Compare And Contrast Critically Locke And Parrfit's View Of Reality

Parfit using Bundle Theory as a jumping off point to explain how he believes that some of our common beliefs about humans are mistaken. He talks about the idea that Bundle Theorists deny the existence of persons. Obviously, they do not outright deny that people exist. Instead, what they deny is that people have an existence that goes beyond their actions and feelings. Instead of being independent beings, humans are more of a series of events. This is a significant element because it helps highlight where Parfit believes that humans have erroneous beliefs about the nature of people. The vast majority of people believe in something similar to the Ego,

The problem with psychological continuity, however, is that many of the relations involved (including memory relations) appear to presuppose identity. Parfit attempts to avoid this charge of circularity by using the concept of q-memory. Q-memories do not presume that the person having the q-memory and the person who actually had the experience are the same person, unlike ordinary memories which do presuppose identity. Parfit applies this same redesription to other relations of psychological continuity such as intention and responsibility.

371). This responds to the objections raised by Thomas Reid in the 18th century (Shoemaker, 2008, p. 340), however, the Memory Theory did require a modification to include the possibility of temporarily forgetting the experiences of an earlier person-stage, “as long as one has the potentiality of remembering it” (Shoemaker, 2008, p. 340). In the conversations held by Gretchen Weirob, Sam Miller and Dave Cohen in Perry’s ‘Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality’ (Perry, 1977), this concept is addressed in depth. Miller relays a chapter written by Locke – “the relation between two person-stages or stretches of consciousness that makes them stages of a single person is just that the later one contains memories of an earlier one...I can remember only my past thoughts and feelings, and you only yours...take this relation as the source of identity” (Perry, 1977, p. 343). These concepts are logical possibilities in my opinion, and are far less unstable than those presented within the Body/Soul Theory, as these concepts do not require the senses of others, but the individual’s first person perception of their personal identity.

A simple example of this is: The person is the same person as someone in the past if the person has the consciousness of the experience that the someone in the past did. Thus, the identity of a person is limited to how much the conscious of later person remembers their earlier conscious memories. Only then he is truly the same person or himself. But then this bring few questions: Can there be a the same thinking substance in different people or different thinking substance in the same person and how do we punish people? To answer the first question he believes that the issue lies whether a immaterial being with consciousness could have its consciousness of its past actions be completely removed then begin a life with new consciousness. Nonetheless if it was possible then Locke argues that there is no reason to say that the person who’s soul and conscious lived before the removal is the same person whose new consciousness took over. To answer the second part, Locke says that the answer depends on whether the conscious of the past actions can be transferred to another person who did not experience it. Locke believes this phenomenon is possible and if it was, would this person be the same person he was before? Yes. Using Locke’s theory where

Locke’s argument for the memory criterion of personal identity, is that psychological continuity (the consciousness of past experiences) is the aspect that preservers our personal identity. Locke

Locke distinguishes between man and person. Locke’s theory talks about consciousness and how our consciousness makes our identity through our experiences. A person can be conscious, self-aware and rational. Consciousness to Locke is awareness of our body and

Derik Parfit corrected this error in Locke’s theory by creating psychological continuity theory. With this improved theory on the original memory criterion , as stated by Parfit:

From the instant folks begin to grip the world around them, notions begin to form. The mind plays a significant role in such chore as it is the core machine transporting such concepts for a soul to comprehend the world. In fact, this concept mimics the passage of an individual gathering apples during a pleasant summer day. Each apple recollected, enfolds a gist in its figure, tint and size over the networks attained by the individual from the instance each apple is selected, and this pertains my view about experiences since we evolve by them. Similarly, the empiricist John Locke, developed his theory of knowledge grounded by sense experience claiming individuals can get to know things outward to their minds. Contrary to this view, Rene Descartes who held rationalist backgrounds, doubted about knowledge acquisition through the senses putting into question perceptions rejecting the concept of material objects being sensed, meanwhile it is Locke’s main key from where his epistemology derives from. Both thinkers try understanding the origins and acquisition of knowledge differing in the idea of grasping the outside world.

     Locke instead is an empiricist, and therefore he directly critiques Descartes epistemic system and tries to establish his own foundation of knowledge. Locke believes that our knowledge of the world comes from what our senses tell us. Locke’s theory state that we are all born with a blank slate, tabula rasa, before we

I will argue that Locke believed that if you remain the same person, there are various entities contained in my body and soul composite that do not remain the same over time, or that we can conceive them changing. These entities are matter, organism (human), person (rational consciousness and memory), and the soul (immaterial thinking substance). This is a intuitive interpretation that creates many questions and problems. I will evaluate Locke's view by explaining what is and what forms personal identity, and then explaining how these changes do conceivably occur while a human remains the same person.

A Discussion On Locke’s Distinction Between Primary And Secondary Qualities And Berkeley’s Opposition Moved by a desire to end skepticism and provide proof for the existence of God, Berkeley defended that the root of all of the former is the belief that there are mind-independent matters. Much different than his immaterialist view, John Locke developed a philosophy in advances to an apparently natural form of realism, in where material matters are in existences, but also independently of our minds. In this essay I will discuss John Locke’s idea of primary and secondary qualities as well as Berkeley’s objection that both must exist only in our minds. In order to discuss primary and secondary qualities, we must first address the definition

Locke rationalizes, an older person may not remember their “self” as young child, but they have memories from when they were middle-aged. When they were middle-aged, they remember their “self” as a young child, therefore their consciousness can be linked.

Plato and Locke have opposite opinions on the matter of innate ideas. Plato argues that the recognition of truth in reality is derived from the "recollection" of truth in the soul. A necessary part of Plato's argument is that "recollection" of Truth depends upon the existence of an immortal soul. Locke, on the other hand, rejects Plato's argument by stating that the recognition of truth is not dependent on "recollection" but is rather "self-evident." In other words, Locke argues that one does not need to "understand" truth to know it or admit of the existence of an immortal soul, for truth according to Locke reveals itself by virtue of its being true. This paper will analyze the arguments of each philosopher and show why I believe Plato to have the better argument on the matter of "recollection" and innate ideas in the soul.

Next, Hume explores the existence of “necessary connextion” when the will commands a new idea. Again there are three arguments. In the first argument the soul’s production of an idea is examined: it “is a real creation; a production of something out of nothing” (45).

One might claim that disproving Locke’s primary-secondary quality distinction is not necessary to Berkeley’s goal, which is refuting previous philosophies of reality. However, he spends a considerable amount of time on the concern that Locke’s primary qualities are also subject to the relativity of experience and the inconsistencies of perception, as secondary qualities are. This, in its self, refutes such a claim.