The Theater Strategy And Campaigning

The American “way of war” can be seen politically through the evolution of military policy as political perspectives changed. Post-World War II reveals primary and consistent policies that lead American military policymakers to avoid major international conflict. Coined the Cold War, Americans began waging war

The United States from the Cold War and into the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) continues to face challenges in translating military might into political desires due to its obsession with raising an army, electing politicians and assembling a diplomatic corp that continue to gravitate towards State-to-State engagements that if not rectified could lead to substantial delays in fighting terrorism and non-terrorist adversaries or worse total failure of the United States Military’s ability to properly carry out it’s politicians objectives due to being blindsided.

This paper discusses the War Powers Act/Resolution of 1973. Though this resolution was passed by Congress to give it more say in declaration of war and the deployment of American troops to foreign countries promising hostilities, this aim has hardly been achieved. The War Powers Act remains as one of the most contentious legal provisions in the American constitution and has been the subject of several debates and interpretations. More often than not, one finds American soldiers actually engaged in hostilities in foreign lands without the explicit or even implied support of the US Congress. This paper discusses why this is so and hypothesizes that realpolitik has significantly contributed to the practical ineffectiveness of the War Powers Act. Structurally, this paper will first proceed to present a brief history of the War Powers Act and its intended purpose. Afterwards, the linkage between realpolitik and the Act will be discussed.

United States involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last thirteen years has resulted in much debate over the role of the United States military. This debate is encouraged, as it will sustain conversation of how to best employ an important yet dwindling national resource. The publication of Dominic Tierney’s article “Why Has America Stopped Winning Wars” speaks directly to this debate. The article argues that the US military has lost the capability of winning wars since World War II . Tierney posits that the world is a more peaceful place and the United States is incapable of adapting to the resultant style of low intensity conflict that normally rises with state peace. He believes the U.S. government has a lust for global hegemony. The excessive use of military force is the only way to quench Washington’s thirst He concludes with an implication that American’s victory culture has led to disillusionment of our government’s expectations, and that this culture should be reexamined in order to prevent unnecessary loss of life in the future. Although Tierney makes a valiant effort to question US military strategic efforts over the last 70 years, he fails to realize that America’s emphasis on national security is a major contributing factor for why the world has seen a reduction in state-on-state war.

In the article, Why has America Stopped Winning Wars? the author, Dominic Tierney, asserts that the United States has entered an age of “unwinnable conflict”. Tierney argues that since the end of World War II excessive military power, an international shift from state-on-state war to internal conflict, the emergence of non-state actors and peace between states have contributed to The United States’ inability to win major conflicts. Tierney uses mistakes in strategy and tactical failures to support his argument.

President Theodore Roosevelt, well known for his extraordinary, worldly diplomatic skills, was quoted as saying, “Speak softly and carry a big stick, and you will go far.” During the early twentieth century, he brandished that big stick, or convincingly threatened to, with remarkable efficacy in support of his country’s political objectives. The big stick that President Roosevelt carried with him as a diplomat and Commander in Chief was the superior power of the United States military. “Historically, power has been measured by such criteria as population size and territory, natural resources, economic strength, military force, and social stability. Hard power enables countries to wield carrots and sticks to get what they want.”1 Power, a nation’s ability to influence other states to achieve a desired outcome, manifests in numerous different forms or elements within a state. Powerful states strive to employ all the elements of power, including diplomacy, information, economic, cultural, and most importantly military to further their national objectives. Although a reasonable person might expect that a militarily powerful state routinely triumphs over the weaker state in matters of war, superior military power only guarantees a victory on paper, not in any real war. This paper will show that when one considers a state’s relative military power, weaker states are capable of defeating more powerful states that struggle to formulate

The notion of an American way of war informs how scholars, policymakers, and strategists understand how Americans fight. A way of war—defined as a society’s cultural preferences for waging war—is not static. Change can occur as a result of important cultural events, often in the form of traumatic experiences or major social transformations. A way of war is therefore the malleable product of culturally significant past experiences. Reflecting several underlying cultural ideals, the current American way of war consists of three primary tenets—the desire for moral clarity, the primacy of technology, and the centrality of scientific management systems—which combine to create a preference for decisive, large-scale conventional wars with clear objectives and an aversion to morally ambiguous low-intensity conflicts that is relevant to planners because it helps them address American strategic vulnerabilities.

