Parkview Queensland Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2013] NSWCA 422 FACTS The appellant, Parkview Queensland Pty Ltd (“Parkview”), is a building contractor who commenced construction of a residential property development under a standard form building contract with Fortia funds Management Ltd (“Fortia”), the developer. Fortia financed the construction under a loan facility with the Bank of Western Australia Ltd (“BankWest”). The building contract provided for progressive payments to Parkview, with 5% of the value of the work completed to be retained by Fortia (“retention monies”) until practical completion. As per clause 5.10 (“cl5.10”) of the building contract “…The parties [i.e. Fortia and Parkview] shall hold the retention, security or the proceeds of the security on trust…”. Parkview, BankWest and Fortia signed a Builder Tripartite Deed. This entitled, but did not actually obligate, BankWest to pay all progress payments certified by Fortia directly to Parkview and to take over the building contract in the case of Fortia defaulting. The building contract allowed for Parkview to obtain payment out of part, or all of, the retention monies on provision of satisfactory alternative security to Fortia. Parkview subsequently provided a bank guarantee for part of the retention monies. BankWest received and retained the guarantee and subsequently remitted the equivalent amount of the retention monies to Parkview. Following practical completion Parkview
Section 52A (2) (b) of the CA, implies prescribed terms, conditions and warranties into the contract. Regulation 8 of the CSOLR directs us to these prescribed warranties in Schedule 3. Clause 1(d) implies a warranty into the contract that other than those disclosed within the contract there is no matter in relation to any building or structure on the land that would justify the making of any upgrading or demolition order or, if there is such a matter, a building certificate has been issued in relation to the building or structure since the matter arose.
The Plaintiff is claiming $35 million from the State of NSW, which is purported to be vicariously liable for the Land and Environment Court and Pain J [1]. This claim includes nullifying Pain J’s judgment [14], and it is accompanied by Motions to uphold Lloyd J’s dismissal and refund the Plaintiff’s filing fees [2].
Bulsey & Anor v State of Queensland [2015] QCA 187 signified the requirements of legal justifications when conducting unwarranted arrests, and further expresses the importance of the right to personal liberty as it is ‘the most fundamental of the human rights recognised under the common law.’ It was evident to the Judges that at least one officer held reasonable suspicion that “the suspect” had committed an indictable offence, but the lawfulness of the arrest was inevitably questioned as to whether an officer with reasonable suspicion was the arresting officer. The judgements in favour of the appellants heightens the need for officers to use their powers within the ‘confines of the law’ when ‘forcibly arrest[ing] and detaining’ a person as to preserve the right to personal liberty, for once this right is left in the power of any authority, to imprison arbitrarily whomever they suspect, ‘there would soon be an end of all other rights and immunities.’
Police officers including approximately six armed members of the “Special Emergency Response Team” forcibly entered the appellants’ (Bulsey & Anor) house. Bulsey was taken from his bed, placed on the floor, handcuffed and dragged out to the street and later charged with riotous assembly and destruction of a building. In subsequent committal proceedings, the respondent conceded it did not have a case against the first appellant. He was discharged. Bulsey (the first appellant) sued the respondent for damages for trespass to the person (assault, battery and false imprisonment). Anor (the second appellant) sued the respondent for damages for assault and false imprisonment. The trial judge dismissed the appellants’ claims with costs, with judgments in favour of the respondent.
Under the law of partnership, all partners were jointly and severally liable for the debts, because the acts of one partner, acting within the apparent scope of his authority, bound the entire partnership. The court found that the trial court did not clearly err in determining that the mechanic 's liens, held by the suppliers, were inferior to the construction mortgages perfected by the banks. The mortgages were recorded prior to the commencement of the construction of the improvements on each project site, so they were prior to the suppliers ' liens, relating to construction materials obtained thereafter. Further, the mortgages were valid under Ark. Stat. Ann. § 51-605, because the aggregate sum requirement in the mortgage satisfied the
Reference to Another Agreement Holly Hill Acres, Ltd. (Holly Hill), purchased land from Rogers and Blythe. As part of its consideration, Holly Hill gave Rogers and Blythe a promissory note and purchase money mortgage. The note read, in part, “This note with interest is secured by a mortgage on real estate made by the maker in favor of said payee. The terms of said mortgage are by reference made a part hereof.” Rogers and Blythe assigned this note and mortgage to Charter Bank of Gainesville (Charter Bank) as security in order to obtain a loan from the bank. Within a few months, Rogers and Blythe defaulted on their obligation to Charter Bank. Charter Bank sued to recover on Holly Hill’s note and
Cuesport Properties LLC, sold condominiums to Critical Developments LLC. Cuesport agreed to build a wall within 30 days before the closing and failed to do so. The contractual agreement states if Cuesport failed to build the wall. They will be responsible to pay Critical Developments $126.00 until completion. The charges will be for incidental damages, because Critical Development would lose money, because the units could not be rented.
The report that we have been studying and learning about is the magistrates court and how there system works so that people pay the price for what they have done. Meaning different consequences given for how bad the situation is.
Question 4. 4. (TCOs C, D) How does an installment sales contract (land contract) (a) resemble a
The subject collateral consists of 2 parcels currently know as 4339 & 4401 Mount Vernon Memorial Highway Alexandria VA. Borrower must receive final site plan approval to subdivide into three recorded lots 2A, 3A, and 3B prior to closing. The Borrower purchased lot 2 for $30M on August 28, 2014 and lot 3 for $465M on July 23, 2014. They paid cash for lot 2 and borrowed $470M from Burke & Herbert Bank for the purchase of lot 3. The subject approval includes a $905M A&D closed end line of credit, a $740M revolving construction to fund up to 2 of the 3 units, of which no more than 2 can be speculative (including a model), and up to $100,000 in Letters of Credit to cover the development bond. The Borrowers plans to market the Radford model on lots 2A and 3A and Custis model on Lot 3B. These lots will be accessed through Mount Vernon Park Phase I, a 2 acre parcel in the Mount Vernon
If this Engagement Agreement is acceptable to you, please sign a copy thereof and return to me. This Engagement Agreement is effective as of November __, 2015 and supersedes all prior oral or written agreements regarding Thompson & Knight’s representation of you in this matter. This Agreement can be amended or modified only in writing. This Engagement Agreement shall be binding upon Greenville and the Firm, and respective heirs, executors, legal representatives, successors and assigns of such
The court case was on an appeal about whether the parties had intended that a construction with a repurchase clause should be enforceable by a specific performance or a future interest on a condition subsequent. The court held that the parties intentions was that the obligation found on the deed sale constitutes for a covenant that
The conditions of the closing were that there was no deposit to be paid but that a special clause was to be included.
The contract entered between Bruce Bickham and Washington Bank & Trust Company’s representative was a bilateral contract. “The relationship of the litigants is governed by bilateral contracts. The first such contract is represented by the oral agreement struck between Mr. Bickham and the Bank on January 23, 1974”( Bickham v. Washington Bank 1987) The agreement that was entered between Mr. Bickham and G.S. Adams, Jr., vice president of Washington Bank & Trust was if Mr. Bickham would do his personal and business banking with the bank Mr. Bickham would be receive loans at 7.5 percent rate payable over 10 years. As a result of this over the next two years the bank made several loans to Mr. Bickham with an interest rate of 7.5 percent.
The purpose of this report is to examine the history, and the development of the Australian Bankruptcy Law. Through reviewing historical information, the origins of the current Bankruptcy Law are explored. Furthermore, the development of Corporate Insolvency Laws in Australia from 1901 through to 2001 Corporations Act is studied.