Non-Consensual Property Rights
Some form of classification is necessary to aid attempts to bring order to a confusing and confused area of law. If the events from which non-consensual property rights arise can be classified, then the law’s response is more likely to be consistent and coherent. Yet there are problems. The very nature of the facts that are brought before courts in the sorts of cases that comprise this area of law demand fairness, and legal policy considerations lurk behind every rationalisation. This makes it more difficult to achieve coherence, but our task is less demanding than achieving coherence in the law: we only need to look at the sets of facts that give rise to property
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He and one of the beneficiaries told the other beneficiaries that the best way to realize the value of the shares would be to make a takeover bid. In the end, Mr Boardman made such a bid, successfully, in his personal capacity. However, this became an event giving rise to non-consensual property rights, a wrong, because he only gained the opportunity to do this and the information necessary while purportedly (or actually) acting in the capacity of adviser to the trustees. Mr Boardman did not act dishonestly in the sense that he deliberately set out to deceive the beneficiaries. After his actions they effectively ‘doubled their money’. Viscount Dilhorne, who dissented, was prepared to hold that the authority of Regal v Gulliver (a case with similar facts which he distinguished on the ground that there the fiduciary held assets originally belonging to the trust which wasn’t the case in Boardman) required ‘wrongdoing’ which was absent in the case before him because the trust had not suffered a loss. The reasoning of the majority did indeed beget a strict rule; that an agent is liable to account for profits he makes out of trust property if there is a possibility (my italics) of conflict between his interest and his duty to the principal (Lord Cohen).
AG for Hong Kong v Reid
This function of the law, ensuring reasonable predictability in daily life, is challenged within this case. This is shown within the case, from the perspective of being the owners of
The law relating spousal compellability. In 1940 Wigmore observed spousal compellability has a long history wrapped ‘in tantalizing obscurity’. Whereas Lord Wilberforce also states that to allowed a spouse to give evidence would rise to discord and perjury of the law which would be to ordinary people repugnant . These are two distinct opinions highlighting the fact that spousal compellability is a highly debatable area of law. Under section 80 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 spouses are non-compellable unless the offence is one which is specified. However this spousal compellability has sparked intense criticisms and renders the justification questionable. By utilising relevant source, academic opinions and case authority, I will critically evaluate and consider all arguments concerning spousal compellability and include whether or not I think it is justifiable.
The law relating to spousal compellability. In 1940 Wigmore observed spousal compellability has a long history wrapped ‘in tantalizing obscurity’. Whereas Lord Wilberforce also states that to allowed a spouse to give evidence would rise to discord and perjury of the law which would be to ordinary people repugnant . These are two distinct opinions highlighting the fact that spousal compellability is a highly debatable area of law. Under section 80 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 spouses are non-compellable unless the offence is one which is specified. However this spousal compellability has sparked intense criticisms and renders the justification questionable. By utilising relevant source, academic opinions and case authority,
[Analysis/Application] Like the cited cases above, our case of Vivian v. Bernie lacks mutuality of consideration. The reason being, Bernie never bound himself to the contract signed by both parties. When Bernie wrote “In the event that the seller breaches this agreement, the seller must refund the purchaser's deposit, but the parties shall be limited to this remedy and only this remedy” He freed himself of any duty of having to perform his part of the contract.
This decision can be clearly identified within Ansbacher Trustees Ltd, where it was stated that it would “be a highly unsatisfactory situation if such beneficiaries were held not to have standing to sue the trustees for breach of trust”. These powers are of obvious importance to objects, who may need to draw upon these remedies, in instances where settlements have been created, for example, to avoid tax, such as what can be seen in the Vandervell case, or in The Exeter Settlement where it was mentioned “the power to add and delete beneficiaries from the class of potential objects of a discretionary trust originated from the need to obtain “maximum flexibility” in, for example tax planning strategies”. These types of trusts are thus set up to provide more secrecy for the settlor; however they are vulnerable to being
Continuous use means that the occupation of the property must have been continual without lapse for the entire period as dictated by statute, in this case 20 years.
In the case Pastizzi Café Pty Ltd v. Hossain (No 4) NSWSC 808 (28 July 2011) there is a relatively straightforward conflict involving five principals (three individuals and two corporate entities) in which a number of legal issues come to the fore. Briefly, the events in question occur over the span of nearly five years and involve a partnership between Deborah Ross, Leonard Ross and Miraj Hossain to own and manage Pastizzi Café Pty Ltd. Though the case is straightforward, the events are somewhat convoluted--in sum, Ms Ross is guarantor of the start-up costs and in April 2007, Ms Ross and Mr. Hossain receive $1 share in the new company, Mr. Ross, for other legal reasons, does not receive a share (Pastizzi Café v Hossain, 3,4). Eventually, Mr. Hossain and his company, Talukder Enterprises Pty Ltd make the claim that Mr. and Ms Ross are making all management decisions, but that this is illegal since he argues that Mr. Ross is not a partner, shareholder or director. Mr. and Ms. Ross vehemently disagree. (Pastizzi Café v Hossain, 4, 5). Further, Mr. and Ms Ross argue that Mr. Hossain agreed in a meeting on 12 November 2010 to sell his third of the partnership, and there arose a question as to the value of the business. (Pastizzi Café v Hossain, 5). On February 7, 2011, Mr. Hossain locks both Mr. and Ms. Ross out of the restaurant and establishes his own business on the property. Both sides seek damages.
