Values in Meta-ethics
In John Ludwig Mackie’s book Inventing Right and Wrong, he claims that “in making moral judgments we are pointing to something objectively prescriptive, but that these judgments are all false”. By saying this, he supports his main point that there are no objective values. However, John McDowell will be against Mackie’s argument, because he suggests that moral values are secondary qualities which can be objective. I hold the same viewpoint as McDowell’s. In this essay, I will firstly explain Mackie’s argument, then illustrate McDowell’s objections, and finally explore some potential responses by Mackie.
In the quote, Mackie argues that there are no moral obligations that are objectively prescriptive. He explains that his claim is based on a second order sense, which means that he does not question the content of moral judgments, but cast doubt on whether this type of arguments express objectivity. Mackie then presents the argument from relativity and the argument from queerness to illustrate all moral judgements are false. In the argument from relativity, Mackie contends that there are no universal principles. What determines people’s moral principles is their upbringing. When there is a disagreement, people judge it as right or wrong based on their moral sense, rather than objective values. Hence, there is no good or bad with moral judgements. Moreover, in the argument from queerness, Mackie claims that if there were objective values, they would be in
Ethics can be defined as "the conscious reflection on our moral beliefs with the aim of improving, extending or refining those beliefs in some way." (Dodds, Lecture 2) Kantian moral theory and Utilitarianism are two theories that attempt to answer the ethical nature of human beings. This paper will attempt to explain how and why Kantian moral theory and Utilitarianism differ as well as discuss why I believe Kant's theory provides a more plausible account of ethics.
Throughout this paper, I will contrast and compare two moral theories in attempt to uncover what one provides a better argument and can be applied as a universal moral code. The two moral theorists Immanuel Kant and J.S Mill have created two distinctly different theories on morality and how to develop a universal moral code. Both theories focus on intentions and consequences. Kant believes that the intentions and reasons of our actions can be measured and defined as morally correct, where as Mill believes that our intentions really play no role in morality, and that we should focus on the consequences and outcomes of our actions to evoke the most happiness for the most people. Even though both philosophers make incredibly different
We believe that Gilligan’s distinction between a morality of care and a morality of justice is a distinction held in the minds of all human beings… However, these two senses of the word moral do not represent two different moral orientations existing at the same level of generality and validity. We see justice as both rational and implying an attitude of empathy. It is for this reason that we make the following proposal: i.e. that there is a dimension along which various moral dilemmas and orientations can be placed. Personal moral dilemmas and orientations of specials obligation, as we have just discussed them, represent one end of this dimension and the standard hypothetical justice dilemmas and justice orientation represent the other end (Kohlberg, Levine, and Hewer,
When thinking about morality, it is necessary to consider how aspects from both nature and nurture, along with free will, may form ones moral beliefs and dictate ones moral actions. To understand how moral beliefs as well as actions formulate and operate within individuals and societies, it is imperative that a general definition of morality is laid out. Morality, then, can be defined as ones principles regarding what is right and wrong, good or bad. Although an individual may hold moral beliefs, it is not always the case that moral actions follow. Therefore, in this essay I aim to provide an explanation that clarifies the two and in doing so I also hope to further the notion that one’s moral framework is a product of all three factors; nature, nurture, and free will. The first part of this essay will flush out what exactly morality it and how it manifests similarly across individuals and differently across individuals. Contrariwise, I will then explain how morality manifests similarly across societies and differently across societies. Alongside presenting the information in this order, I will trace morality back to primordial times to showcase how morality has evolved and developed since then, not only from a nature-based standpoint, but also from a
There are various elements that contribute to the significance of a film. Cinematography, is one important element in which the camera is used to capture visual images through a number of other controllable elements such as; camera lens, framing, scale, movement etc. Editing is another fundamental component of film studies in which different shots are put together in a coherent sequence in order to make meaning of a film.
Sometimes agents are forced to choose between the morally right action and that which would be in their self-interest. When conflicting demands are imposed on a person, how are they to determine the best course of action? In “The Ring of Gyges: Overridingness and the Unity of Reason,” David Copp argues that neither morality nor self-interest overrides the other, and so there is “never an overall verdict as to which action is required simpliciter” in “conflict cases” (86-87). Furthermore, he denies that there is any normatively supreme standard (87). This paper will first expound Copp 's definitions of normative properties and standards. Secondly, his account of overridingness and his arguments against the supremacy of the standards of morality, self-interest, and personal excellence will be explicated. Finally, his claim that any standard which is posited as the answer to the overridingness question will result in circularity will be analyzed. It will be argued that his definition of an “authoritative” standard forces him to either accept that a normatively supreme standard does exist or, otherwise, that there is no non-arbitrary way to attribute normative significance to any standards at all.
J. L. Mackie makes his position explicit by opening his article "The Subjectivity of Values" with this terse statement: "There are no objective values." Mackie had found recent dialogue in moral philosophy to be fraught with misunderstandings and conflations of various moral positions, so he felt it necessary to rigorously define his position as well as the boundaries of his concerns. Thus his article has two major parts: First, Mackie defines the nature of his moral skepticism, and, second, he defends his position by showing the implausibility of moral realism with a series of arguments.
Mill 's Utilitarianism and Ross ' Intuitionalism both use moral intuitions as core components of their moral theories, but their valuation of these intuitions in making morally sound decisions differ. I will argue that it is this misevaluation of moral intuition in the Utilitarian tradition that makes the moral theory unstable and prone to criticism. Ross ' deontological approach to moral intuitions provides a more believable, and morally acceptable account of the role these intuitions play in making ethical decisions. In this paper, I will begin with underlying both Ross ' and Mill 's valuation of moral intuitions in the framework of their moral theories, followed by a brief explanation of each philosopher 's view of “what makes an act moral”. Having established these I will, with the aid of a brief anecdote, describe my difficulties with Mill 's utilitarian approach to ethics. Finishing with an assessment of some utilitarian complaints about Ross ' theory. Ultimately Utilitarianism provides a commendable theory for widely applicable and practical moral action, but its inability to address conflicts with strong moral intuitions weakens its argument. Ultimately Ross ' more flexible, yet not relativistic, deontological intuitionalism becomes a more attractive moral theory.
Moral relativism, as Harman describes, denies “that there are universal basic moral demands, and says different people are subject to different basic moral demands depending on the social customs, practices, conventions, and principles that they accept” (Harman, p. 85). Many suppose that moral feelings derive from sympathy and concern for others, but Harman rather believes that morality derives from agreement among people of varying powers and resources provides a more plausible explanation (Harman, p. 12).The survival of these values and morals is based on Darwin’s natural selection survival of the fittest theory. Many philosophers have argued for and against what moral relativism would do for the world. In this essay, we will discuss
Both Susan Wolf’s article “Moral Saints” and John Stuart Mill’s book “Utilitarianism” will be discussed here. These works offer expositions of and opinions on the philosophical issue of the moral worth of adhering to a certain set of values, and how a person’s motivations for doing so can change their worth and the desirability of their way of life. Wolf offers the position that leading an extremely morally good life is undesirable, while Mill’s opposing position is that if morality leads to happiness, then that behavior is preferable. To determine which of these stances on the value of morality has the most pertinence, these two arguments will be outlined and consequently analyzed. Their differences and similarities will be enumerated and described, and consequently their merit will be discussed. Finally, Wolf’s moral theory will be proven to be inferior to Mills’s, due to its prejudice, lack of supportive evidence, and its inability to be universally applicable.
7. Kant’s ethics gives us firm standards that do not depend on results; it injects a humanistic element into moral decision making and stresses the importance of acting on principle and from a sense of duty. Critics, however, worry that (a) Kant’s view of moral worth is too restrictive, (b) the categorical imperative is not a sufficient test of right and wrong, and (c) distinguishing between treating people as means and respecting them as ends in themselves may be difficult in practice.
This paper offers an analysis of Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham in order to argue that both of their moral theories are two different ethical principles. Nevertheless, many of their reasonings are applied in moral debates and are relevant in today’s society. Both of these philosophers brought back moral philosophy and provided different approaches on how an individual should follow moral principles. In the first part of this essay, I will analysis Kant’s moral philosophy, such as context of right and wrong, the meaning of the text, and provide evidence that these principles is applied in today’s moral debate. Then, I will discuss Bentham’s moral philosophy using the same steps of analysis.
The question of what constitutes morality is often asked by philosophers. One might wonder why morality is so important, or why many of us trouble ourselves over determining which actions are moral actions. Mill has given an account of the driving force behind our questionings of morality. He calls this driving force “Conscience,” and from this “mass of feeling which must be broken through in order to do what violates our standard of right,” we have derived our concept of morality (Mill 496). Some people may practice moral thought more often than others, and some people may give no thought to morality at all. However, morality is nevertheless a possibility of human nature, and a
John Finnis, an Australian legal philosopher has tried to resurrect the natural law tradition in moral philosophy and law since the mid-1960s. He tries to offer a "neo-Aquinian" natural law philosophy which does not presuppose a divine being. By focusing attention on goods rather than a single Good, Finnis skilfully articulates what he calls a theory of moral action for our day. Or, in other words, he seeks a theory of how to live well. Finnis identifies a number of equally valuable basic goods or ends, given human nature, there are seven. Three are substantive, existing prior to action and four are reflexive which is depending on our choices.
In his influential book, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, J.L Mackie begins with the bold claim that “[t]here are no objective values.” Mackie holds that moral judgements are beliefs and that moral statements are propositions, meaning that they are capable of being true or false. However, for Mackie, all such propositions are false, and thus one is in error about what they are actually claiming. In this paper I will summarize two of Mackie’s arguments for why we should accept error theory: the argument from relativity and the argument from queerness. I will then explain two possible positions error theory leaves us with respect to morality —abolitionism and fictionalism —followed by some objections to both. While these positions have certain benefits, their strict forms, I will argue, are ultimately unsatisfying with the addendum that fictionalism seems the more tenable.