3)
As the very definition of demand deposits are customer accounts held by banks for security purposes, earning minute interest levels, a decrease in demand deposits can become quite troublesome (Investopedia, 2017). With $300m in demand deposits representing 12.07% of Total Liability & Equity, should this level decrease by any such margin, total assets of equal margin, by definition must be reduced, to satisfy A = E + L.
Resulting from a decrease in demand deposits could force Dragon Slayer Bank to sell off loans at a discount to hold a buffer on the desired level of capital.
Should Dragon Slayer bank decide against selling loans at a discount, the bank may have to settle with lesser levels of Assets, Liabilities and Equity. This may expose them to lower share pricing on the stock market, which in turn would lessen dividends (assuming listed on the ASX and pays dividends to shareholders), less-lucrative contracts could present themselves as the bank could be seen as inadequate or unworthy.
Furthermore, this could present trouble in regards to appropriate cushioning for holding sufficient levels of capital. Under extreme circumstances, should the bank not be able to hold sufficient capital levels (i.e. 8% up to 2015, and 10.5% from 2016 onwards) necessitated by APRA, a bailout may perhaps be necessary or even the windup of the company, forced into liquidation.
Moving to a customer point-of-view in regards to decreases in demand deposits. With surges in withdrawals, such as IndyMac Bank in 2008 (Lange, et. al, 2016, pp 129-130), a weakening capital position could indicate to investors and depositors that their value held with the bank could possibly decrease. This could result in high levels of customers withdrawing their funds could putting immense pressure on the bank and its monetary levels to stay profitable.
4)
By looking merely at the Balance Sheet, Dragon Slayer Bank appears to have sufficient assets to cover any unexpected losses that may arise due to market turns. However, upon APRA’s minimum capital requirements, stemming from Basel III, set proportionally for every Financial Institution, it becomes a lot clearer to identify if the bank would be able to survive unexpected changes.
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Unfortunately, the improvements in earnings and loan losses have not extended to Banks’ operating revenues. Banks’ operating revenues are not growing due to “lower servicing income (down $8 billion), reduced gains on loan sales (down $4.8 billion), and lower income from service charges on deposit accounts, which fell by $2.1 billion (5.9 percent).” (FDIC Quarterly, p.2)
Suppose a bank has $10,000 in deposits and $8,000 in loans. It has loaned out all it can. It has a reserve ratio of C
In the document is also said that even when people have money in that bank people would go to the bank and go get their money since that bank was going to be a failed and it also said that after their failure the repressive effect on the spending of its clients. They couldn’t do anything to help the bank to crash even though they will all be crashed any day.
Mention each account affected and the appropriate amount. The Reserve account of the company is increased by $ 10,000; cash account of the bank is increase by $ 90,000, while the liability of $
Peoples had accumulated assets of $556m. These assets were funded by short term consumer deposits, consisting largely of 3-month fixed rate savings certificates. These savings certificates were highly affected by interest rate fluctuations. The long term loans provided to people generate interest earnings which are do not increase or decrease with the interest rate fluctuations. Therefore, there was a mismatch between the interest rates earned by the bank and the interest rates that it had to give
Accordingly, banking regulators assessed minimum values for each of these key measures. At 2007, “adequately capitalized” (i.e., minimum) levels were 4% for the Tier 1 capital ratio, 8% for the total capital ratio, and 3% for the leverage ratio; “well capitalized” levels were 6% for Tier 1 capital, 10% for total capital, and 5% for leverage. Well capitalized banks qualified for, among other things, lower premiums assessed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Undercapitalized banks (e.g., below the 8% minimum required total capital) received a warning from the FDIC; continued violation of capital requirements triggered further regulatory costs, including intervention or (in the extreme) takeover by government regulators.
Lawsons’ liquidity ratios may be alarming to the bank. The company’s ability to repay short-term debt has significantly deteriorated over their four year span to the point where the company is almost unable to operate. This is defiantly a fragment of the company that the bank will have to take a deeper analysis on.
Recent studies have investigated the impact of the 2007-2009 financial crises on banks’ capital. Berger and Bouwman (2011) emphasised the importance of capital during financial crisis. Their empirical study concludes that banks with solid capital base have some benefits during the crisis than those that are poorly capitalised. Well capitalised banks are more able to withstand the shocks due to liquidity squeeze, and therefore had higher chances of surviving the crisis period. Other benefits accrued to well capitalised banks include increase in their market share and profitability, as customers withdrew their funds from less capitalised to a well-capitalised banks. This conclusion was also reinforced by a recent empirical study conducted Olivier de Bandt et al (2014) on a sample of large French banks over a period of 1993 – 2012. Similarly, Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011) demonstrate the existence of structural changes during the period of financial crisis. They conclude that banks with weaker core capital positions, greater dependence on market funding and on non-interest sources of income restricted the loan supply more strongly during the crisis period. Using a multi-country panel of banks, Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache and Merrouche (2010) find among others results, that during
Extensive research has determined that the banking industry is in an unstable state. The industry’s profits have
As additional part of the covenants the bank placed importance on the net working capital. This could have positive impact to the firm’s future. As the firm is affected by liquidity problems, the covenants on net working capital will make Butler to
In 2008 the world faced the worst financial crisis since the great depression. Many banks closed their doors for good that year. Among them were both small and large banks. One specific bank that collapsed that year was IndyMac, one of the largest banks in the United States. IndyMac marked the largest collapse of a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insured institution since 1984, when Continental Illinois, which had $40 billion in assets, failed, according to FDIC records (“The Fall of IndyMac 2008). This paper will talk about the cause of the collapse of IndyMac in 2008, the handling of the issues, as well as the aftermath of the collapse.
In this essay I will be addressing the “Too Big To Fail” (TBTF) problem in the current banking system. I will be discussing the risks associated with this policy, and the real problems behind it. I will then examine some solutions that have been proposed to solve the “too big to fail” problem. The policy ‘too big to fail’ refers to the idea that a bank has become so large that its failure could cause a disastrous effect to the rest of the economy, and so the government will provide assistance, in the form of perhaps a bailout/oversee a merger, to prevent this from happening. This is to protect the creditors and allow the bank to continue operating. If a bank does fail then this could cause a domino effect throughout
Throughout the remainder of the year, banks’ capital needs will accelerate as credit losses are expected to continue, despite easing monetary policies and government intervention. To weather the turbulence in an economy that
The higher capital requirements would imply that banks need to use more capital funding and place larger constraints on banks’ sources and usage of funding (The banking system 2013). This would limit or forego banks opportunity to finance new projects (FSI 2013).
And the company is suffering from liquidity challenges because it is not in a position to finance its day-to-day activities, so its bank account stands over drawn. This situation has impacted negatively on the company's ability to repay its earlier loans and customers are upset because of delayed delivery.