General Lee's Battle Analysis

He positioned his trained infantrymen on top of the first hill as the last line of defense. The militia was placed in front of the hill and the sharpshooters were place in front of the militia. The militia was the first line of defense and Morgan ordered his sharpshooter to target specifically the officers and cavalry and fall back in the line of militia before they get in firing range of the redcoats. Once the sharpshooter gets in position with the militia the British army advanced the attack the militia. The militia’s duties were to engage the redcoats for a short amount of then run away to the right side of the side of the hill. Tarleton expected the militia to run away. He sent one infantry unit and one cavalry unit after the militia. However, waiting behind the second hill was Lieutenant Colonel William Washington and his dragoon unit. The British cavalry didn’t expect to encounter another cavalry unit. Washington wiped out the Tarleton’s cavalry then flanked the right of Tarleton’s main element. Simultaneously, the militia ran around the hills to flank the left side. Tarleton found himself in a double envelopment. Tarleton receives 110 casualties, 229 wounded and 829 captured or missing, meanwhile Morgan suffered 25 casualties and 124

“It was not war-it was murder” (M.G. D Hill 1862). July 1st 1862, held one of the bloodiest battles during our civil war. Throughout the battle we have learned the importance of understanding your terrain and surroundings. Confederate also realized the relevance of controlling Malvern Hill from a military stand point. Throughout the mistakes of this battle it has taught us over time better ways to communicate, emplace, and maneuver artillery units as a whole. This battle plays a key role in the advancement of our military tactics and execution in the ways that we use artillery today.

Although Bloody Hill was one of charge and countercharge for the Confederates, the major problem was tactical positioning of the topography and technology. BG Slack and Woodruffs defense greatly outnumbered Lyon’s force as they were positioned down the hill and held inferior weapons. As Slack’s 2 regiments alongside Woodruff guns proceeded to move forward, close enough to be within range to shoot their shotguns and muskets, but the Federals would drive them back with artillery, small-arms fire, and short counterattacks. In order to hold Lyon’s advance, almost his entire force was engaged except for his reserve, the 2nd Kansas Infantry. Eventually, when the fighting died out all along the line as both Confederate and Union sides needed to reposition and recuperate to continue to fight as time went on. (George E. Knapp, 1953).

On November 14th the 50th New York engineers reported the pontoons were ready to move besides the lack of 270 horses needed to move them. At first Lee anticipated that Burnside would beat him across the Rappahannock and that to protect Richmond he would assume the next defensible position would be the south the north Anna river but then he saw how slowly Burnside was moving and he directed all of his army towards Fredericksburg. By November 23rd all of Longstreet’s crops had arrived and lee placed them on the bridge that was known as the Marye’s Heights to the west of town, Andersons division was on the far left and directly behind that was McLaws with that in mind Picket’s and Hoods was to the right of that. Then on November 26th he sent out for Jackson but his second corps commander had anticipated the need and began forced marching his troops from Winchester on November 22nd covering as much as 20 miles a day. When Jackson arrived at lees headquarters on November 29 his divisions were deployed to prevent Burnside crossing downstream from

Late in the day, Major. General Ambrose Burnside’s corps pushed across a bullet-strewn stone bridge over Antietam Creek and with some difficulty managed to imperil the Confederate right. At a crucial moment, A.P. Hill’s division arrived from Harpers Ferry, and counterattacked, driving back Burnside and saving the day for the Army of Northern Virginia.

On July 2, 1863, the Battle of Gettysburg was in its second day. Lee's plan was to attack Meade on his flanks. He placed General James Longstreet in charge of the main advance on the left flank of the Union line while General Richard Ewell was to lead the supporting attack on the right. Longstreet, however, was strongly against the idea of attacking. Instead, he wanted the main body of the Confederate army to move around the Union left to get between that army and Washington. This would have forced Meade to come out into the open and attack, thus giving the tactical advantage of defensive positions to the Confederates. Longstreet spent the better part of the morning on July 2 insisting his point to Lee but all to no avail. So much time had been spent in debate, though that long

In day one (July 1, 1863), the Confederates attack first in the west of Gettysburg. The day starts off with General Lee and General Longstreet discussing tactics while riding, Longstreet wants to out flank the Union army and cut off the road to Washington, forcing the Union to attack. Lee prefers that the Confederate army attack the Union army at Gettysburg and defeat them, then take Washington, as Lee believes that defending is not as honorable as attacking. They are interrupted by the sound of cannon fire and Lee decides to ride toward the guns. It is discovered from Buford’s point of view that the rebels have begun to attack, and his line is able to repel the first rebel charge. The rebels attack once again and once again they are held off. It is discovered that General Heth of the Confederacy is leading the charge, and a last large rebel attack is given. Buford knows he cannot hold the lines, but is saved by reinforcements from General Reynolds, who is shot in the open and killed. The Union line does not give in. Later, in Lee’s point of view, we learn that he has established a base of commands and the readers learn of the calamity of the battle, how Heth initially believed he was only attacking militia. The battle continues and Lee is informed that it appears the Union line is falling back. Lee meets Longstreet again to discuss tactics and Lee concludes that he will attack. In Chamberlain’s point of view, it is learned that Twentieth Maine is approaching Gettysburg, and

