I. Whether the district court correctly held that a third-party’s authority to consent to a search of a shoebox was not ambiguous when she gave officers clear indications of mutual access to and use of the shoebox and, even if the third-party’s authority had been ambiguous, such ambiguity would not defeat her apparent authority because allowing it to do so would impose an unreasonable burden on police officers?
II. Whether the government’s presentation of circumstantial evidence showing that the defendant-appellant acted evasively in his dealing with the substance at issue, knew the chemical components that made up the substance, and knew the effects of the substance was sufficient to prove the requisite scienter element necessary to sustain
Search and seizure is a vital and controversial part of criminal justice, from the streets to the police station to court. It is guided by the Fourth Amendment, which states that people have the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure of their bodies, homes, papers, and possessions and that warrants describing what and where will be searched and/or seized are required to be able to search the above things (“Fourth Amendment,” n.d.). Interpretations of the Fourth Amendment by the U.S. Supreme Court and the establishment of case law by many state and federal courts have expanded upon the circumstances under which search and seizure is legal. Several doctrines and exceptions have also emerged from the Supreme Court and other case law that guide law enforcement officers on the job and aid lawyers in court.
Throughout the past centuries, the United States has encountered many court cases dealing with illegally searching citizens homes and using the evidence found against them. Cases dealing with Search and Seizure have dated back to Mapp v. Ohio, in which Dollree Mapp’s apartment was illegally searched and child pornography was found. This case raised the question, may evidence obtained through a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment be admitted in a state criminal proceeding? This issue is a major problem because it could lead to many citizens rioting and even more cases dealing with this controversial topic. In spite of many attempts to eliminate illegal search and seizures, it has still been a reoccurring problem. Regarding the issue of search and seizure, the Supreme Court has developed a much
Another case that establishes the premise for determining the validity of the search includes United States v. Matlock. The question before the Court in Matlock was whether the third party's consent for the police to search the defendant's house was "legally sufficient" to render the evidence admissible at trial. Police officers arrested the defendant in his front yard, but did not request his permission to search the house. Instead, some of the police officers approached the house and requested permission to search from Mrs. Graff, who lived in the house with defendant. Mrs. Graff consented to the search and the officers found nearly $5,000 in cash in a closet. Both the district court and the court of appeals excluded the evidence from the trial, finding that Mrs. Graff did not have the authority to consent to the search. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to settle this evidentiary issue. Justice White, for the Court, espoused the
Her attorney argued that she should never have been brought to trial because the material evidence resulted from an illegal, warrant less search. Because the search was unlawful, he maintained that the evidence was illegally obtained and must also be excluded. In its ruling, the Supreme Court of Ohio recognized that ?a reasonable argument? could be made that the conviction should be reversed ?because the ?methods? employed to obtain the evidence?were such as to offend a sense of justice.? But the court also stated that the materials were admissible evidence. The Court explained its ruling by differentiating between evidence that was peacefully seized from an inanimate object, such as a trunk, rather than forcibly seized from an individual. Based on this decision, Mapp's appeal was denied and her conviction was upheld.
Terry v. Ohio, a landmark case from 1968, where John W. Terry was stopped and later searched by Officer Martin McFadden because he suspected Terry of “casing” out a store to rob. McFadden decided to search Terry’s clothing for weapons before he questioned him about his suspicious behavior. The Fourth Amendment applies to this case because it protects people from “unreasonable searches and seizures” without a warrant or probable cause. The reason I chose this particular case to analyze is because it is a clear example of an officer using his experience to recognize suspicious characters and gain probable cause in order to justify searching Terry and his cohorts’ clothing without violating their Fourth Amendment rights. I will examine the facts about the case, answer whether the officer’s actions violated the Fourth Amendment, Chief Justice Warren’s rulings, the Fourth Amendment and how it applies, the suspects expectations of privacy, the Courts admission of evidence into Court, and my overall opinion on the case and the Court’s decision.
The court should find that the evidence found against the defendant, Mr. Arnold J. Stewart, should not have been suppressed under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states that “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The moment Stewart left his suitcase in the care of Mr. Holt, he gave him possession over it. In the case of United States v. Arango, 912 F.2d 441 (10th Cir. 1990), the court determined that the one who has the right to possession of personal property has the right to exclude others from searching it. In this situation because of Larry Holt’s growing concerns with the suitcase beginning left with him for longer than intended and the concerns of whether the suitcase contained a bomb, he did not exclude
The Court assessed the reasonableness of the police activity here by comparing it to activity that would ordinarily require a warrant. "[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the
INTRODUCTION: In Terry vs. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the question of the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure was brought before the court system. The case looked at the admissibility of evidence discovered during search and seizure, in particular, as it relates to street encounters and investigations between citizens and officers of the law. The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the decision of the 5th Ohio Court of Appeals. This case was of particular importance it helped establish what type of search and seizure behavior was lawful and unlawful on the part of officers, and set clear guidelines. The rulings in this case pertain to the Fourteenth Amendment (Cornell University Law School, n.d.).
