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Aristotle 's Philosophy On Moral Virtue

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In Book II of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle discusses the idea of moral virtue. Aristotle emphasized the importance of developing moral virtue as the way to achieve what is finally more important, human flourishing (eudaimonia). Aristotle makes the argument in Book II that moral virtue arises from habit—equating ethical character to a skill that is acquired through practice, such as learning a musical instrument. However in Book III, Aristotle argues that a person 's moral virtue is voluntary, as it results from many individual actions which are under his own control. Thus, Aristotle confronts us with an inherently problematic account of moral virtue.
Aristotle offers four cardinal moral virtues: prudence, temperance, courage, and …show more content…

In this sense, a person can do the “right” thing, but if it is not done by his own will or choice, it is not morally virtuous. The claims of Books II and III directly contradict each other. The former argues that force must play a part in the development of moral virtue, while the latter explicitly states that what is done by force is not at all morally virtuous.
This contradiction can perhaps be resolved within Aristotle’s analysis of justice in Book V. Here he makes evident that justice as a virtue is inherently intertwined with law-abidingness, so much so that he calls lawfulness “complete virtue” (1129b28). Yet, Aristotle also provides an extensive critique of laws. Giorgi Areshidze examines this critique in his essay, “Aristotle’s Critique of Justice, the Rule of Law and the Common Good in Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics.” According to Areshidze, “laws are deficient because they are expressed as universals and therefore are likely to fail to secure justice in particular cases (1137b13), and above all because at the core of laws rest deeply flawed assumptions about human beings: laws require penalties because they assume that the lawbreaker gets away with too much good, and must therefore be subjected to punishment through which “the judge tries to take away his gain and restore the equilibrium” (1132a8).” As a result of this assumption, Areshidze states, “all

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