To: Professor Shelton
From: 40A
Date: 9/25/2017
Re: Closed Memo Assignment: Common Law Marriage
Discussion
Linda Jordan wants to know if Tod Wood, her current partner, will be able to prove that a common-law marriage had been established. Under Montana common-law courts have held that the party claiming a common-law marriage must prove: “(1) that the parties were competent to enter into a marriage; (2) that the parties assumed a marital relationship by mutual consent and agreement; and (3) that the parties confirmed their marriage by cohabitation and public repute.” Barnett v. Hunsaker (In re Estate of Hunsaker), 968 P.2d 281, 285 (Mont. 1998). (Citing In re Estate of Alcorn, 868 P.2d 629, 630 (Mont. 1994)). There is no doubt that Ms.
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Id. at 286. In In Re Estate of Hunsaker, the living spouse testified they felt married, the couple wore engagement rings, and displayed a grandfather clock engraved implying the same last initial. Id. These three facts, led the Supreme Court of Montana to conclude the couple had satisfied mutual consent. Id. The court reasoned that the implications of the facts are sufficient. Id. (Citing Slavens P.2d 293 at 295).
Here, it is likely the court will hold that Ms. Jordan and Mr. Wood mutually agreed to a marital status. First, unlike In Re Estate of Hunsaker, the court may not determine that a subjective intent was explicitly acknowledged. See id. at 286. In contrast to In Re Estate of Hunsaker, in which the couples felt married, Ms. Jordan never explicitly states whether or not she or Mr. Wood felt married. See id. at 286. However, Mr. Woods will likely argue that Ms. Jordan’s previous outward communication suggests they had at one point in their relationship they both felt married.
Second, the court will likely hold that Ms. Jordan and Mr. Wood’s outward display established mutual consent. Just as the engagement rings in In Re Estate of Hunsaker, Ms. Jordan and Mr. Wood may have established mutual consent by wearing silver bands on their wedding ring fingers. See id. at 286. Likewise, just as in In Re Estate of Hunsaker, Ms. Jordan and Mr. Wood refer to each other
The primary legal question facing the court is whether or not Ms Jonah and Mr White’s relationships can be classified and recognised as de-facto in accordance with the definition produced in section 4AA (1) of the Act. In order for the court to decide, it must be established if the pair’s relationships was one of a “genuine domestic basis”. The court must analyse Murphy J’s decision that the parties did not hold a “reputation” as a coupledom. Whether or not the feelings of both parties towards the grounds of their relationship was mutual is questioned. Furthermore, the appeal highlights that in accordance with the Act and precedence of Green v Green (1989) 17 NSWLR 343, it is possible for a marriage and a de-facto relationship to exist simultaneously, thus the court must address whether or not this fact is relevant to the decision.
There has been a long history regarding reform proposals and recommendations surrounding the law of divorce. The first legislation which was introduced in divorce law was the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857, which allowed people to obtain a divorce. However, today the provisions within that act are outdated, yet, it represented society in 1857. In 1937, legislation altered to catch up with societal changes and additional grounds of divorce were introduced. This again occurred in 1973, where legislation changed altering the grounds and facts in which a divorce could be obtained. This is the current legislation relied upon today.
Johnson further maintains that the circuit court erred by admitting documents that were not properly authenticated. The State counters that “the appearance and contents of each of the documents contained sufficient information from which the factfinder could have reasonably concluded that the document was what the State purported it to be.” We hold that the documents admitted against Johnson were properly authenticated.
The law relating spousal compellability. In 1940 Wigmore observed spousal compellability has a long history wrapped ‘in tantalizing obscurity’. Whereas Lord Wilberforce also states that to allowed a spouse to give evidence would rise to discord and perjury of the law which would be to ordinary people repugnant . These are two distinct opinions highlighting the fact that spousal compellability is a highly debatable area of law. Under section 80 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 spouses are non-compellable unless the offence is one which is specified. However this spousal compellability has sparked intense criticisms and renders the justification questionable. By utilising relevant source, academic opinions and case authority, I will critically evaluate and consider all arguments concerning spousal compellability and include whether or not I think it is justifiable.