Morris, 331 N.W.2d 48, 53 (N.D. 1983)); Florida v. Adkins, 96 So. 3d 412, 414 (Fla. 2012) (discussing the difference between actual and constructive possession); Brent v. State, 957 N.E.2d 648, 648, 652 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that the defendant did not have actual or constructive possession of a bag of drugs located on the ground, beside a vehicle, that the defendant was in); Hunter v. Commonwealth, 690 S.E.2d 792, 794, 799 (Va. 2010) (holding that the evidence would have supported a charge of constructive possession of a firearm when the defendant/passenger stated that the gun located in the driver’s glovebox was his, but he was not charged with that crime); Martinez v. State, 152 P.3d 1237, 1243 (Idaho Ct. App. 2007) (holding that the defendant’s case must be reversed because he was not aware of the required mental state to plead guilty to constructive possession); Campbell v. People, 73 P.3d 11, 14 (Colo. 2003) (holding that the State must prove that the accused had actual or constructive possession of the drug); Washington v. McPherson, 46 P.3d 284, 291 (Wash. 2002) (holding that the defendant had actual possession of drugs found in another person’s pocket under the accomplice liability theory); Sims v. Alabama, 733 So. 2d 926, 929 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998) (holding that the defendant had actual possession of the drugs located under the driver’s seat of a vehicle he
See McFadden, 135 S. Ct. 2298; Bruno, supra, at 914-19 (articulating the preexisting circuit split). In resolving the circuit split, the Supreme Court set forth two ways of proving the scienter element, 1) presenting evidence that proves the defendant knew the substance with which he was dealing with was some controlled substance through the operation of the Analogue Act, regardless if he knew the actual identity of substance, or 2) presenting evidence the defendant knew (or made representations that) the substance with which he was dealing with had properties and effects similar to (or greater than) those of a schedule I or II substance. McFadden, 135 S. Ct. at 2306. The Government does not have to prove the defendant knew of the Analogue Act in order to meet either way and it can prove the scienter element using either one of the ways was as well. See id. Furthermore, the Government can use circumstantial evidence to prove the scienter element. See id. In the instant case, the Government contends it can prove the scienter element using either
Under the 4th Amendment of the United States, citizens are protected against unreasonable searches and seizures. One exception is through consent to the search. Petitioner Fallsbauer will argue that the consent his mother gave was ambiguous, and because his mother’s consent was ambiguous the consent was not valid and therefore the police had a legal duty to clarify the ambiguity. Specifically, the officers needed to clarify the ambiguity of her consent regarding searching in the shoe box where the police officers found the tablets later discovered to be Taz. Petitioner will argue that the case of U.S. v. Whitfield is analogous to and controlling in his case. In Whitfield, the defendant had been accused of theft, and police officers came to search the residence of the defendant. The court ruled that the mother had not told police officers whether she had anything to do in the 29 year old defendant’s bedroom. They had no reason to know and therefore they could not take her consent. The area of the house to be searched was not under her authority. The court said that ownership of the house does not imply common authority. “A landlord-tenant type of arrangement between a
First, the supreme court rejected all of the prosecution’s case law it relied on to support that the jury’s inference of knowledge was reasonable under the circumstances. Then, the majority then crafted their own logic, not rooted in possession case law, to justify convicting Fischer of possession of methamphetamine. The court’s logic was
In the case State v. Ellis, Central State University RA discovered marijuana in the defendant’s dorm room while they were conducting an authorized, unannounced safety inspection. Campus police officers were then 19 notified and went to the room.While the campus police did not participate in the search, they were present in the room at the resident assistants’ invitation. The Ellis court concluded that the seizure of the marijuana was unconstitutional. It found that while the resident assistants’ search was authorized under the university’s policies and procedures, the later police entry into the room was unlawful because it was made without a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances. This case would be beneficial to Deary Jones because it
The district court’s holding that allowing ambiguity to defeat apparent authority would unreasonably burden police officers by forcing them to clarify the consenter’s authority over every container within the area they were permitted to search should be upheld as it is one that is supported by persuasive precedent from a sister circuit of this Court. See United States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038, 1042 (7th Cir. 2000). In Melgar, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit uses Supreme Court precedent to support the position on ambiguous apparent authority stated above. See id. (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999)). The Seventh Circuit states the Supreme
to investigate the home and its immediate surroundings is a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment” (Epstein & Walker 2016). This case justifies my argument that the Warren court left a positive impact on the American people by interpreting and extending the meaning of searches and seizures, and gave a distinct answer of how far a search can go before it violates one’s rights.