My research question is aimed at showing how the cold war led to establishment of supranational institutions and how realism as a level of analysis failed to predict the events that led to the end of the cold war?
How the Cold War Led To Supranational Influences
From the beginning of the Cold War there have been many tensions between the East and West superpowers. The proposal of the Marshal Plan of June 1947 put the integration of Europe on the map for international relations. The creators of the plan were afraid of the spread of the communist ideology to other outside Europeans outside the communist circle. It is in this way of thinking that the grand Domino Theory was established for the basis for the west to be involved in the
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(Schwabe, 2001, p. 18) This policy was essentially the containment of communism spreading amongst Europe and the containment of a possible German rearmament in the future as means to appease the European community in America’s commitment to the integration of Europe. In support of this idea the Supranational structures of Europe were not very supportive and too much of the disappointment of the State Department planners in Europe. European cooperation leaned more towards intergovernmental lines. This and the reluctance of Great Britain created a barrier for the supranationally unified Europe (Schwabe, 2001, p. 27) It is for this reason that under Kenann’s influence Dean Acheson preferred to have France as the leader for European Integration and not Great Britain. The continuing fear of Pro-Soviet West Germany pushed the State Department to vehemently support European integration which would as they thought “harness” a revived West Germany to the West. This was a well-known argument in the 1960’s in favor of supranational European integration as means to deploy the idea of “double containment”. (Schwabe, 2001, p. 30) In the west the scrambling for more or less independent nuclear deterrents did not fail to influence the attempts at European integration and thus the European Defense Community (EDC) was seen as the solve all and end all that would guarantee that the idea of double containment of
The Cold War was the name given to the political economic, military and ideological contention that occurred between the United States and its allies and the Soviet Union and their allies after World War II. The two forces never directly engaged in military activity in light of the fact that both had atomic weapons that if utilized, might have had crushing outcomes for both sides. Instead, proxy wars were battled. A proxy war results when contradicting forces utilize outsiders as substitutes for battling each one other and is ordinarily launched by a power that does not itself partake. The Korean and Vietnam wars are two examples of proxy wars on the grounds that the U.S. and the Soviet Union did not directly engage one another however, Soviet endeavors to spread and bring together both Korea and Vietnam under communist rule provoked mediation either by the United States and/or by their allies. These two occasions were simply a few of the impacts of the Cold War in Asia. This paper will examine each war individually and in more detail and endeavor to persuade that the Korean and Vietnam Wars were the immediate aftereffects of Soviet endeavors to expand communist influence in Asia and the United States and their allies' approach of forestalling and holding such endeavors.
As tensions continued to augment profoundly throughout the latter half of the Cold War period, they brought forth a movement from a previous bipolar conflicting course, to one of a more multipolar nature. These tensions were now not only restricted to the Soviet Union and United states, but amongst multiple other nations of the globe. It became a general consensus that a notion of ‘peace’ was sought globally, hence, the emergence of détente. The nature of this idea in the short term conveyed itself to be an act of change for the conflicting nations, however, in the long term it proved to be a blatant continuity, ultimately acting as a ‘mechanism for domestic fortification’ which prompted a more divisive tone. It became apparent that by the prime 1970’s Cold War countries were now seeking a state of relaxation in political and international tension, détente, through measures of diplomacy and negotiation. Actions, influences and treaties such as the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the establishment of SALT 1, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 and the Shanghai Communique of 1972 evidently help reinforce that the concept of détente brought a period focused on lessening the tensions of international relations and ultimately achieve political relation for the future of the Cold War, although the success and impact of this era is abhorred by many historians who have concluded that détente didn’t activate any positive changes to the cold war, and was conclusively a failure.
room to compromise on the makeup of post war Europe. Thus, security fears where supposedly at the heart of Soviet policy.
Citizens of Europe were living in shambles (See Fig 2). Politically, Americans knew spreading capitalistic ways in Europe would gain support from the Europeans, giving the United States trade partners. During the Cold War, Germany became the center of all the tensions between Capitalism and Communism. Germany was the ideal gateway between East and West Europe. Its location made it a suitable place for these political struggles to occur. This angered the Soviets because they too wanted to influence their ways on Europe. The Marshall Plan, following the Truman Doctrine-- which supplied $400 million to countries under totalitarian regimes (Turkey and Greece), appeared to be another anti-communist move made by the United States. However, the United States still successfully achieved the goal of making Europe economically stable.
