Yale Law School
Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship Series Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship
1-1-2004
Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure and Enron
Jonathan R. Macey
Yale Law School
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation
Macey, Jonathan R., "Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure and Enron" (2004). Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 1419. http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1419
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship at Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
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The downfall of Enron also illustrates both the importance of corporate governance to corporate performance, and the inherent susceptibility to corruption present in any system of corporate governance. Further, from an international perspective, one is tempted to ask whether the Enron debacle could happen in Europe or Japan or whether it demonstrates a vulnerability unique to the U.S. system of corporate governance. I have three observations to make on this issue. First and foremost, the Enron fiasco demonstrates the acute pressure felt by U.S. corporate management to produce superior performance results. As discussed later in this Article, Enron 's financial maneuvering, which led to the company 's massive 2001 restatement of earnings, was prompted only in 1997 when Enron came under significant pressure from investors. Essentially, Enron 's corporate performance was consistent for a considerable period of time prior to 1997. 4 However, between 1996 and 1997, the firm 's profits and return on equity each declined by ninety percent. 5 The sudden deterioration in performance pressured management to engage in transactions that increased revenue and moved debt off of the firm 's
3 This monitoring tradeoff is developed in more detail in my Article coauthored with Arnoud Boot, also presented in this Symposium. See Arnoud
Between the years 2000 and 2002 there were over a dozen corporate scandals involving unethical corporate governance practices. The allegations ranged from faulty revenue reporting and falsifying financial records, to the shredding and destruction of financial documents (Patsuris, 2002). Most notably, are the cases involving Enron and Arthur Andersen. The allegations of the Enron scandal went public in October 2001. They included, hiding debt and boosting profits to the tune of more than one billion dollars. They were also accused of bribing foreign governments to win contacts and manipulating both the California and Texas power markets (Patsuris, 2002). Following these allegations, Arthur Andersen was investigated for, allegedly,
Prior to 2002, financial statement reporting for publically traded companies within the United States was overseen with far less oversight in comparison to current reporting standards and procedures. Appropriate financial reporting is merely one element that was not occurring prior to 2002. An element of corporate dishonesty and deception existed within some the largest publically traded companies and this idea of deceitfulness was perpetuated by the executive staff of the businesses. Enron’s financial disintegration became the facilitator for the need of more rigid financial oversight, but they were not the only company that added to the idea of corporate fraud.
At the turn of the turn of the twenty-first century, a tide of corruption scandals involving reporting and accounting fraud with major US publicly-traded corporations generated a crisis of confidence in US financial markets. Major, apparently prosperous, companies like WorldCom, Sunbeam, Adelphia, and the infamous Enron engaged in accounting fraud of massive proportions to cover financial losses. These actions caused enormous outrage with the US electorate and infused the mistrust of market investors, situation that threatened to disrupt the process by which companies raise capital. Green (2004) concludes that it was adamant to restore public confidence in the capital markets by the end of 2002.
34 Issue 2, p533; Yale University, School of Law Language: English, Database: Academic
The word “fraud” was magnified in the business world around the end of 2001 and the beginning of 2002. No one had seen anything like it. Enron, one of the country’s largest energy companies, went bankrupt and took down with it Arthur Andersen, one of the five largest audit and accounting firms in the world. Enron was followed by other accounting scandals such as WorldCom, Tyco, Freddie Mac, and HealthSouth, yet Enron will always be remembered as one of the worst corporate accounting scandals of all time. Enron’s collapse was brought upon by the greed of its corporate hierarchy and how it preyed upon its faithful stockholders and employees who invested so much of their time and money into the company. Enron seemed to portray that the goal of corporate America was to drive up stock prices and get to the peak of the financial mountain by any means necessary. The “Conspiracy of Fools” is a tale of power, crony capitalism, and company greed that lead Enron down the dark road of corporate America.
