of why the view of either natural law theorists or legal positivist theorists is right. The last topic that will be discussed is if they are a necessary connection between law and morality.

Frederick Schauer’s paper, Was Austin Right After All? On the Role of Sanctions in a Theory of Law, has two central claims. First, the fact that law is primarily coercive (with the use of sanctions to ensure compliance) has been vastly overlooked in the wake of H.L.A Hart’s critique of John Austin’s work on legal positivism. Second, those who aim to study the philosophical nature of law would be better to examine what makes law truly important and distinctive rather than the necessary and mandatory features of law. In this paper, I will begin by describing Austin’s account of the nature of law. Then, I will explore Hart’s criticisms of Austin’s account that Schauer objects to before delving into Schauer’s argument. To conclude, I will