The tensions that were between the Soviet Union and the US were growing. Nuclear threats from both sides caused hatred. In document three the excerpt from Secretary Marshall's speech he explains how he suggests a plan/policy for the reconstruction of Europe. Because the world was in such a dismal the United States tried to help
George Kennan's containment plan is a radical shift in the U.S foreign policy when the Policy of the United States towards the Soviet Union prior, and during the World War II is considered. The containment policy marks the shift of American foreign policy towards the Soviets from alliance to deterrence. Kennan's states in the Long Telegram, "USSR still lives in antagonistic "capitalist encirclement" with which in the long run there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence." (Citation needed) only two years after the end of World War II, a war both the U.S and the Soviet Union fought side by side for a common ambition. If the aspect of radical shift in the U.S foreign policy is seen from a post-Cold War perspective, another radical change can
MacDonald’s article Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War, four schools of thought surrounding the origins of the Cold War are laid out. Specifically, MacDonald argues mostly in favor of the traditionalist school, which emphasizes the expansionist, offensive nature of Soviet expansion into Asia and Eastern Europe. Also, MacDonald makes an important point regarding the accuracy of information and historical texts regarding the origins of the Cold War, explaining that “The argument over the origins of the Cold War is important not only for historical accuracy, but also for the consequences it will have on theoretical questions and therefore on their implications for policy.” Not only is this true, but also extremely relevant to scholars studying the Cold War with regard to international relations, as it points out the importance of the correct application of paradigms and perspectives to the Cold War case study. In MacDonald’s argument in favor of the traditionalist school, he
In 1945 after WWII the United States and the Soviet Union became divided as far as how they felt Europe should be divided. This began the period of conflict called the Cold War. The Cold War was “a state of political hostility between countries characterized by threats, propaganda, and other measures short of open warfare”(dictionary.com).The USSR believed in communism, where the US believed in democracy. The US was between two potentially hostile nations, the US designed a Buffer Zone to prevent any overt acts of aggression.At the end of WWI,I almost all of the eastern European countries were occupied by Russia these countries were known as Satellite States. The distrust between the two nations began at the Yalta Conference which included the three big powers: Churchill (Great Britain),Stalin (Soviet Union), and Roosevelt (United States of America). Stalin wanted more control as far how Europe progressed after WWII, where Roosevelt believed Europe should hold free election and determine their political system and rivalry between the two superpowers and began the Cold War. Some might blame the Americans for the causing for the Cold War because of the American’s wanted to occupy the countries, but the Soviet Union bares the responsibility for the Cold War because of their actions in Eastern Europe, by the military expansionism of Stalin and his successors, and the principles presented in the Iron Curtain Speech .
Whether events in the 1970s and 1980s have borne out President Eisenhower's warning to the American people. During the 1970s and 1980s, America spent more money on military security than the net income of all United States corporations. The government was building up armed forces to combat the Soviet Union until its collapse.
Despite its name, the Cold War did not actually involve military fighting between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, the Cold War is still an excellent example as to why war can be a result of bargaining failures and explains reasons as to why war occurs. A single person’s rationality can tip the scale between war and peace. The Cold War was essentially a deadlock between the two super powers of that time, the United States and the Soviet Union. Both states expressed desire to maintain and widen their respective spheres of influence around the world. Both states also wanted to prove that their political system is superior; whereas the United States was pro-democracy, the Soviet Union was pro-communism. Although the Cold War was a result of many factor, war can definitely occur due to information problems between two states. Nonetheless, I do believe there is always a range of agreements that is possible between states, as is evidenced by the resolution of the Cuban missile crisis.
