Cullimore Vs Johnson Case

Szafranski and Ms. Dunston would both be considered legal co-parents of the child and that Mr. Szafranski agrees to undertake all legal, custodial, and other obligations to the child regardless of any changes between each party. Furthermore, the co-parent agreement went on to state that any eggs retrieved and cryopreserved as a result of the in vitro fertilization retrieval shall be under Ms. Dunston’s sole control and should the couple separate, Ms. Dunston will control the disposition of those pre-embryos. The co-parent agreement was never signed yet the couple moved forward with the in vitro fertilization. In May of 2010, Mr. Szafranski sent Ms. Dunston a text message effectively ending their relationship and then filed a pro se complaint in the Circuit Court of Cook County three months later seeking to permanently enjoin Ms. Dunston from using the pre-embryos so he could preserve his right to not be forced into fathering a child against his will. Mr. Szafranski argued that a man and woman are in equal positions when it comes to cryopreserved embryos as they’re not inside the woman’s body. Therefore, Mr. Szafranski argued, “the constitutional right not to be a parent means the consent of both the woman and the man is required for any sue of the pre-embryos. “ In September

Cases of this kind emphasise the tension between two significant policy goals: the child’s best interests, which must dominate the court’s determination as to whether to grant parenting orders, and the prohibition of commercial surrogacy. The former, naturally, prevails. In every published case, the Family Court relied on the evidence tendered by the intended parents indicating the foreign birth mother’s consent to the applications, even where some of that evidence was quite concerning; the birth mother’s lack of interest in parenting the child;and the satisfactory nature of the parenting arrangements achieved under the agreement, in concluding that the best interests of the child were served by making the parenting orders.The earliest published international surrogacy case is Re Mark (an application relating to parental responsibilities). The facts are fairly typical. A couple from Victoria entered into a surrogacy contract under which a woman in California agreed to bear a child for them; the ovum was supplied by an anonymous woman, and one of the applicants provided the

Commercial surrogacy is the process in which a woman is paid a fee to carry and deliver a baby to term. Once the baby is delivered, the woman relinquishes all parental rights to the commissioning couple who exclusively raise the child as their own. Altruistic surrogacy, by contrast, is an arrangement where the surrogate receives reimbursement but only for the expenses that she may have incurred during the pregnancy. In this essay I will argue that commercial surrogacy should not be market-inalienable. I will start by outlining Elizabeth Anderson’s argument in “Is Women’s Labor a Commodity?” in which she offers a number of criticisms to commercial surrogacy. I will then outline objections to the argument and highlight how her argument is highly speculative and does not provide an adequate basis for the prohibition of commercial surrogacy.

The procedures of surrogacy is a delicate and sensitive topic which raises many concerns in the public. As a result of this, Australian laws and courts of law must allow and regulate these practices to make it safe for all involved. Commercial forms of surrogacy agreements are illegal in most states, shown in Part 2, Division 2 in the Surrogacy Act 2010 NSW and Chapter 4 Part 1 in the Surrogacy Act Qld. However, in remaining jurisdictions, couples are allowed to deal in commercial agreements and therefore often turn to an overseas arrangement. It is here where Australian law becomes more obscure and less regulated. In any arrangement including altruistic surrogacy, there are no enforceable laws on the agreement, hence prompting multiple issues regarding the parentage of the child. When the child is born from the gestational carrier- the birth mother and father, according to the Status of the Children Act 1996, are the legal parents. It is when the intended parents apply for a parenting order and accepted by the birth mother that the child’s parentage is transferred- this situation is set out in the case of Re Michael

This suggests the law is successful in meeting society’s needs for children not to be perceived as, “commodities.” However, this logic is disputed; why would one pay for a “commodity,” which will reap no financial gain? The only reason seems to be the personal reward of bonding with a child. Thus, the legislation can spawn

Purdy defends surrogate mothering from a consequentialist point of view. Her case is founded on two premises: firstly, that surrogacy is favourable (that is, it brings about pleasure and reduces pain), and secondly, that the practice is only non-traditional and not morally reprehensible. She thus concludes that "appealing to the sacrosanctity of traditional marriage or of blood ties to prohibit otherwise acceptable practices that would satisfy people 's desires hardly makes sense", and thus, surrogacy should be permissible (Purdy, 1999).

Procedural Facts: In May 2010, a couple of months after Plaintiff Jacob Szafranski donated his sperm and have eight eggs fertilized for freezing, Plaintiff Jacob Szafranski sent Defendant Karla Dunston a text message ending the relationship. In August 2010, two months after the relationship ended, Plaintiff Jacob Szafranski filed a pro se complaint in the circuit court of Cook County. Plaintiff Jacob Szafranski sought to keep Defendant Karla Dunston from using the frozen pre-embryos so he was not forced to father a child against his will. Defendant Karla Dunston ended up counterclaiming and asking the court to grant her sole custody and control over the pre-embryos so she could someday use the pre-embryos to bear her children. Defendant Karla Dunston sited breach of contract and asked the court for relief under promissory estoppel. The circuit court ended up siding with Defendant Karla Dunston by granting her full custody and control over the use of the frozen pre-embryos.

