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Audit Firm Size and Going-Concern Reporting Accuracy

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INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH IN BUSINESS

JANUARY 2012
VOL 3, NO 9

Audit Firm Size and Going-Concern Reporting Accuracy
Dr. Daruosh Foroghi, PhD
Faculty of Accounting
Department of Accounting, University of Isfahan, Iran

Amir Mirshams Shahshahani
Graduate Student at Department of Accounting, Mobarakeh Branch, Islamic Azad
Univeristy, Mobarakeh, Iran
Abstract
This study examines the association between measures of going-concern reporting accuracy and audit firm size of the companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange. Prior works have examined the association between auditor size and audit quality, using various proxies for audit quality. Recent work has hypothesized that
going- …show more content…

Hence, it is not obvious from theory or intuition that Big 4 firms should be superior to non-Big 4 firms (Lawrence et al, 2011).
As the main observable outcome of an audit is the standardized audit report, researchers have used various proxies in an attempt to assess audit quality and, in turn, determine whether a differential in audit quality exists. An extensive branch of audit differentiation research focuses on the quality of the client’s financial statements, in which discretionary accruals are often used as a proxy for audit quality, as they reflect the auditor’s constraint over management’s reporting decisions (Lawrence et al, 2011). Becker et al.
(1998) find that Big 4 clients report lower absolute discretionary accruals than non-Big 4 clients. Francis et al. (1999) suggest that Big 4 auditors constrain opportunistic and aggressive reporting because their clients have higher total accruals but lower discretionary accruals. Krishnan (2003) finds a greater association between discretionary accruals and future earnings for Big 4 than for non-Big 4 clients. However, a weakness is that it only partially captures the effectiveness of an audit in constraining earnings management, as discretionary accruals not only reflect management’s opportunism, but also management’s signaling attempts and random noise, as noted by Guay et al. (1996). The

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