George Kennan did not make any detailed policy recommendations in the Long Telegram of 1946, although he made it clear that he did not regard the Soviet Union as the same type of threat as Nazi Germany. He opposed the ideas of National Security Council Memorandum 68 (1950) as a hysterical overreaction, and thought that global containment was a serious strategic error, especially in peripheral regions like Indochina. Unlike Hitler, Stalin's aggression and expansion were unplanned and opportunistic, and its leaders did not wish to risk a general war with the West. For this reasons, the Soviets were highly sensitive to the "logic of force" and would retreat if confronted with resolution (Kennan 1946). Internally, it was a police state ruled by a Communist Party oligarchy and bureaucracy, but one that was always insecure in its power. Although Marxism had no real emotional appeal to the masses, the elites were guided by the assumption that the imperialist powers were always attempting to encircle the Soviet Union and that the contradictions within capitalism would always lead to wars. They would attempt to exploit these differences within the capitalist nations, while at the same time attempting to weaken their hold on the colonial areas. Kennan was well aware that the main problem in Western Europe was war-weariness and economic insecurity, and the U.S. would have to take the lead in reviving these countries or the "Russians certainly will" (Kennan 1946). In this case, though,
The traditional, orthodox interpretation places the responsibility of the Cold War on Stalin’s personality and on communist ideology. It claims that as long as Stalin and the authoritarian government were in power, a cold war was unavoidable. It argues that Stalin violated agreements that he had made at Yalta, imposed Soviet policy on Eastern European countries aiming at political domination and conspired to advocate communism throughout the world. As a result, United States officials were forced to respond to Soviet aggression with foreign policies such as the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Yet revisionists argue that there was “no proof of Stalin promoting communism outside Russia” and that Stalin’s decisions were first and foremost, pro-Soviet and not of communist intentions. Up until 1947, it is evident through Marshall Plan as well as statements and interviews made by Stalin that he was still thinking of cooperation with the United States, Britain and France. Despite post-war conflicts and instability of Soviet-American relations, the USSR’s initial embrace of the Marshall Plan at its announcement expressed
Leffler stated that “they were worried that the Kremlin might exploit these weaknesses to alter the balance of power… so they harnessed the economic principles of the open door to the national security interests of the United States. (Heilbrunn) Leffler describes the Cold War in this way: “…neither the Americans nor the Soviets sought to harm the other in 1945… The protests that each country’s actions evoked from the other fueled the cycle of distrust as neither could comprehend the fears of the other, perceiving its own actions as defensive. Herein rests the classic security dilemma… U.S. officials… chose to contain and deter the Russians rather than to reassure and placate them, thereby accentuating possibilities for a spiraling cycle of mistrust.” (Heilbrunn) In 1947, Ernest Bevin, British foreign secretary, “believed it essential to construct a defensive military alliance in Western Europe; and in December of that year he proposed to George C. Marshall an alliance that would guarantee Western European security and prevent further Soviet aggrandizement.” (Heilbrunn) This proposal was realized in the North Atlantic Treaty and the establishment of NATO in 1949. Only an alliance such as this would halt Soviet infiltration and the gradual collapse of one western wall after another. According to Heilbrunn, the Soviet military buildup started after 1945. By 1950 American intelligence estimates suggested that the Soviets
This caused the US to believe that Soviets had mainly expansionist aims. The US was “not prepared to see the opportunity for future investment [in Eastern Europe] foreclosed” (Crockatt 67) and this belief sparked the development of the containment policy directed by George Kennan, outlined in the Long Telegram (Lightbody 5). In addition, “the west had to oppose the Soviet Union for its own survival” (Lightbody 5) as the nuclear race between the US and USSR ensued and the USSR strived to equal the already well-established program of the US. This tension did not recede as Soviets sent spies into the US Manhattan Project, the nuclear development program (Lightbody 5). When the Soviets refused to join the Baruch Plan – which controlled nuclear weapon development – the USSR became even more openly viewed as a threat to US security. The growth of communism in Asia within the countries of Korea, Vietnam, and China along with tensions between the “Iron Curtain,” or divide, between Eastern and Western Europe also contributed to increasing threat towards capitalism and the Cold War’s inevitability.
The historian’s belonging to this school see the Truman doctrine from 1947 as the point when the Cold War started. They put the responsibility for the Cold War on the Soviet Union and its expansionist policy. According to them, this is the reason, why Soviets broke promises from the negotiations during the World War II, especially the Yalta agreement. On the other hand, the U.S. politicians wanted to continue the cooperation between the Allies even after the defeat of the Axis. They put a lot of hope to the newly created organization – United Nations – and the principle of collective security. However, the U.S. needed to react to the Soviet aggression in Europe. They adopted the policy of containment. The orthodox scholars view this policy as necessity because without it “the Soviet Union would have become the master of all Europe, instead of only the eastern Europe” .