Her attorney argued that she should never have been brought to trial because the material evidence resulted from an illegal, warrant less search. Because the search was unlawful, he maintained that the evidence was illegally obtained and must also be excluded. In its ruling, the Supreme Court of Ohio recognized that ?a reasonable argument? could be made that the conviction should be reversed ?because the ?methods? employed to obtain the evidence?were such as to offend a sense of justice.? But the court also stated that the materials were admissible evidence. The Court explained its ruling by differentiating between evidence that was peacefully seized from an inanimate object, such as a trunk, rather than forcibly seized from an individual. Based on this decision, Mapp's appeal was denied and her conviction was upheld.
The main legal issue to examine regarding this case deals with encroachment, which is simply defined as: A possessory right to the property of another that may be acquired by the passage of time. Crockett has well documented existence of the woodlot property dating back over 20 years and was not met with objection on the part of the Smith, who is the true owner. Due to the fact that the plantiff left the defendant undisturbed for over 20 years, he lost his right to dispute to object the encroachment. Smith would have had to make his objections known regarding Crockett’s occupancy in the log cabin, constructed on his wood lot, many years earlier if he wanted to maintain his right to object.
love but there was no talk of marriage. Then in 1882 Williams’ father was appointed the judge
Derby v. Derby, 378 S.E. 2d 74 (Va. Ct. App. 1989) Husband filed a cross-bill on claims of his wife’s adultery, and persuasion to sign a property settlement agreement without consultation with counsel. Derby v. Derby, 378 S.E. 2d 74 (Va. Ct. App. 1989) The husband claimed he was coerced into signing the papers with a false pretense of his wife’s eventual return to the family home. Derby v. Derby, 378 S.E. 2d 74 (Va. Ct. App. 1989)
Coward v. Coward, 582 P.2d 834 (Or. Ct. App. 1978). In Coward, the parties had discussed the premarital agreement in advance, and the wife had refused the advice of her then-fiancé’s attorney to seek out counsel of her own before signing the agreement. Id. Further, in Coward the wife possessed knowledge of the quantity and value of her fiancé’s property interests. Id. In addition, the wife in Coward was deemed to have sufficient business acumen due to her years of business experience.
In In re Marriage of Granger, 197 Ill. App. 3d 363 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1990),
What law is applicable to the determination of the competency of the wife of the petitioner as a
Even If This Court Was To Find That Ms. Brie’s Authority to Consent Was Ambiguous, This Court Must Still Find that the District Court Properly Denied the Defendant-Appellant’s Motion.
Sung’s children challenged the validity of the marriage for three reasons. One of them being that mental capacity was not met, because Mr. Sung was on very large amounts of medication to minimize the effect of Parkinson’s disease on him. So his mental state could have been clouded by the medication leading him to think unclearly. Genuine consent could have been another reason for the questioning of the validity. If Mr. Sung was on a respirator he most likely could not agree to the idea of getting married because a person is physically un-able to talk/agree to marriage. The third reason for questioning the validity of the marriage could be freedom of parties to marry. The case study did not mention Mr. Sung having proof of his previous wife’s
Forest and Olive Green have decided to obtain a dissolution of marriage, after twenty years of marriage. She and Mr. Green have already had several arguments concerning child support arrangements for their children Kelly Green, age 14, and Moss Green, age 10. Mrs. Green thinks that it would be best for the children if she and Mr. Green had joint custody of the children. Along with this, Mrs. Green wants to be able to receive child support from Mr. Green because due to her lack of job experience she thinks it is unlikely that she can find a job that will support herself and the children. Mr. Green who is a corporate executive who
A Madhya Pradesh High Court judgment in 1985 dealt with the case of Loli, who had lived for several years with Radhika Singh. Together they had five daughters and a son. The trial court dismissed the case made by Singh 's sister-in-law that Loli should not have property rights as she was just a mistress. The sister-in-law had sought her rights over the property, and contended that Loli had started living with Singh even when her first husband was alive, and therefore, there could not be a presumption of valid marriage. But the appellate court set aside the trial court 's order, a stand the Madhya Pradesh High Court also agreed with.