The, Moral, And Moral Relativism

I am going to argue in support of Peter Singer’s claims against speciesism. It is right to claim that human suffering and animal suffering should be given equal considerations. Both humans and nonhuman species suffer both physically and emotionally and both deserve equal considerations on the basis of morality.

The question of the correct ethical treatment of animals has been a topic of many heated debates. The basis of this discussion arises numerous premises that justifies the treatment of animals. Whether animal do in fact have a sentient? And what is distinctive about humanity such that humans are thought to have moral status and non-human do not? Providing an answer to the correct ethical treatment of animals has become increasingly paramount among society as well as philosophers.

Nevertheless, I do not mean that our moral obligations to them are identical to our moral obligations to other human beings – the view that Regan, many vegans, as well as those who are against speciesism. In his essay “The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism,” Regan argues that non-human animals deserve equal consideration and treatment, because they are, in many ways, similar to humans. Most of us nowadays would agree that non-human animals are not what Descartes called “automata,” that “have no mind and are unable to think;” they surely can feel pain and pleasure just like we do, and this has become a common knowledge (Regan, 4). However, as far as I am concerned, that non-human animals have sensations is in no way suggesting that our moral obligations to other humans need to be applied to non-human animals as well, regardless of the fact that we do have moral obligations to them. In other words, we are not entitled to treat them precisely the same way we treat other humans, because no matter how many similarities we share with them, they are still not humans; they do not and cannot reason rationally and make free choices like we do – at least we think they cannot. As a result, we are not obliged to treat them the way we treat other humans, when the concept of rights does not apply in their worlds, and they cannot act or think the way other humans

In her essay Speaking of Animal Rights, Warren (1987) argues for the weak animal rights position, which holds that non-human animals have weaker rights than human beings because non-human animals do not have the same moral status as us human beings (383-4). This is due to their lack of the ability to “reason well enough to function as autonomous moral agents” (385), which she believes is a requirement for being moral of human beings (384-5). In this essay, I will argue that Warren’s weak animal rights position misses the entire point about speaking of animals rights and we should instead recognize non-human animals as our moral equals and grant them full moral rights in virtue of their entitlement to dignified existence , rather than basing moral equality and rights upon rationality, as Warren indicates.

An individual’s ability to establish concepts of right and wrong based upon societal conventions and independent thought is the philosophy of moral relativism. Nathaniel Hawthorne explores this philosophy in The Scarlet letter to connect the understanding of sin to Puritan society and the inevitable hypocrisy that comes with uniform principles. Hawthorne uses tone and diction to reveal the concept of sin in relation to moral relativism, proving the improbability of establishing uniform morality that Puritan society attempts to achieve. Hawthorne’s depiction of Hester’s role in society reveals that her morality derived from her alienation from the Puritan community, thus altering her perception of sin. After Hester and Dimmesdale propose

In this paper I will present the charge of speciesism contended by many animal right’s activists. I will attempt to substantiate Immanuel Kant’s view on animal morality and justify how his philosophy is not in violation of speciesism. Furthermore, I will explain how the Kantian view still grants animals some moral consideration through the designation of “indirect duties”. Lastly, I will present a difficulty with accepting the Kantian view of “indirect duties” towards animals.

Chimpanzees have been proven to be capable of empathy, altruism, and self-awareness. Elephants mourn their deceased family members. There are many instances in cases of diminished human intelligence, such as severe brain damage or mental handicaps, in which animals exhibit higher levels of intelligence and moral capabilities than humans. Singer is adamant that speciesism is baseless because there are no consistent characteristics with which determination of superiority, in any sense of the word, is possible. Hence speciesism is completely irrational.

In Peter Singers paper “All Animals are Equal”, he attempts to make the point that all animals have interest equal to those of humans. Over the years, both this topic and Peter Singer himself have stirred up much controversy. His beliefs, while radical, are founded upon well-developed logic based upon the utilitarian calculus. In this paper specifically, he supports the rights of non-human animals with two main positions.

Christine M. Korsgaard argues in the article ‘PERSONHOOD, ANIMALS, AND THE LAW’ that non-human animals, although may not be categorized as ‘persons’, should be regarded as ends in themselves and the subjects of rights against human treatment.

The final areas addressed by Goodman were rape and clitoridectomy. Both of these actions are violations against another person. While it is known that both men and women are raped, rape is primarily recognized as a sexual crime against a woman. Rape not only involves forced sex; it often also includes assault, other physical injuries, and many times, even death. I can agree with Goodman (p. 92) “that rape is not a sexual crime but a power crime.” I also agree with Goodman’s statements: “Rape is wrong. It is always wrong. No circumstance can make it right.” (p. 92)

Animal rights has been a topic of controversy for the last decade and the question arises on whether or not animals have rights. In the quote from Arthur Schopenhauer’s The Basis of Morality, the main argument is that the only way humans can remain moral is if we treat all animals with compassion. Schopenhauer uses different comparisons in the short quote to improve the impact on the reader as well as show the way humans view the animals being treated. With that, it is evident that animals do need basic rights which can potentially be achieved through proper compassion and care. These animals need to have the ability to freely express their personalities as well as the proper attention and interactions on a daily basis.

Relativism is the position that all points of view are pretty much as considerable and the individual makes sense of what is certifiable and relative for them. Relativism surmises that truth is various for unmistakable people not simply that assorted people acknowledge differing things to be legitimate. While there are relativists in science and number juggling, moral relativism is the most generally perceived blend of relativism. Practically everyone has heard a relativist trademark:

In Peter Singer’s All Animals are Equal, he presents an argument for equal consideration for members of nonhuman species, otherwise known as animals. In this paper, I will argue that Singer’s argument does not prove that animals are deserving of equal consideration because it contains a premise that is not obviously true. The premise I believe to be inadequately supported is the premise that there is no property that all human sentient creatures have that not all sentient creatures have that would explain why the interests of human sentient creatures ought to be given equal consideration even though it is not true that the interests of all sentient creatures ought to be given equal consideration.

In sum, Singer in no way claims that the pains or interests of humans and animals measures or perceived as equal. He merely asserts that humans and animals both experience them, and that their equality in this sense is irrelevant (Singer, 1977). While it is fair to judge animals differently than humans in this sense, Singer argues that to do so simply because they are animals is immoral. Moreover, he deems to discriminate in such a way, because we are more evolved, is an act of

The greatest distortion of the human/animal relationship is the act of cruelty towards animals. The legislative response to animal cruelty first became known in North America and Europe in the beginning of the eighteenth centuries. Concern for the pain and suffering experience of animals came about when we started “humanizing animals”. Animals were allowed in the house, given a name and taken care for much like you would a child. Thomas (1983) study found the following: