Different Elements That Compromise The Intelligence Communities ( Ic ) From Local Law Enforcement Essay

It is very important that each echelon understands one another limitations and roles and responsibilities in the greater scheme of domestic and national intelligence. Despite increased communication between local law enforcement and federal intelligence agencies, problems can arise relating to coordination and cooperation because the two communities possess different rules, objectives, different sources and methods, and different standards regarding the quality of intelligence they

Everyone utilize some type of resource to conduct his or her daily activities. The resources may vary from tools or assets that are available to help being productive. The Appendix A, B, C, and D from Intelligence Led Policing “The New Architecture” shows the different resources available for Law Enforcement Agencies that they can utilize in order to improve or to get answers if there are questions that needs to be addressed. This summary paper will discuss each appendix, describe the resources available, and what are their purposes and functions to serve as a valuable resource for Law Enforcement Agencies.

One of the most important elements to the success of intelligence-led policing is having the support of the community similar to community policing. First and foremost, law enforcement needed to define “suspicious” activities and behavior and educated communities on this matter(Intelligence-Led, n.d.). This definition would be invaluable because communities would know what information would be valuable for developing intelligence(Intelligence-Led, n.d.). From trying to discover potential terrorist to gang activities, acquiring intelligence

The terrorist attack that occurred on September 11, 2001 (9/11) is arguably the greatest tragedy the United States has ever faced. This attack was widespread, coordinated and devastating in nature. Many people claim that the government failed to protect us from this event and that it should have been prevented. Over the Course of this paper, we will examine that claim. We will examine how the Intelligence community failed to prevent the 9/11 terror attack. This paper will also examine how the Intelligence community could have used its assets more effectively. The two biggest factors in this attack were the lack of information sharing and lack of action taken on received intelligence. After discussing how those two factors facilitated the 9/11

According to the Bureau of Justice Assistance, intelligence-led policing is a “collaborative enterprise based on improved intelligence operations and community-oriented policing and problem solving, which the field has considered beneficial for many years” (Peterson, 2005).

“In the modern era, law enforcement agencies necessarily engage in a range of intelligence-related activities associated with their broad crime control and public safety mission,” (Logan 2015). Police officers receive extensive training in interview techniques and investigations that make them natural

Police officers and those who supervise and manage them are only as successful as the environment allows them to be. With regards to the intelligence function, law and policy, citizen support, resource availability, agency cooperation, political environments, and other elements of the environments in which departments operate are just some of the issues that determine the ability and successfulness of agencies to create a useful intelligence product (Carter, 2010). Some beneficial means of working with these issues include proper planning and research, opening avenues of communication and cooperation with other agencies, and training.

Intelligence-led policing is a focus on improving safety within communities, reducing crime rates and controlling criminality and disorder with involvement from all enforcement agencies incorporating modern methods and technologies. Aimed at reducing the criminals capability to do business and disrupting their ability to engage in criminal activity. It is built around

As our readings covered this week, the attacks on September 11, 2001 opened up a whole new world of requirements that are needed in order to defeat the terrorist threat the world is faced with now. The domestic threat that creeped up onto the shores of the United States on that fateful day raised significant concern on how it could prevented in the future. As James Burch mentioned in our reading, “the very term domestic intelligence raises significant questions, as well as concerns about civil liberties” (Burch 2010, 184). He went on to state even further that even though domestic intelligence may raise concerns about civil liberties, “it also supports an equally vital need – the preservation of the nation-state” (Burch 2010, 184). The US was forced to adapt and by doing so had to create a new set of rules and put certain safeguards and methods in

Subsequent to 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center (WTC), which compelled the U.S. to imagine the inconceivable, because that day things went really wrong. That was the day that terrorist decided to make their presences know by attacking us. They evolved from using bombs to using airplanes to deliver as their attack weapon because it would cause lethal fatalities on U.S. soil. This was never done before and we were not prepared to handle such a massive attack. This paper will investigate what went wrong before and after 9/11, surveillance surge, and what was the problem, with the CIA and the FBI regarding communication with each other, the dissemination of information to first responders, and recommendation for changes to policies that are obsolete. We understand that local law enforcement and state agencies will bring specific advantages (their strength) from their organizations, and they will also bring their inherited weaknesses. But, they will also bring one important thing to the table which is, how they collect local intelligence; and being able to address some of their organization’s weaknesses, and how they can fully use any data they collect before and after 9/11. This paper builds and contributes to how things were before and after 9/11, and the types of changes that were made in law enforcement, CIA.,

The events of September 11, which are partly associated with errors in the work of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), raised the issue of reforming the agency both in the countries of the old democracy and in the countries of the new democracy. Most of the discussions about reforming the work of the special services in the fight against terrorism are reduced to the exchange of information between the structures of power. However, it is only by understanding the nature of the tasks of the special services in combating terrorism that it is possible to develop the necessary "architecture" or organizational structure suitable for the solution of the task. The task of the special services at this stage

“Intelligence-led policing (ILP) - a collaborative law enforcement approach combining problem-solving policing, information sharing, and police accountability with enhanced intelligence operations” (Lambert 2010, 2). The main goal of the ILP is to reform police practices and improve the effectiveness of current practices that are used to target and reduce violent crimes and create intelligence that targets investigations and tactical responses to disrupt and reduce crime (Gibbs, McGarrell &Sullivan, 2015). ILP emphasizes the integration of information to help inform strategic resource allocation and identify emerging trends and tactics associated with criminal activity. (Carter, Phillips & Gayadeen, 2014).

Intelligence-led policing is the new standard of information sharing among law enforcement agencies across the country at all levels. Before intelligence-led policing gained popularity most law enforcement agencies did not freely share information amongst each other, which lead to huge gaps in the functioning of law enforcement agencies. Many believe that this laps in sharing is what lead to the 9/11 disaster. All police agencies must form a cohesive approach to a central system of intelligence gathering and information dissemination. By doing so, they may better achieve a common goal for the unified approach to policing. This process of intelligence-led police may seem like a simple concept, but it involve the many departments working together which can cause confusion and angst among them.

Intelligence collection and apprehension of criminals have occurred for many years; however, with the exception of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, these actions were performed by different organizations. Nonetheless, roles and responsibilities have changed since the attacks on September 11, 2001. Intelligence-led policing and the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing program were incorporated, and fusion centers were established to help gather intelligence from different levels of the government. Although law enforcement at the local, state, and tribal levels aid in intelligence collection, it is important to ensure that intelligence gathered to protect national security and law enforcement

Counterintelligence (CI) involves actions aimed at protecting the United States against foreign intelligence operations and espionage from penetration and disruption by hostile nations or their intelligence services (Lowenthal, 2014). Three main components of Counterintelligence include collection, defensive and offensive. The collection is the ability to gather intelligence information about rivalry capabilities against own nation; defensive part of CI involves measures to prevent and thwart other nations ' attempts to penetrate into own nation 's intelligence system; while an offensive aspect deal with running double agents to penetrate, manipulate, exploit, and control targeted adversaries. CI is said to be the most essential aspect of the intelligence disciplines, in the sense that it helps in collecting vast quantities of secret information and produce an excellent analysis of intelligence, although, ineffective counterintelligence measures may diminish confidence in the final results (Van Cleave, 2013).