Argument Of Larry Laudan 's Pessimistic Meta Induction Essay

Kathryn Schulz argues in “Evidence”, a chapter of her book called Being Wrong, that we need to “learn to actively combat our inductive biases: to deliberately seek out evidence that challenges our beliefs, and to take seriously such evidence when we come across it” (Schulz, 377”). By attending to counterevidence we can avoid making errors in our conclusions.

Everything that is known was once unknown. In John M. Barry’s book, The Great Influenza, he effectively asserts this belief with the use allusions and a paradox to characterize scientific research as embracing uncertainty to make the unknown known.

Epistemological Foundationalism essentially claims that some empirical beliefs carry justification that does not require, or depend, on the justification of other empirical beliefs. In this essay, I intend to introduce the reading, “Can Empirical knowledge Have A foundation?” Written by Laurence Bonjour, to give a detailed summary of his arguments - as well as those who object to his - and ultimately to assert my belief that there is currently no example of an empirical belief that of which can be justified in an epistemic sense without avoiding reference to other empirical beliefs, which would then have to be justified themselves, not solving the regress problem.

In his book The Great Influenza, author John M. Barry writes about his opinion on the characteristics of scientists and their research. He believes that science is full of uncertainty and scientists must be able to deal comfortably with the unknown, as well as the fact that scientists must be creative and accept that their own beliefs can be easily broken by their own research. He accomplishes this by utilizing rhetorical strategies such as allusions, references to relatable examples, and a “matter of fact”, harsh tone.

Induction is a form of reasoning where the premises support the conclusion, but do not confirm that the conclusion is true. To justify induction, we are required to justify that we can infer that experiences we have never experienced will resemble those that we have experienced. Making inductive inferences is necessary for everyday life as well as in science. It is rational to rely on inductive arguments in everyday life for claims such as “the sun will rise tomorrow.” But inductive arguments require that nature is uniform. For example, tomorrow the laws of physics will continue to work the same as how they have in the past, so the world will continue spinning and the sun will rise. This perceived uniformity (the principle of uniformity of nature) allows claims like the one previously outlined to be easily understood. Although inductive arguments are useful, whether or not they can be justified is a topic of debate. In James Van Cleve’s “Reliability, Justification and the Problem of Induction,” he uses an inductive argument to attempt to justify induction. In his justification he claims that his method of argument is not circular. I argue that his reasoning is problematic because an inductive argument is not able to justify induction, mainly because inductive arguments presuppose the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature.

Furthermore, there are three main aspects which were customarily associated with a science: metaphysical, theoretical and methodological assumptions. Under metaphysical it is believed that to gain scientific status requires the certainty that the subject matter i.e. human thought/ behaviour, is similar to that of other accepted sciences. This could then be true for Psychology, as particularly since Darwin’s suggestion of a continuity between behaviours of humans and other species, behaviour has become more scrutinised. However, this must be assumed in respect of determinism, suggesting predictions could be made. ‘Heisenbergs uncertainty principle’ suggests that when relating evidence of indeterminism within the universe to human behaviour, it proves ambiguous, and with parts of the discipline believing strongly in free will it seems difficult to establish a common ground (Valentine E.R. page 2).

In Creation Science is not Science, Michael Ruse argues that Creation science is not science and in Science at the Bar- Causes for Concern, Larry Laudan opposes this view by arguing that Creation Science is science, but that it is false. In this paper, I argue that Michael Ruse had the better argument and that Creation Science is not science. First, I explain Ruse’s argument for why creation science does not meet the criteria for science. Second, I consider and explain Larry Laudan’s opposing view that creation science is false science. I then argue why I believe Ruse has the better argument.

The following essay aims to discuss the inconsistencies between the inductivist and Popper’s points of view of science rationality of science in light of claims that the scientific method is inductive yet an inductive method is no. I think is rational to say that inductivist view of science has significant contradiction that Popper’s view solves. To support Popper’s view my argument will introduce the inductivist and falsificationsist views and I will focus in showing the issues of considered science as objective, scientific knowledge as proven and nature as uniform as well as the differences between inductivism and falsificationism to the creation of hypothesis.

It is logical to say that things happen for a reason. A ball, kicked by a child in a playground, flies through the air and eventually comes down to the ground. The child has kicked the ball enough times to expect that once the ball reaches its highest point, it will fall. Through experience of kicking the ball and it coming back to the ground, the child will develop expectations of this action. This thought process seems sound, yet a question of certainty arises. Can we be certain that future events will be like past events? Can we be certain that the ball will fall once it has been kicked? This concept was one of David Hume’s most famous philosophical arguments: the Problem of Induction. This paper will outline Hume’s standpoint, as well give criticism for his argument.

The inductivist account of science recognizes five steps which are essential to scientific progress. First, scientists compile a large body of facts from observation and experiment. Using the principle of induction, these facts can be generalized to form the basis for a theory or law. Then, once a theory has been developed, scientists can use the theory as part of a valid logical argument to make new predictions or explanations of phenomena. According to Chalmers, the inductivist account has “a certain appeal” to it, namely, that all of scientific progress can be seen as the result of five fundamental leaps of thought (54). “Its attraction lies in the fact that it does seem to capture in a formal way

The controversy within the field and study of Philosophy is continuously progressing. Many ideas are prepared, and challenged by other philosophers causing the original idea to be analyzed more thoroughly. One of the cases that challenge many philosophers is The Problem of Induction. David Hume introduced the world to The Problem of Induction. The Problem of Induction claims that, past experiences can lead to future experiences. In this essay, I will explain how the problem of induction does not lead to reasonable solutions instead it causes philosophers more problems.

In the 17th century Francis Bacon introduced induction as the new method for producing scientific theories. However inductive reasoning is riddled with problems that make it unsatisfactory for demarcating science. Hume’s problem of induction

In “The Refutation of Skepticism”, Jonathan Vogel establishes an “Inference to the Best Explanation” (hereafter, “IBE”) as a means to refute skepticism about the external world. In this refutation, Vogel acknowledges that skepticism about IBE still remains a possibility, but that this kind of skepticism would be rather outlandish in character and thus could be ignored. This paper shall both establish and evaluate Vogel’s reasoning as to why he confidently dismisses any skepticism pertaining to his IBE, and furthermore will illuminate some points as to why Vogel may have mischaracterized potential threats to his method, leaving his refutation of skepticism vulnerable to doubt that is not as

As people, we come with earlier knowledge and understandings on subjects and topics of study, “Science” being one of them. We make presumptions, based on either reasonable evidence or that our thoughts and ideas are known as true by others. Through this we have come to understand and define science as its aims, leaving its definition, whether consciously or unconsciously, unchallenged. We have taken advantage of the label that we have set for science, as well as its goals, and failed to look at them further.

Assumptions in the title of this essay imply that results, theories and laws resulting from the current system of peer review multiple perspectives produce completely infallible objective truth, this is a false premise. Whilst the group of knowers known as the scientific community have collectively less bias than one lone knower trying to understand the universe, there is still collective and engrained level of institutional bias. The same problems of confirmation bias and expectation are present in a group of knowers just as they are with one single knower. According to Karl Popper (1902-1994) the best way to eliminate any expectation and confirmation bias was to falsify and disprove rather than confirm one’s hypothesis and predictions. Popper argues: no matter how convincing an argument or theory is, all that is needed to disprove it is one piece of valid counterclaiming evidence. Whilst this theory is valid on an individual level, it really becomes an effective tool in the objectivity of science on a large scale. Despite this attempt at objectifying and ‘protecting against’ error and bias it is inadequate due to inherent flaws in the scientific method. Induction, moving from the specific to the general, is the key element in scientific logic. Any theory or law ‘proved’ through this logic has some key flaws: the main flaw being that inductive logic can never be certain of any event happening or of any prediction. Richard van de Lagemaat