On the last and final day of the endless firing of the Gettysburg Battle, Pickett’s Charge began when Union Major General George Meade with his 6,500 men was facing 15,000 Confederate troops led by General Pickett. This happened because General Robert E. Lee thought he had weakened the first lines in the center and started to bombard them with 150 Confederate cannons, the largest amount ever assembled in the U.S. In reply, the Union sent 75 cannons back until ordered to cease fire. Fortunately, most of the South cannons overshot their targets and hence gave little damage to the North

It was a dark and wet June evening in 1863 when Major General James Ewell Brown Stuart (J.E.B. Stuart) received the order. Maintain contact with the enemy, harass and impeded the northerners if they attempt to cross the Potomac River, and guard the Blue Ridge’s mountain passes. If the enemy attempts to cross the river, cross first and stay on the Confederate’s right flank. The orders were clear enough for execution. General Robert E. Lee often issued orders that gave his trusted subordinates the leeway to conduct operations as they saw fit. Only this time, not even the strategically talented General Lee could predict the necessity of having Stuart’s Cavalry support the Army of Northern Virginia’s advance from the front and flank while maneuvering into Gettysburg.

The second battle pitted the Federal troops in the Army of Virginia, commanded by Major General John Pope, against the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, led by General Robert E. Lee.

General Robert E. Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia launched their Second Invasion of the North following the Battle of Chancellorsville in June 1863. General Lee understood military tactics and understood that if he wished to help his nation win the war he would have to use the teachings of Carl von Clausewitz. In Clausewitz’s book ‘On War’ he stated, “War therefore is an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfil our will.” Clausewitz goes on to state, “If we desire to defeat the enemy, we must proportion our efforts to his powers of resistance. This is expressed by the product of two factors which cannot be separated, namely, the sum of available means and the strength of the will. (Clausewitz, 1832)” General Lee understood

Commander Longstreet arrived with over 20,000 men to further strengthen the Confederates. The new troops were sent to flank the Union’s left along the two hills (Drake, 1892). Interestingly, the Union Army had failed to send troops up these hills. Most of General Meade’s troops were in the field, forming a fish hook shape with its center lying along Cemetery Ridge, while the defensive positions were stationed on the Cemetery and Culp hills. The left side was flanked by General Daniel Sickles, an influential politician from New York. However, Gen. Sickles was not satisfied with his assigned position and took it upon himself to move the Third Corp over half a mile west to a high ground at a wheat field. This move proved to be a serious blunder

General Robert E. Lee hoped that the Armory at Harper’s Ferry Virginia would be evacuated once the Army of Northern Virginia came up the Shenandoah Valley. On September 9, Lee divided his army into three groups under the leadership of Stonewall Jackson. He gave them orders to seize Harper’s Ferry. Meanwhile, Colonel Dixon S. Miles, the Union Commander at Harper’s Ferry, prepared to defend the Arsenal. The surrounding area, however, made it really difficult to defend. Harper’s Ferry is surrounded by three tall hills. Miles decided to defend two of the three hills, under the assumption that the Confederates wouldn’t be able to attack from that point. The soldiers Miles posted on the hills were very inexperienced. He kept most of the trained militia

It is our duty, as soon to be Second Lieutenants in the Army, to learn from history. Learning from mistakes in the past is necessary to understand the responsibilities we will soon have. The Battle of Gettysburg shows prime examples of the nine principles of war: Objective, Offensive, Mass, Economy of Force, Maneuver, Unity of Command, Security, Surprise and Simplicity. In the military today, we are overwhelmingly blessed with every asset that we have including technology and monetary resources the list could go on forever but the most invaluable asset is history. Although all nine principles of war are pertinent to success on the battlefield, only five will be discussed in this analysis.

An interesting turn of events would soon favor the Federal Army as General J.E.B. Stuart and his cavalry were north and east of Gettysburg causing a lot of fear in the North but consequently were not performing adequate reconnaissance, the result was that General Lee did not know where General Meade and the Army of the Potomac were or what their strength was (Freeman, 147). When Confederate General Henry Heth moved into