Grand Strategy and the dimensions of the abovementioned. In reviewing the multiple definitions of strategy, one has to look no further than the United States Air Force for the most compelling understanding, “Strategy is the continuous process of matching ends, ways, and means to accomplish desired goals within acceptable levels of risk.” The least compelling definition derived from Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini who states; strategy encompassed the whole theater and was “the art of making war upon the map.” Jomini, brilliant as he was, misses the main appreciative aspect of grand strategy in his definition, the ends, ways, and means of strategy and here is where we will focus and clearly define, with examples, why the United States is strategically slipshod. In understanding, how the ends desired create problems for the U.S., we will look at three components of that variable to identify and understand the shortcomings of U.S. grand strategy. They are international relations, power, and nested within both is the theory of …show more content…
grand strategy, one should look no farther than the Cold War. According to Walt, realism was the dominant theoretical tradition throughout the Cold War. It depicts international affairs as a struggle for power among self-interested states and is generally pessimistic about the prospects for eliminating conflict and war. Realism dominated in the Cold War years because it provided simple but powerful explanations for war, alliances, imperialism, obstacles to cooperation, and other international phenomena, and because its emphasis on competition was consistent with the central features of the American-Soviet rivalry. At the onset of the cold war, we see telltale signs of the theory of realism. One could argue Josef Stalin initiated the “war” and it was his attempt at communist world domination. The flipside of that argument is at the conclusion of World War II; the U.S. dismissed the Soviets security concerns. At the end of the day, the relationship deteriorated and the main powers of the day sat at different ends of the table…the United States sitting next to the United Kingdom while on the other side of the table the Soviet Union looked on in amusement, thinking all had agreed on the future. The initiation of the Cold War finds its roots at the Yalta Conference in Tehran mired poor international relations. In the end, the Yalta agreements were not so much a true compromise as a useful misunderstanding among the three leaders. Stalin left happy he had won Anglo-American acceptance of de facto Soviet control of Eastern Europe; Roosevelt and Churchill left happy they had won Stalin's acceptance of the principle of self-determination; however, the two parts of the agreement were mutually exclusive. Future disputes over the problematic Yalta agreements were not just likely; they were virtually inevitable. The failure of the Yalta Conference and the subsequent break down of international
Over the course of history, the strategic environment has changed rapidly and is now more complex than ever before – it is currently characterized by unpredictability and disorder, and may yet manifest itself in the collapse of nuclear armed nations, destabilizing conflict in geo-politically vital regions, and humanitarian crises. A world of disparate actors – not all nation states – now exists. Unpredictable events will continue to cause strategic surprise. The widespread effects of past conflicts such as World War II, Vietnam and the Iraq war are still being felt and have created significant strategic repercussions. The failures of these conflicts are the result of our military and political leaders’ failure to quickly adapt to wartime conditions. This occurs because of a general refusal to commit to a military culture of learning that encourages serious debate, critical assessments of our military operations, and challenges to our doctrine in the face of emerging change. Additionally, leaders have struggled with the critical responsibility of forecasting and providing for a ready force, one that is well-resourced and prepared to conduct future operations. It is the responsibility of our military and political leaders to send our military to war with a ready force, and a strategy that will ultimately result in victory. But understanding war and warriors is critical if societies and governments are to make sound judgments concerning military policy.
The Cold War, a period of sustained political and military tension between the USA and the USSR, resulted in various viewpoints concerning the cause of the tension emerging. Until today the question remains unresolved, even after the 1991 release of Soviet archives. The main point of disagreement relates to the roles that ideology played in the events between 1945 and 1949. Was it the strongly opposing ideologies, capitalism and communism, or power and material interest that drove both superpowers to the decades of struggle for global supremacy.
