Matier's Summary Judgement

Woods filed a K.S.A. § 60-1507 motion for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed; res judicata barred his claim, and even if it did not, “Woods failed to overcome the strong presumption that his attorneys sufficiently investigated [the witness’s] proposed trial testimony.” Woods filed a second § 60-1507 motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that “a colorable claim of actual innocence” required the district court to reconsider the merits of his

Funk was tried twice and convicted both times in Federal District Court for conspiracy to violate the prohibition law. In the first appeal to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals the decision of the Federal District Court was reversed due to issues not applicable here. 46 F.2d 417. In both trials the defendant called upon his wife to testify on his behalf and she was excluded both times on grounds of incompetency. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals sustained this ruling after both trials. 66 F.2d 70.

Case background: T.L.O. and another student were caught smoking cigarettes in a high school bathroom. Tobacco use was allowed in this high school in certain smoking areas, but was not allowed in restrooms. They were taken to the principal’s office by a teacher. T.L.O. would not admit to smoking and declared she was a non-smoker. The assistant principal took T.L.O. to his office where he searched her purse. When he found cigarettes and rolling papers, he decided to search the rest of her purse for other items associated with marijuana. He found marijuana and evidence that she was dealing marijuana to fellow students. T.L.O.’s mother was called and took T.L.O. to the police station, where she

Griggs, the defendant, then decided to appeal to the courts, claiming they erred by rejecting his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, determining the child witnesses were competent to testify , admitting hearsay testimony from various witnesses, denying his request for a continuance, and admitting evidence under W.R.E. 404(b). The Supreme Court responded by affirming, holding “(1) the district court did not err by (i) rejecting Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, (ii) determining that the child witnesses were competent to testify, (iii) denying Defendant’s requests for continuances, and (iv) admitting other bad acts evidence under Wyo. R. Evid. 404(b); (2) the district court erred in allowing the admission of some hearsay testimony at trial, but the errors were harmless; and (3) Defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was not

The Federal District court denied this motion to suppress the block of methamphetamine and prosecuted Bond finding him guilty of conspiracy to possess and possession with intent to distribute. Moreover, Bond challenged the judgment made on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on grounds that the court should have granted his motion to suppress the evidence since it was a violation of his right under the Fourth Amendment and because as per the petitioner, Bond, the officer had manipulated the bag in a way that other passengers would not have. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected his argument and affirmed the lower court’s

In the case State v. Ellis, Central State University RA discovered marijuana in the defendant’s dorm room while they were conducting an authorized, unannounced safety inspection. Campus police officers were then 19 notified and went to the room.While the campus police did not participate in the search, they were present in the room at the resident assistants’ invitation. The Ellis court concluded that the seizure of the marijuana was unconstitutional. It found that while the resident assistants’ search was authorized under the university’s policies and procedures, the later police entry into the room was unlawful because it was made without a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances. This case would be beneficial to Deary Jones because it

Even If This Court Was To Find That Ms. Brie’s Authority to Consent Was Ambiguous, This Court Must Still Find that the District Court Properly Denied the Defendant-Appellant’s Motion.

The Defendant, George Tiba (“Defendant Tiba”) and L.A. were both at a local bar, Walrus, on the night of Feb. 16, 2013. Walrus is a commonly known as a college bar, often filled with students from the University of Colorado. Defendant Tiba offered to purchase beverages for L.A. and her friend, who both accepted. Afterwards, Defendant Tiba continued to make inappropriate contact and statements to L.A. during their time at the bar. After a period of time, Defendant Tiba drove L.A. back to her apartment where the offenses occurred early in the morning on Feb. 17, 2013. L.A. went to the hospital later in the day on Feb. 17, where a SANE examination was conducted by a SANE certified nurse. From the evidence collected, the District Attorney commenced

Petitioner disingenuously attempts to circumvent this Hearing Officer’s previous orders dismissing Beaumont II and Beaumont III by re-phrasing the same issues; that the District did not comply with Orders 3-7 of the Decision and Order in Beaumont I. It has already been established that the implementation of a prior Hearing Officer’s order in a prior case is not subject to a new due process complaint. The allegations regarding appropriate goals and objectives in Paragraph 31-A are nothing more than a recitation of Order 3-7 loosely veiled as new issues but nevertheless inextricably entwined with the Decision and Order in Beaumont I.

The marijuana and Alicia Keys’ statement should be suppressed because they are tainted evidence obtained from the unlawful search of Defendant’s home. Pursuant to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, any evidence, or statement derivative of any law enforcement’s unconstitutional activity must be suppressed in accordance to the exclusionary rule. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The officers’ argument that the taint was purged fails because no exception to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is applicable here. The evidence was not obtained through an independent source. The evidence was only acquired as a result of the unlawful search of the Defendant’s home. Also, inevitable discovery does not apply here because absent the illegal search of the Defendant’s home, the officers would have never visited Alicia Keys’ home in relation to the Defendant. Similarly, Alicia Keys’ statement and the marijuana seized

DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE DEFENDANTS CONDUCT DID NOT RESULT IN AN OBJECTIVELY SERIOUS INJURY TO THE PLAINTIFF NOR DID THE DEFENDANTS ACT WITH DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE OR RECKLESS DISREGARD TOWARD THE PLAINTIFF’S RIGHTS, HEALTH, OR SAFETY.

Ninth Circuit Court holds that an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in their private office, because it is locked and not shared with others. This reasonable expectation of privacy extends to the contents of their office, including the employee’s company computer, located therein. As a result, the court held that the fourth amendment protects both the office and computer from warrantless searches by the government unless it obtains valid consent from either the defendant or one with common authority over the items searched, or proceeds on the authorization of one with apparent authority to give such valid consent. In this case, the Ninth Circuit holds that the government obtained valid consent from one with common authority over the items searched, when it received such consent from the employee’s employer. The employer had common authority over the employee’s office computer because it had a policy of, and regularly did, monitor employees’ computer usage of company machines, a policy of which its employees were made aware. The court accordingly denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence found by the government during its warrantless search of defendant’s office computer. As a result, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant was convicted of the receipt of obscene material based, in part, on evidence obtained during this search. The evidence obtained during this search, and by the company earlier, showed that defendant had viewed and had possession of

The court reasoned that this testimony was crucial to the accused’ defense in that it “caused the appellant to engage in illegal conduct by methods of persuasion.” Ortiz at

Similar concerns that arose during the second reading are brought up once more in the committee meeting. Andrew Swan again advocates that the discretion given could be problematic, as well as including marijuana on the prohibited list could eventually be problematic, as people with medical conditions requiring medical marijuana may be unable to access the courts. By giving the security officers the power to remove people from the courthouse it could be due to a lack of knowledge or nerves brought on by the courts themselves, “I wouldn't want someone's bad day in court to wind up preventing them from having the usual broad access

Issue: i.) The sole issue in this appeal from a conviction for cultivating marijuana is the legality under the Vermont Constitution of a warrantless search of defendant’s posted land. The search violated Chapter I, Article 11, of