The Opinion Of Justice Binderoff

The Commerce Clause is an enumerated power listed in the Constitution in Article 1, Section 8, and Clause 3. The Clause states that the United States Congress shall power, “To regulate Commerce with Foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” The Commerce Clause represents one of the most fundamental powers delegated to Congress. The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Lopez and reversed his conviction, holding that, “Section 922, in the full reach of its terms, is invalid as beyond the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause” (Source 1.)

In America’s time there have been many great men who have spent their lives creating this great country. Men such as George Washington, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson fit these roles. They are deemed America’s “founding fathers” and laid the support for the most powerful country in history. However, one more man deserves his name to be etched into this list. His name was John Marshall, who decided case after case during his role as Chief Justice that has left an everlasting mark on today’s judiciary, and even society itself. Through Cases such as Marbury v. Madison (1803) and McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) he established the Judicial Branch as an independent power. One case in particular, named Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), displayed his

Gibbons v. Ogden was a landmark decision in which the United States Supreme Court held that power to regulate interstate commerce. It was given to congress by the commerce clause of the constitution. It was led by Chief Justice John Marshall. The debate in Gibbons concerned contending cases of adversary steamship establishments. The condition of New York gave Aaron Ogden a select permit to work steamboat ships between New Jersey and New York City on the Hudson River. Thomas Gibbons, another steamboat administrator, ran two ships along the same course. Ogden looked for an order against Gibbons in a New York state court, asserting that the state had issued him elite rights to work the course. Accordingly, Gibbons guaranteed he had the privilege to work on the course in accordance with a 1793 demonstration of Congress directing waterfront business. The New York court found for Ogden and requested Gibbons to stop working his steamships; on bid, the New York Supreme Court avowed the request. Gibbons spoke to the U.S. Preeminent Court, which surveyed the case in 1824. John Marshall ruled for Gibbons, holding that New York 's selective award to Ogden disregarded the government authorizing demonstration of 1793. In coming to its choice, the Court deciphered the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution surprisingly. The proviso peruses that "Congress should have energy to manage trade among the few States." According to the Court, "trade" included articles in

The Supreme Court and Chief Justice Marshall rejected Ogden’s argument with a unanimous (6-0). The justices agreed that the Commerce Clause did, indeed, give Congress the power to oversee the operation of steamboats between New York and New Jersey. Hence, the license given to Gibbons by the government to run a ferry service antiquated the license to run a ferry service given to Ogden by the state of New York. As a result of this decision, State-issued ownership of island rivers and channels ceased and commercial competition was heartened. The Gibbons decision established

Next, the Court examined the clause's phrase "commerce among the several States," concluding that the word "among" means "intermingled with." Accordingly, Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce does not "stop at the external boundary line of each State, but may be introduced into the interior." In other words, Congress may pass any law that regulates commerce, so long as that commerce is not wholly confined within a single state, and its power to regulate such commerce is plenary. Under this interpretation of the Commerce Clause, Congress' clearly had the authority to regulate the commercial steamboat route between New York and New Jersey. It was assumed that the licensing act of 1793 did this and that the New York law in question

Narrow construction is not found in the Constitution, but the powers granted to Congress to regulate commerce are found. Exactly stated, "Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." This clause has no definite interpretation, but has included many aspects of regulating. The word "commerce" is defined as the exchange or buying and selling of commodities on a large scale involving transportation from place to place (Webster 264). Congress has exercised this delegated power in many cases. The nature and basic guidelines of Congress' power over commerce is first laid out in the case of Gibbons v. Ogden. In addition, the case United States v. Lopez is a

The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power “[t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.” Despite its silence as to the effect of that affirmative power, federal courts have recognized the Framers’ wish to create a unified national market and have found a dormant congressional authority in it. Since the landmark case of Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), that dormant authority has limited state regulations that burden interstate commerce, even in the absence of congressional regulation. Congress has the power only to restrict the scope of permissible state regulation but it does not absolutely preclude states from affecting commerce. "[T]he states retain authority under their police powers to regulate matters of 'legitimate local concern', even though interstate commerce may be affected." A challenged statute is upheld if its effect on interstate commerce is merely incidental. On the other hand, a state regulation that is facially or practically discriminatory will be defeated unless it shows a legitimate local purpose that cannot be accomplished by any less discriminatory alternatives.

Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution states that “Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes” (Epstein, et. al., 2017). “Congress can regulate the channels of interstate commerce and has the authority to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and persons or things in interstate commerce. Congress has the power to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce” (Epstein, et. al., 2017).

For this circumstance, William Marbury, a Federalist and a "midnight game plan" of President John Adams, did not get his reward from the new Secretary of State under Thomas Jefferson, James Madison. All around, the outcome of Marbury versus Madison was a great deal more huge than anybody in 1803 would have thought. Marbury asked for that the Supreme Court issue a "writ of mandamus" obliging Madison to pass on his reward.

Does the Supreme Court have the right to use the Commerce Clause, under Article I Section VIII, when dealing with the constitutional right of interstate commerce?

It strengthened Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce. It was between two ferry owners from New York. The state gave Ogden a license to work on the river, so Gibbons took the case to the Supreme Court, because he had a license from Congress. The Court ruled in favor of Gibbons because Congress has power to regulate interstate

You have asked me to summarize the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Doré v Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12, SCR 395 and analyze whether the Law society is likely to sanction Evan Frank. Although the Rules of Professional Conduct place limitations on certain conduct to ensure professionalism, the expressive rights of lawyers must be given due respect and the likelihood of Mr. Frank’s sanction will depend on a fair balance of “expressive value” of the content in the letter, with the public’s expectation of professionalism.

The R v Bentham case , which presented the question of imitation firearms, and whether part of your body is covered in the legislation adopted the literal approach and as this directive was employed judges declared the word ‘possession’ did not include someone’s fingers. If words of the act are evident, they should be adhered to, even if they provoke a distinctive absurdity. The legislation specified that imitation firearms could be “anything which has the appearance of a firearm whether or not it is capable of discharging any shot, bullet or missile”. It was held by Lord Bingham that Parliament obviously meant to legislate about imitation firearms and not to develop an offence of dishonesty, claiming to possess a firearm. Accordingly, possession of something needs to be independent from the body and the defendant was found not guilty.

One of the many powers given to Congress by the Constitution is the Commerce Clause. This clause allows Congress to regulate commerce between foreign nations, states, and Indian tribes. The authority laid out authorizes Congress to pass laws that ultimately regulate activities of states and citizens and free the restraints of states who feel otherwise. Throughout the history of the United States, the Commerce Clause has caused controversy over the extent that Congress can justify the use of this clause to pass laws. The Supreme Court has been relied on to determine the constitutionality of the laws and settle the controversies. One of these controversies lies within the Supreme Court case of United States v. Lopez.

The Commerce Clause has been a vital component of trading for more than a century. Though this clause, individual from different states and even different countries can engage in the selling of goods. Although the Commerce Clause pave the way for trading across state lines, there are still rules that apply. This paper will attempt to explain the effect on business activities, the power of the states to regulate commerce and explain the “balancing test”.