Federal courts generally reference what the Kansas courts describe as a “cognizable legal prejudice” as the loss of a “substantial right” due to the dismissal. Pontenberg v. Boston Scientific Corp., 252 F.3d 1253, 1255 (11th Cir. 2001). The Tenth Circuit has recognized four main factors when determining whether a legal prejudice exists: “the opposing party's effort and expense in preparing for trial; excessive delay and lack of diligence on the part of the movant; insufficient explanation of the need for a dismissal; and the present stage of litigation.” Brown v. Baeke, 413 F.3d 1121, 1124 (10th Cir. 2005). Defendants’ Response claims the Defendants will be “substantially prejudiced” by an or-der of dismissal, but do not provide any identification of what that prejudice would be or how the prejudice would rise to the level of the loss of any substantial right. Since the Defendants have not identified any “legal prejudice,” or met their burden of showing any “plain legal prejudice” resulting from the requested dismissal, the Court is without grounds to deny the …show more content…
This argu-ment is also foreclosed by the procedure set forth in the Protective Order because it leaves to the discretion of a party the designation of documents as confidential and subject to the order, see Order, at ¶ 3(7), and which also provides the means by which a party could seek review of a des-ignation of confidentiality, Order, at ¶ 8. No such motion was ever timely filed by the Defend-ants. Any motion hereafter filed by the Defendants for such a purpose, after a dismissal, would come at a time when the Court was without jurisdiction and would be moot (not to mention futile for reasons stated above). See Ireland v. Byrne,
Pursuant to Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 927, Defendant, Lauris Hollis (“Defendant”), through undersigned counsel, moves this Court to dismiss the Plaintiff’s action. Article 927 provides that the Peremptory exception of no cause of action and no right of action or no interest in the plaintiff to institute suit. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 923 provides that the function of the peremptory exception is to have the plaintiff’s action declared legally nonexistent, or barred by effect of law, and hence the exception tends to dismiss or defeat the action.
On May 26, 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in SEC v. Graham, No. 14-13562 (11th Cir. May 26, 2016), reached an important decision. The court extended the reach of 28 U.S.C. § 2462, the five-year statute of limitations for “any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture” applicable to enforcement actions by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). The court held that SEC enforcement actions for declaratory relief and disgorgement were subject to the five-year statute of limitations. The Eleventh Circuit built its ruling on top of a decision by the Supreme Court, Gabelli v. SEC, 133 S. Ct. 1216 (2013), which held that 28 U.S.C. § 2462 applied to SEC civil penalty actions.
The Eighth Circuit Court has raised an intriguing legal and controversial issue by ruling that the State of Arkansas could force death row prisoner, Charles Laverne Singleton, to take antiphychodic drugs to insure he was sane for execution. After research, I found that Singleton remained in the appeals process for twenty-four-and-a-half years because of the 1986, U.S. Supreme Court decision, Ford vs. Wainwright, that ruled execution of the insane is cruel and unusual punishment. The state authorities finally decided to treat the prison inmate based on the 1990, U.S. Supreme Court decision, Washington vs. Harper, that subjects prison inmates with serious mental illness to mandatory anti-psychotic drugs against his
The District Court’s denial of Petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss is reviewed de novo, and may be affirmed on any ground that is supported by the record. Am. Int'l Enterprises, Inc. v. F.D.I.C., 3 F.3d 1263, 1266 (9th Cir. 1993). Under a de novo standard of review, the appellate court reviews a decision on a question of law anew, and need not give deference to the legal conclusions or assumptions made by the previous court to hear the case. Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Ashland, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 852, 868 (Tex. App. 2001). An appeals court may refer to the trial court’s record to determine the facts, but may rule on the evidence and matters of law without deference to that court’s finding. Id. District court rulings on a motion to dismiss under Federal
It is the policy of the law to favor, wherever possible, a hearing on the merits, and appellate courts are much more disposed to affirm an order where the result is to compel a trial upon the merits than they are when the judgment by default is allowed to stand and it appears that a substantial defense could be made; the law looks with disfavor upon a party who, regardless of the merits of the case, attempts to take advantage of the mistake, surprise, inadvertence, or neglect of his adversary. (A & B Metal Products v. MacArthur Properties, Inc. (1970) 11 Cal App 3d 642, 648.
Dismissing the case would be an easy task as such since it will require an affidavit supporting the dismissal motion. While in exercising the application of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff should be able to provide his or her sworn affidavit. Once both affidavits have been drafted, they are to be compiled and ensure that they do not provide any conflicting information relating to the issues being addressed. Thus, the court is expected in this case to make any significant ruling based on the information contained in the affidavit. Thus, going beyond the personal jurisdiction will relinquishment the case of the defendant’s objections and proceed to the federal court (Andrews and Newman,
discriminatory animus by Cardinal Financial with regard to the declination to make a loan on the original terms. Thus, the circuit court looked correctly to the Substitute Trustees to advance, if it could, a nondiscriminatory reason for the denial.
to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action” [15 U.S.C. § 78t(a)(2000)].
Under Rule 91a, “a party may move to dismiss a cause of action on the grounds that it has no basis in law or fact.”
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court and refused to dismiss the action. They concluded that it was believable enough to survive a Rule12 (b)(6) motion to dismiss.
Because his admissions preclude him from creating a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the company's reasons are false or not credible and that the real reason (or a motivating factor) for the transfer denial was unlawful race discrimination, summary judgment is appropriate.
At the hearing, the Plaintiff articulated that his dismissal was rejected by the clerk’s office for failing to affix an appropriate fee or fee waiver to the filing. In any event, the plaintiff articulated that he had previously dismissed the action because he thought that it was necessary to do so in order to add additional defendants. The plaintiff then advised that he has since learned that he can move to amend his pleading, and as such, he expressed a desire
DECISION No. US Court of Appeal, Ninth circuit, affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss Brody and Crawford's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The defense made a motion to suppress some of the defendant’s statements because he believed they were made during an unlawful interrogation. The defense believed that because the
6. The applicant disputes that she refused to obey lawful and reasonable instructions. She also contends that her dismissal was substantively and procedural unfair. She said that she performed the work according to the instruction