The realization, however, came with a stark reality: in order to obtain access to overseas markets, the US would need to devise clever strategies to validate and facilitate these aims. So, while power-hungry business moguls were busy conjuring up plans as to how to bring this about, government and military officials like Theodore Roosevelt, Senator Henry Lodge, President McKinley and Captain A. T. Mahan sought to extend the political and military presence of US forces around the world. The plan was to gain a foothold, and eventually be positioned to control leaders and policies of overseas nations. Naturally, it was a plan that would require the careful construction of outwardly logical
When one can truly understand and uncover the meaning behind these articles and how they fit into one or more of the ‘boxes’ we call paradigms and perspectives. In order to dissect and analyze the case of the Cold War, especially its origins, one must not only skim through the text and uncover main ideas, but also must also relate the readings to these paradigms and establish one’s own ideals and opinions regarding the study of international relations. Personally, I believe the articles associated with the origins of the Cold War along with Professor Katzenstein’s lecture on the topic provide strong arguments for the use of a ‘middle fish’ perspective and a ‘big fish’ paradigm: domestic politics and realism, respectively. Through George Kennan’s personal accounts, experience and analysis at both the time of the Cold War’s inception and forty-plus years later after the fall of the Soviet Union, a point is made regarding the nature of Soviet expansion as an offensive maneuver, which he believed must be contained by a defensive strategy. This point of conflicting strategies by the U.S. and (especially) the Soviet Union provides the reader with a realist argument and perspective. Also, in his second piece, which details remarks made to the Council on Foreign Relations in 1994, Kennan explains that instead of whole-heartedly adopting
To follow their goals in wartime, states tap their economic, political, and diplomatic resources and experiences, as well as their military ones. All of these are elements of grand strategy. Strategy means the larger use of military force. Some examples include implementing blockades, wear and tear, exhaustion, and applying immediate pressure at many points.
Realism is one of the most dominant international relations theories in the academic world. But within Realism, Realists are split on a number of issues. A perfect example of which being the rise of China. Over the past 30 years China has increased not only in population and power, but has also achieved one of the strongest economies in the world. The rise of China is seen as problematic by many realists. Since the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union, the US has enjoyed a position of hegemony in the unipolar power structure of the world. Many fear that the rise of China could upset the current balance of power. One such individual is a prominent realist scholar, John Mearsheimer. He believes that war with China is inevitable and “calls for the US to do whatever it can to slow China’s rise.” Another political theorist Jonathan Kirshner wrote this paper to counter many of Mearsheimer’s claims, stating that Mearsheimer’s offensive realism “is wrong, and dangerous”. Kirshner suggests that instead of using offensive realism we should look instead to the theories roots in classical realism to analyse the rise of China.
The traditional, orthodox interpretation places the responsibility of the Cold War on Stalin’s personality and on communist ideology. It claims that as long as Stalin and the authoritarian government were in power, a cold war was unavoidable. It argues that Stalin violated agreements that he had made at Yalta, imposed Soviet policy on Eastern European countries aiming at political domination and conspired to advocate communism throughout the world. As a result, United States officials were forced to respond to Soviet aggression with foreign policies such as the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Yet revisionists argue that there was “no proof of Stalin promoting communism outside Russia” and that Stalin’s decisions were first and foremost, pro-Soviet and not of communist intentions. Up until 1947, it is evident through Marshall Plan as well as statements and interviews made by Stalin that he was still thinking of cooperation with the United States, Britain and France. Despite post-war conflicts and instability of Soviet-American relations, the USSR’s initial embrace of the Marshall Plan at its announcement expressed
Realism is a theory which believes that sovereign states are the primary actors in the international system. It also believes that the international system has always been anarchic due to the nature of states not trusting each other and each state seeking to gain or maximize its own power capability. The Realist approach to the Cold War was also that of an “anarchical constitutive” and had seen the Cold War as something that was not out of the ordinary. The realists believed that states are always competing to maximize their own power, “the basic premise of its understanding is that the Cold War was not historically unique. the Cold War rather reflected in general terms the ongoing logic of inter-state conflict derived from the anarchical constitutive nature of the international system, and the ‘power maximization’ policies of states” R.Saull (2001:7).
Realism has dominated international relations theory since emerging in the 1930’s. The era of state conflict lasting from the 1930’s to the end of the cold war in 1947, proved the perfect hostile environment to fit the largely pessimistic view of world politics. While many aspects of realism are still alive in International Relations today; including the dominant presence of states, intrinsic of war and the decentralised government. However, realism only reaches so far in explaining and creating a structure for international relations. Whilst the strengths of the theory lie in its pragmatic approach to power politics and conflict. However, the realist view is weakened by changes in the way that conflict is fought, the ineffectiveness of the balance of power model and the increasing global and interconnected world. Thus, using realism as a structure to explain international relations today is to some extent, a theory of the past.