Prior cases such as Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, Lykes v. Commissioner, Kornhauser v. United States, Deputy v. du Pont were given as examples. The principle the Court derived from these cases is that the characterization, as “business” or “personal” of the litigation costs of resisting a claim depend on whether or not the claim arises in connection with the taxpayer’s profit-seeking activities. It does not depend on the consequences that might result to a taxpayer’s income-producing property from a failure to defeat the claim. That leads to the question: did the wife’s claims respecting Gilmore’s stockholdings arise in connection with his profit-seeking activities?
The organisation, Gerard Cassegrain & Co Pty Ltd, claimed a dairy farm in New South Wales. The Husband, in his ability as executive of the organisation, exchanged title of the land to both himself and his wife as joint occupants in like manner. The spouse later moved his enthusiasm for the property to his wife for $1. An Application was brought by the organisation against the spouse and wife in the New South Wales Supreme Court looking for that the property be exchanged back to the organisation because of fraudulent activities of the spouse. The trial judge requested that the spouse pay remuneration to the organisation, however dismissed the procedures against the wife as she herself was not a knowing party to the fraud.
This essay will discuss the Supreme Court decision in FHR European Ventures LLP and others v Cedar Capital Partners LLC (Cedar) . The issue in this case was whether a bribe or secret commission accepted by an agent is held on constructive trust for his principal. This topic is a “relentless and seemingly endless debate” , as Sir Terence Etherton described, and that the “remedy awarded has vacillated for the last 200-odd years” . The major reason for the debate is because the principal will have propriety claim as opposed to a mere equitable compensation, if the bribe or commission is held on a constructive trust . The principal will be in a much more advantageous position if he was held to have propriety
The contention arose with Hunter v Moss which did not follow the orthodox approach where Hunter was entitled 50 out of moss’s 1000 shares. Under the Goldcorp rule there would be no trust because the property was not separated however Dillon J said there was a valid trust. The rationale for this controversial decision was that it would have made no difference which 50 shares would have been given because they were all identical. So here there was no need to segregate the property if it was intangible.
On the contrary, in Bruton court’s understanding of “exclusive possession” was a relative concept. Exclusive possession granted to Mr. Bruton was found based on the fact that he was not required to “share possession with the trust, the Council or anyone else”[13] and “the trust did not retain such control”[14]. Whether the grantor possesses title or not was held to be irrelevant. Nevertheless, since LQHT in fact could not exclude the true owner (i.e. the Council) from taking possession, the exclusive possession enjoyed by the “tenant” would be “only as against the grantor and not the rest of the world”[15] and practically dependent on the contractual relationship. This has received support from later cases applying Bruton. In Islington LBC v Green[16]with similar facts to Bruton, the tenant raised an argument that the
A Contract requires several elements in order to be considered enforceable. However for the purpose of this essay we would explore one of these elements in order to effectively understand the controversial cases of Williams v Roffey Brothers and Nicholls (contractors) Ltd (1990) and Stilk v Myrick (1804). Before going any further one should briefly understand the doctrine of Consideration. Despite the vast amount of content written, the doctrine of consideration is still to this day unclear due to the inconsistency of the courts and its application of necessary rules. Consideration refers to that which the law deems as valuable in that the promisor receives from the promise that which was promised. In other words, it is the exchange of something of value between the parties in a contract. One should be mindful that in English law, every promise may not be legally enforceable; it requires the court to distinguish between are enforceable and non-enforceable obligations. This brings us to the controversial cases of Stilk v Myrick and Williams v the Roffery brothers. Many argue that that the case of Williams was wrongly decided leading to impairments in the rule initially established in Stilk v Myrick. This essay seek to analyse and critique the cases of Stilk v Myrick and Williams v Roffey Brothers and also highlight whether or not the new rule of Practical benefit lead to serious impairments in later cases.
Despite acknowledging that Hohfeld did not originally create the metaphor or even use the term ‘bundle of sticks,’ his conceptual analysis of property rights in terms of legal relations led to the development of the ideas that property is made up of not things, but instead composed of legal relationships. It equally
By way of contrast, in Mitchell Bros v Tomlinson [1957] a change of intention was found to be justifiable, despite claims that the sales of former investment properties had been motivated by leasing becoming uneconomic. That is, an increase in repair costs and the need to realise the partnership on the death of a partner. However, in this case there was a great deal of other evidence that a trading intention had been established well before the partner died.