Close Air Support Research Papers

In this lesson you will continue to review the key agencies and major force management processes used in developing warfighting capability provided to combatant comman

Introduction In the 20th-century Canada in support of its closest ally “Great Britain” participated in two world wars. These were wars with new technology, specifically the “fixed wing aircraft” which gave birth to a new battlefield “the sky”. This changed the tactics of previous wars, the airplane was capable of many duties; ranging from aerial reconnaissance to ground attack to the tactical and strategic bombing, both by day and night. Canada did not start with an Air Force, however was a major player in the battle for the sky. This synopsis will discuss the role Canada played in the training of Air Force Personnel from World War One (WWI) through World War Two (WWII).

In chapter eight of Sherry’s novel “The Rise of American Air Power.” Sherry writes about the obsession war generals had with air warfare during the 20th century. He brings up the time Roosevelt decided to use atomic bombs in World War II against Japan and how he wanted to drop these bombs over Japan by aircraft carrier. The technological aspect behind this mission is complicated and made Roosevelt ‘fantasize’ about becoming more advanced in technological warfare. However, some of these improvements left others up in arms, the use of telegraphs left war generals upset about how they were always being interrupted by their superiors during missions. Another advancement that led soldiers up in arms was the operational commands. Operational Commands were in charge of running the airways and pilots would always complain about how they would interfere air battles and cause a distraction. However, Operational Commands had their perks like the use of radar to detect any

When it comes to succeeding at anything, it is important to plan, prepare, and rehears the outcome. In a combat zone, this becomes even more important because lives and the success of the mission depend on it. This was not the case however, during a fight called Operation Anaconda. The purpose of this paper is to point out what went wrong with the lack of planning, coordination, rehearsal, and preparation between Air and ground communications, and how it proved to be critical during Operation Anaconda. The ending results were a delayed execution and several friendly casualties.

The current amphibious concepts and capabilities of the US ensure that we are better prepared to conduct forcible entry operations than we were during the landing at Inchon, and subsequent liberation of Seoul. Amphibious concepts, such as seabasing, amphibious command and control (C2), and the Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) allow forces to project power across domains. Proof of concept exercises like Bold Alligator continue to refine our amphibious capability to provide flexible, scalable, responsive forces that can conduct a multitude of missions. Inchon, during the Korean War, highlights the benefit of maneuver warfare and joint operations. However, security operations, intelligence, and speed were deficient during Operation CHROMITE. World War II demonstrated a lack of preparedness to conduct amphibious operations in the Pacific by the US and Great Britain. The Pacific Campaign and Inchon prove the need to maintain a professional amphibious force and the importance of concepts like seabasing, C2, and the ESG in amphibious operations. Applying the concepts of seabasing, C2, and the ESG in joint exercises with platforms such as Maritime Prepositioning Force, multipurpose amphibious assault ships (LHD), Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC), AV-8B Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing (VSTOL) jets, and MV-22 tilt rotor aircraft ensure that we are better prepared to conduct forcible entry operations than we were during the landing at Inchon, and subsequent liberation of Seoul.

During the course of this training period, both units were to conduct training that would prepare them for the upcoming operation. While both units conducted rigorous training independent of one another, instances of combined Airborne and Air training was extremely limited. Coordinated training between the two units was limited because there was no higher command linking the two units together. Within the article titled “Report of Airborne Operations- Husky and Bigot”, the author stated that “the lack of a supreme command over the Airborne and Air Units, who actually are but one force, complicated combined training and made extremely difficult the fixing of responsibility for shortcomings in training and

As the years past the Army began a new era of movements and adjustments that affected many units and the 12th Combat Aviation Brigade was one of the first units to be effected by the Army’s Aviation restructuring. The Army’s Aviation Restructuring Initiative (ARI) was proposed in October 2013, by “the Army Chief of Staff” (Tan, 2015 Para. 1). Ultimately, the ARI was projected to remove more than 10,000 positions “by eliminating active-component and reserve-component units from the Army’s force structure” (Tan 2015 Para. 1). Before the restructuration of the 12th CAB, there was “a mix of three assault and support battalions in Katterbach, and two smaller units in Stuttgart” (Gould, 2015 Para 1). The ARI also meant that many units would “be

This Personal Experience Paper (PEP) describes operations prior to and during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 11-12. It chronicles A Troop, 1-82 Attack Helicopter Battalion, 82nd Combat Aviation Brigade, and 82nd Airborne Division. The PEP specifically addresses non-standard aviation maintenance Soldiers assigned in a flight troop. Early realignment of an aviation brigade led to a very successful OEF rotation, a high readiness rate for OH-58D helicopters, and numerous combat hours flown. The paper further addresses the following: the critical first 100 days of an OEF rotation, troop internal 24-hour maintenance program, no task force aviator support, the brigade mandated 120-hour flying hour limit, and the importance of voice communication

The author describes the relationship between the Navy and Air Force following World War II as a war in its own right. The two branches had many disagreements on the organization of military forces, and this led to the development of two different organizational concepts. The first was the Navy concept. This concept stated that each branch of the military should be given weapons, and the use of the weapons, regardless of whether on land, sea, or in the air, should be used to fight the enemy. The second organizational method was the Army-Air Force concept. This concept stated that the weapon itself should indicate which military branch would use it. The author gives an example by saying all aircraft, regardless of purpose, should be under the

During the mid-to-late 1960s, and at the height of the Vietnam War, it became painfully obvious to the USAF, and also to observers from outside the Air Force and Department of Defense (DOD) that a new approach was needed to maintain and enhance the United States’ technological lead on adversaries such as the Soviet Union and the North Vietnamese in the realm of air combat superiority. These

Achieving national goals and maintaining balance in military, political/diplomatic, and economic objectives can be challenging. John Stillion’s proposal to engage in fighter pilot combat skills training during peacetime deployments presents an opportunity for advanced readiness in the case of potential future conflicts, yet I have some concerns with his rationale.

Attack Aviation has a large logistical footprint and very limited amount of internal logistical support. Problems arise when you need to move Class I, Class II, Class V, and Class IX to a new and ever evolving footprint. Leveraging the Air Forces to move supplies and personnel limits the extent that we can exert our combat power over time and distance.

In the 20th century, three important science-based innovations led to significant technological advancement. These advancement are also being applied to military options, which are: 1) Nuclear weapons, 2) biotechnology and 3) information and communication technology2. However, it should also be noted that technology alone is insufficient to revolutionize military affair. For instance, 50 years passed between the invention of gunpowder and its employment on major battlefield; and the innovative concept of the Germans using communication technology to integrate land and air forces in defeating the British who possessed the same technology. Therefore, advances in operational concepts are just as important as technology

Although Army Aviation has endured a multitude of challenging moments throughout history, none have compared to those faced in the land that has historically dared and tried many great nations such as the Macedonian Army around 330 B.C. and the Russian Army in the 1970’s and 1980’s. Because of this, this paper will be an informative look at the challenges the United States Army Aviation Operations faced during Operation Enduring freedom in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014. Included in the research, I will discuss the unforgiving terrain, such as a high mountain environment Aviators operated in, the extreme temperatures, degraded visual cues, the human errors aspect, as well the enemy situation, all which tested them all.

Training objectives must support the mission profile and meet the commanders desired end state. Prior to the 56TH train up at the National Training Center (NTC) the deployment location changed from Iraq to Afghanistan (case study). Changes to mission essential tasks were not identified prior to NTC, resulting in the BCT training on collective tasks and validated during MRE based on the Iraq mission profile. However, the shift to the Afghanistan mission profile created gaps in training not identified until units arrived at Bagram Air Field (BAF). i.e. the BCT had to establish an MRAP drivers training program at BAF extending the RSOI process. Training gaps were not limited to company level shortfalls as battalion and brigade staffs were not able to anticipate potential threats and capitalize on opportunities. (case study 2)