From 1900 to 1945, the United States of America (US) witnessed a great transition in their economic, cultural and political spheres. From the isolation movement in the early 1900’s, the US thereafter acknowledged that their position in the world was to be a developer of a new world order. Therefore with the American entrance in World War II, the US had a political motive after achieving victory to create a postwar world that was independently connected politically and economically. However, with the Soviet Union fighting alongside the US a new policy had to be made to ensure cooperation for postwar peace. But with two radically different ideologies postwar peace would not be influenced by cooperation, but rather by economic and military force.

For the last one hundred years, the United States has been part of numerous regional and global wars. Logically, its engagement in these wars had foundations on various reasons, and it employed numerous tactics to ensure that it emerged victorious in each instance. Besides, these wars had different implications, some of which are still significantly relevant to the contemporary society. Since its establishment as a superpower at the beginning of the twentieth century, the United States has engaged in some legitimate wars and employed incalculable armed intrusions (Rockoff 8). Some of the most famous wars America partook in the last century include World War I & II, the Korean War (1950 – 1953), the Vietnam

In the theater, the role of a performer is to convince the audience they are something or someone they are not. In much the same way actors pretend to fool the audience, politicians likewise use acting to conceal their true political goals from potential opponents. This strong association between the theater and politics is readily apparent in Julius Caesar. The conspirators led by Cassius and Brutus use acting to conceal their politically motivated goal to assassinate Caesar. Marc Antony likewise uses acting to not only conceal his hatred for the conspirators, but to also turn public opinion against them. This relationship between politics and the theater is reinforced by having various characters directly reference the theater when discussing political goals. However, in the end, Antony manages to emerge victorious. This is largely due to Brutus’s decision to not only spare him but to allow him to speak at Caesars funeral. This decision marks a key turning point in the play and highlights a disconnect between Brutus and the theater. This disconnect results in the failure to anticipate not only Antony’s true intentions, but also in the power of rhetoric to sway the populace. Equally important is Antony’s own complete immersion in the theater to allow him to deceive the conspirators and recognize how best to use his words to influence the people. These two factors build off each other and are critical in determining the eventual conclusion

I started this week with the theatrical workshop where I could practice improvisation and persuasion tools. I needed to invent a story, and make it convincing. While telling the story on the spot, I tried to integrate the 'zero position' and to create a world the audience can imagine and relate too and I could feel that it actually improved my performance. Approaching rhetoric through theater reminded me that a speaker is a performer. Also, it made me think that when I come to give a speech it is important to find the balance between me as a person and me as a performer. It might be that in order to persuade the audience I will need to act out and exaggerate my way of being.

The purpose of this essay is to inform on the similarities and differences between systemic and domestic causes of war. According to World Politics by Jeffry Frieden, David Lake, and Kenneth Schultz, systemic causes deal with states that are unitary actors and their interactions with one another. It can deal with a state’s position within international organizations and also their relationships with other states. In contract, domestic causes of war pertain specifically to what goes on internally and factors within a state that may lead to war. Wars that occur between two or more states due to systemic and domestic causes are referred to as interstate wars.

Ballet is my happy place, away from the political world in which I work. I want to make sure everyone who reads this knows that this is just me giving extra information that I'm not making any kind of political endorsement or trying to start a political conversation. I begrudge no one for continuing to use "State Theater," (and frequently use the title myself), but I do think it's important that our society should be informed of who we're talking about--- Just as folks should know that it's not the Ed Koch Theater.

To answer this we must look at the stability and political environments that encompass a state because they play a large role in the ability of other actors to occupy land that it controls. For this reason, the US should only associate with countries that follow their same beliefs. The US must be cautious as to what countries that they decide to ally themselves with in order to analyze potential political outcomes (Lostumbo, Michael J., McNerney, Michael J., Peltz, Eric, 2013). Factors that can play a role can include a countries economic growth, annual GDP, or if there is ethnic conflict within the territory. If analyzed in an efficient way, the argument can be made to allow for the structuring and development of overseas bases in underdeveloped and/or developed

Clausewitz defines war as an “act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” The nature of war is enduring yet the character of war changes over time. Current US strategic guidance is advancing the point of view that since the character of war has changed to focus on irregular wars then the US military should prepare for a future of irregular wars. This shift in focus forgets that the nature of war is enduring and in order to be successful, we must prepare for all types of conflict. This paper will define the types of conflict and the likelihood of each followed by a discussion of US strategic guidance and ending with an analysis of the training resources and force structure requirements needed to achieve success for all types of