A Research Report On Rural Surveillance

The problems that surrounded this Spy Satellite case appeared to be a direct result of a lack of oversight in all aspects of the project. Some of the pronounced facts were:

Various factors like the nature of bureaucratic organizations, unsuccessful diplomacy, lack of military actions, legislators, the uneven structure of the Federal government, advances in technology, backdrops of police surveillance, and policy formation promote organizational problem s in U.S intelligence communities. Intelligence officials and law enforcement experts have made conscious effort in handling terrorist threats before 9/11 attack. Unsuccessful diplomacy and the uneven structure of the Federal government accelerated organizational problems and absence of information sharing among the intelligence agencies. U.S Intelligence strategies have failed to recognize their new enemy and intelligence agencies lacked resources and manpower. U.S Intelligence agencies like CIA, FBI, and National Security Agency have faced organizational crisis from the side of Federal government and bureaucrats, and this organizational crisis contributed failure in their activities.

the inability for local, state, and federal actors to coordinate effectively. The first step for

Two-hundred rebels formed around the village to help deter the Regulars from attacking them. A few of the Regulars attacked the colonist with scatter fire, meaning it was not on command.

As the prominent Kent State professor Charles Brill puts it, “the Guardsmen had not fired randomly out of individual panic. They were organized.”

However, this external trust has been fraying from the edges for many years – clear and realistic political strategy has been lacking from civilian leaders, a well-meaning yet disengaged public, and an insular military class that fails to organically adapt to emerging technologies. A clear and realistic political strategy determined by civilian leaders addresses the first leg of the strategic triad – government. It is said success begins at the top, with a cohesive vision and unified guidance. One doesn’t have to look further than the 2003 invasion of Iraq - then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld claimed it would require no more than 150,000 troops to secure Iraq, despite the insistence of then Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki that it would take 300,000 troops, a number derived from his experience in Bosnia. (Mills, 2013) However, this detail overshadows the deeper implication – that civilian leaders were not planning for stability operations, or had a plan in place after the conventional phase of the war. The lack of guidance and vision from the nation’s strategic leaders make it extremely difficult, if not impossible for the military to effectively prosecute

Finally they had arrived and they has eatons range with them and we jumped out in front of them. A indian man named toopapyti was face to face with mcallister with a gun to his head. Then toopapyti fired three shots out of his gun two hitting mcallister, the other one hitting connell. Mcallister was dead immediately and connell died soon after. Connells range and the rest of the militia escaped into a longhouse. Clipwalen was trying to report the deaths of connell and mcallister. But me and my two other brothers were hiding in a bush and found him and, confronted him. One of the law people shot my brother and he died. From that moment we knew that the battle has begun. We surrounded the longhouse that we found with the militia and eatons range inside. We shot with our arrows, guns, and other weapons. We shot until 4:00 am on october

Upon analyzing 9/11 it was clear to focus on the limitations that the Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Central Intelligence Agency had faced. Security breaches and poor intelligence sharing were just some of the critical failures that were encountered. Moreover, the main focus is pointed towards the miscommunication between these two agencies. Evidently, the execution and tactical strategies went unnoticed despite the apparent red flags that presented themselves, in addition to the Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Central Intelligence Agency failure to pursue threats and establish a baseline of security resulted in the disaster of 9/11. In conjunction to these mistakes, the restriction of shared information

Looking from a management perspective, one of the first steps is to ensure there is a clear objective, and mission in mind. After analyzing this article, it is clear that in relation to this event it appeared the FBI had no mission statement, therefore, causing confusion for all the personnel involved. Moreover, the confusion may have led to the deployment of 100 armed agents as well as, the use

The current system in place not allowing the military and intelligence communities to operate together because each are working from different authorities is another fine example of government inefficiency. It is crazy to think two agencies working for the same government cannot operate jointly to fight the same enemy because of micromanagement and bureaucratic roadblocks. It is troubling that in all this time our government has failed to adapt and change since 9/11 and continue to hinder the fight by outdated structure.

The government became consciously aware of what could possibly happen. Work was done to improve our Intelligence Agencies policies and procedures to allow for them to work together. Emphasis is placed on the observation of the various

The Testimony of Cofer Black, the Director of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center from 1999-2002, greatly affected my thinking about the domestic intelligence ‘failures’ which led to the inability to foresee or prevent the 9/11 attacks. His testimony, paired with both concurring and clashing views from the 9/11 Commission Report, gave a persuasive ‘defense’ of the intelligence community’s actions and capabilities before September 11, 2001. Three of Black 's ‘agreements’ were particularly influential towards my understanding. First, Black presented a strong argument that the inefficiency of counterterrorism had much to do with pre-9/11 domestic priorities, which left those involved with fighting terrorism, including those acts

If in the name of National security the government keeps so many documents and departments classified that no citizen can discern what their government is doing, they lose the oversight of the citizens, and as a result will be more prone to corruption or poor decisions. This can be seen for example, in the United States government’s use of the Navy’s SEAL Team 6. Highly secretive, SEAL Team 6 has been used for classified missions in foreign nations increasingly over the past decade, with little to no outside oversight. Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) investigates reports of misconduct, but JSOC is also the organization that supervises the team’s missions (Mazzetti 3). While this lack of supervision does not mean that SEAL Team 6 is an inherently corrupt organization, it is an example of how the government can so easily fall into

The United States government policy was not to meddle in foreign affairs. But, the danger was enough for a top-secret mission. United States intelligence received reliable information about a plan to kill west African leaders on a yacht in the Atlantic-ocean. Intelligence officials agreed to act because the situation was a risk to the political stability in Africa. The command was given to stop the assassin and orders were immediately sent to the department that handled international problems.

The term “Covert Action” brings with it a connotation of shadowy figures wrapped in secrecy and intrigue. It also brings with it a substantial amount of moral questions as to “what is right.” The use of covert action has been widely publicized since the early seventies, but trying to find out the truth to these events has been difficult to say the least. What is even more difficult, is historically recording these events into categories of successes or failures. These operations are difficult to dissect because of their secrecy and although events have been recorded, some facts simply aren’t apparent. This paper will seek to identify the complex issues associated with covert operations.