In 1984, a protest was held during the Republic National Convention, in Dallas. The demonstrators were protesting the policies of the Reagan Administration and a few companies based in Dallas. Gregory Lee Johnson, at the time a member of the Revolutionary Communist Youth Brigade, participated in the protest. When the protestors reached Dallas City Hall, Johnson doused an American flag in kerosene and set it on fire. Johnson was charged with violation of Texas law, "intentionally or knowingly damages, defaces, mutilates, or burns the flag of the United States or the State of Texas." His actions were classified as a class A misdemeanor. Johnson was convicted, sentenced to one year in prison, and fined $2,000. He appealed to the Fifth Court of Appeals in Texas, stating that his actions were protected by “symbolic

Miller v. Johnson 1995 was a United States Supreme Court Case that decided whether racial gerrymandering was unconstitutional or not. This issue was very controversial, but before being able to understand how the case affected the use of racial gerrymandering, one has to understand what gerrymandering is. Every state is made up of different districts, and each district is entitled to their own votes when it comes to elections. Gerrymandering is the manipulation of district boundaries in a way that creates a political advantage in elections by putting a large group of people who are likely to vote for a certain party in one district.

Mike McKee’s article, "Weighing the Right to Own an Embryo," made the front page of the Recorder, a daily legal newspaper published in San Francisco reporting on legal advice and interests of attorneys and legal practitioners. How did he make his article such a success? What made it front page worthy in the eyes of this legal audience? McKee’s article, "Weighing the Right to Own an Embryo," appeals to a legal audience by presenting an unbiased framework and evidence.

When looking at the dilemma that appears in the case of Mary Beth versus William and Elizabeth Stern there is a moral and legal issue that arises. The judge was very broad in his ruling and was not able to put himself into the shoes of Mary Beth. When it comes to pregnancy, there is a connection that is established during the 9 months, between mother and child that is unexplainable and a maternal relationship that should not be broken. The morally right and just ruling would have been to give the child to the intended parents but allow Mary Beth, as the surrogate, visitation rights. The contract between the Stern family and Mary Beth implied that Mary Beth was doing a duty or a job and getting paid the equivalent of her duties. It stated that Mary Beth would

I believe that it´s the same offender in the Parkinson case and the Johnson case, which is making the offender a serial killer because he has killed 3 people and it has been over a period over 30 days. By looking at different serial killer typologies my firm belief is that this offender will fall into the lust serial killer typology. I concluded this by firstly looking if the crimes were act-focused kills or process kills, I concluded it was process kills because the offender had taken the time to abduct both Parkinson and Johnson and didn 't just kill them right away like an act-focused killer would do. With the offender being a process killer he could only be organized as well because process killers cannot be disorganized. The offender would either be a lust killer, power-control killer or a thrill killer. I concluded that the offender in this case would not be a thrill serial killer, since this kind of murderer gets off my seeing his victims suffering, which is the most important factor for this type of offender. In the Parkinson and Johnson murders there were no signs of torture on the victims bodies and therefore I do not believe that this offender would be a thrill serial killer.

It wasn’t until the 1960s and 1970s that more unmarried pregnant woman opted to keep their babies instead of putting them up for adoption (Else, A., 2012). Due to the financial pressures of sole-parenting the Domestic Proceedings Act was introduced in 1968, which required fathers to pay mothers some maintenance for

United Kingdom courts may consider additional connecting factors in establishing domicile of origin, such as adoption. If the factor of adoption is not present in the case, United Kingdom courts do not permit changes of domicile of unmarried children under the age of 16 unless their parents from whom they depend change their domicile. The only exception to the general rule can be inferred from Section 4 of the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973, according to which the domicile of dependency may be established in the light of the following connecting factors: a) changes of the father’s domicile may justify changes in his child’s domicile; b) the mother is entitled to elect whether her child’s domicile must be changed with hers, under the condition of the father’s death or of when the child is illegitimate. However, the factor of adoption changes everything, as it allows an adopted child to receive a new domicile of origin derived from the

The following two cases were taken against Ireland and therefore directly affect Irish family law. In the case of Johnston v Ireland, the court held that family life existed where a non-married heterosexual couple had lived together for 15 years. In Keegan v Ireland, the applicant challenged the Irish adoption law that allowed an unmarried mother to place her child for adoption, without the consent of the father. The applicant argued this treatment of non-marital fathers violated article 6, the right to fair trial, and article 8 of the ECHR. The Court held in favour of the applicant and found that when an unmarried couple are living together, a child born in that relationship is part of the family unit, which will continue if the parents no longer live together.