Enron’s fraudulent financial practices lead to the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002. Mistakes made by the company and their leadership shocked the world and cost billions. Enron’s leadership could have taken steps to prevent or mitigate the repercussions of their actions. The act restored ethical and reliable financial practices to the market.The major provisions of the act made corporations responsibility for financial reports, and required internal and external audits. The Act changed the accounting regulatory environment. And although corporations incurred the additional expense of audit and new reporting standards, these changes restored consumer investing confidence, strengthening the corporations and the stock market overall. (Flanigan, 2002.)
Enron’s ride is quite a phenomenon: from a regional gas pipeline trader to the largest energy trader in the world, and then back down the hill into bankruptcy and disgrace. As a matter of fact, it took Enron 16 years to go from about $10 billion of assets to $65 billion of assets, and 24 days to go bankruptcy. Enron is also one of the most celebrated business ethics cases in the century. There are so many things that went wrong within the organization, from all personal (prescriptive and psychological approaches), managerial (group norms, reward system, etc.), and organizational (world-class culture) perspectives. This paper will focus on the business ethics issues at Enron that were raised from the documentation Enron: The Smartest Guys
Before going into an analysis on the organizational culture at Enron, I will first elaborate on the severity of the unethical behavior that existed at Enron. The problem can best be shown in the words of an Enron employee who said “If I’m going to my boss’s office to talk about compensation, and if I step on some guy’s throat and that doubles it, then I’ll stomp on that guy’s throat”(Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room). This culture of greed and corruption can also be seen through Enron’s mark to market accounting system, in which Enron cashed in on ideas and “future profits” without actually making anything. Furthermore,
In the late 1990 and 2000, Enron’s traders had great passion on prove themselves. The principle of “priority of profit” at any costs led to considerable agency problems for shareholders of Enron. Undoubtedly, company owners desired high return from investment. The “arrogant culture” could meet investors’ need of profit, although the “arrogant culture” achieved short-term profit by sacrificing company’s long-term stability and wellbeing. It exacerbated the agency problems which accumulated by principals neglecting agency monitoring mechanisms.
In the aftermath of major scandals and bailouts in the United States, the world`s and the public’s confidence in public corporations, has been shaken. With the publicized scandals of Enron and other corporations in the United States, the faith in public corporations fell as fast as the stock market. Investors had no confidence in corporations or in their boards. Measures needed to be taken to form regulations to provide stronger accountability, to prevent these types of scandals from happening and to rebuild the confidence of investors. Corporate governance of publicly traded
Post written by Michael A. Calabrese, J.D. expected May 2018, Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University.
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Unfortunately, scandals like Enron are not isolated incidents and the last decade has offered Americans a disheartening perspective with comparable scandals like that of WorldCom and Tyco, Sunbeam, Global Crossing and many more. Companies have a concrete responsibility not just to their investors but to society as a whole to have practices which deter corporate greed and looting and which actively and effectively work to prevent such things from happening. This
For these reasons, corporate financial accounts do not provide accurate or sufficient information to corporate managers, investors, or regulators. This leads us to recommend that the SEC allow each stock exchange to set the accounting standards for all firms listed on that exchange and to promote the development of industry-specific non-financial accounts to complement the financial accounts (After Enron 53). The most important lesson of the Enron collapse is that every link in the audit chain including: the audit committee and the board, the independent public auditor, the bankers and lawyers that aided and abetted the misrepresentation of Enron’s financial condition, the credit-rating agencies, and the Securities and Exchange Commission failed to deter, detect, and correct the conditions that led to that collapse. Although not a part of the formal audit chain, most of the market specialists in Enron stock and the business press were also late in recognizing Enron’s financial weakness (Corporate Aftershocks 12).
The firm’s mangers lied on profit and concealed debts, all to show that the company was doing fine. Indications started to emerged in 2001, with a stock price as high as $85 in January though $90 in the previous year, descending to a record low of 26 cents (see the graph below). Although, things started going bad much earlier. In what follows, I present in chronogical order how business activities of enron were finally grounded: