Analysis Of ' Inventing Right And Wrong '

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Values in Meta-ethics
In John Ludwig Mackie’s book Inventing Right and Wrong, he claims that “in making moral judgments we are pointing to something objectively prescriptive, but that these judgments are all false”. By saying this, he supports his main point that there are no objective values. However, John McDowell will be against Mackie’s argument, because he suggests that moral values are secondary qualities which can be objective. I hold the same viewpoint as McDowell’s. In this essay, I will firstly explain Mackie’s argument, then illustrate McDowell’s objections, and finally explore some potential responses by Mackie.
In the quote, Mackie argues that there are no moral obligations that are objectively prescriptive. He explains that his claim is based on a second order sense, which means that he does not question the content of moral judgments, but cast doubt on whether this type of arguments express objectivity. Mackie then presents the argument from relativity and the argument from queerness to illustrate all moral judgements are false. In the argument from relativity, Mackie contends that there are no universal principles. What determines people’s moral principles is their upbringing. When there is a disagreement, people judge it as right or wrong based on their moral sense, rather than objective values. Hence, there is no good or bad with moral judgements. Moreover, in the argument from queerness, Mackie claims that if there were objective values, they would be in

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