Many strategies have been devised by empires over centuries, these strategies and decisions have helped shape the world as it is in its present state. The author explains how strategic decisions made in the past were the wrong decisions in his opinion, as John Perkins had seen first hand the devastation that could be caused by the American government in its pursuit for a “global empire”.
After December 26 1991, when the Soviet Union fell, the bipolarity of the international system was effaced. In the post- Cold War era, the United States faced the problem, without a defined enemy, to adopt a new foreign policy. To begin to analyze the political foreign policy of the United States, one must first understand the international system. According to Political Realism, a theory of international thought, the state is the key unit within the acts within the system. These states act according to their key norms, which are allowed by the system. However, these sates are also affected the domestic and external factors which control how they act. The domestic factors include political culture, their economic system, the leadership
The historian’s belonging to this school see the Truman doctrine from 1947 as the point when the Cold War started. They put the responsibility for the Cold War on the Soviet Union and its expansionist policy. According to them, this is the reason, why Soviets broke promises from the negotiations during the World War II, especially the Yalta agreement. On the other hand, the U.S. politicians wanted to continue the cooperation between the Allies even after the defeat of the Axis. They put a lot of hope to the newly created organization – United Nations – and the principle of collective security. However, the U.S. needed to react to the Soviet aggression in Europe. They adopted the policy of containment. The orthodox scholars view this policy as necessity because without it “the Soviet Union would have become the master of all Europe, instead of only the eastern Europe” .
Theories are used in many fields of science, but in no field are they more prevalent than Political Science. These theories are often used and researched upon to try and attempt to discern how states interact with one another. Offensive Realism, a new branch of realist political theory, is brought forth in John Mearsheimer’s book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. This theory focuses on the key aspects of realism, while adding a twist as to why war is an option. In his book, Mearsheimer explains the history of great powers, and predicts that China, the world’s current rising great power, will not gain hegemony in Asia peacefully. With the rise of China, he asserts the US will form coalitions with multiple states throughout Asia, to contain their growing power. This rise in power, and subsequent reactions by the US, are based on his theory Offensive Realism, which is used to predict China’s future actions. The rise of powers, and the reactions of other powers, is historically analyzed, beginning in the late 18th century, all the way to modern times. These analyzes each attempt to support his overall claim that China will rise through non-peaceful means, and shows significant support with historical examples. While the theory often meets an exception when the usual non-European power, Japan, is mentioned, Mearsheimer’s theory introduces a solid new aspect to the realm of Political Science, and presents enough evidence and information to be considered integral to
Realism is one of the main theories within International Relations. It provides the view that all actors within the international system act on their own self-interests to gain power. This essay intends to discuss its usefulness as a theory and the reasons for and against it being used to analyse world affairs. Firstly, it shall discuss how the theory is advantageous as it explains how shifts in the balance of power can lead to conflict however it is unable to explain why the distribution of power changes. Second, it will portray how it is useful because states do not need to be labelled as good or bad to fit the theory although it disregards the idea of Natural law and gives a cynical view of human morality. Finally, it will suggest that as the theory is very parsimonious, it can be applied to multiple situations within the world system. On the other hand, it will be said that it fails to look at individuals within a state and their influence on the actions of the state. These costs and benefits will be conveyed through the current tensions between the USA and North Korea to link the theory in with current world politics.
In “Structural Realism...” Waltz defends his theory of Structural Realism against criticism that its tenets are no longer valid in a post-Cold War world. The international system, he writes, is still anarchic, even though that system is unipolar instead of bipolar as it was during the Cold War, and that states still seek hegemony and power. A nation 's ideals and internal factors may count for something (he posits that the US intervention after the collapse of Yugoslavia was the result of such pressures),3 but they certainly shouldn 't. States should make decisions based on the idea of maintaining their own security and maintaining a balance of power in the international system.