How Creative Judicial Interpretation Has Changed Over The Last 50 Years Essay

Human Rights Act 1998 – is an Act that gives legal effect in the UK to certain fundamental rights and freedoms contained in

One strength of the UK constitution is the flexibility that it has, for the reason that the constitution is uncodified or unwritten and is therefore not entrenched in law. Due to the fact that the UK’s constitution is uncodified or unwritten, it has an opportunity to modernise itself to the ever changing society or any other new circumstances that may arise. An example of the flexibility of the UK’s

The given statement suggests that the emphasis on judicial diversity is unnecessary since there is no guarantee that a diverse judiciary would arrive at a different decision than that of a conservative judiciary. This essay attempts to argue that although there is no evidence that a diverse bench would radically change the outcome of a given case, the quality of justice will be substantially enhanced by the inclusion of a range of perspectives from which are currently not represented by the English judiciary.

Both statutory interpretation and the Human Rights Act are a doctrine of precedent by which law is changed and justice is served. The doctrine of precedent is an essential principle of English legal system, which is a form of reasoning, interpreting and decision making formed by case law. It suggests that precedents not only have persuasive authority but must also be shadowed when similar situations arise. Any rule or principle declared by a higher court must be followed in future cases. In short the courts and tribunals are bound within prearranged restrictions by prior decisions of other superior courts. All the judges are also obliged to follow the set-up precedents established by prior decisions which is called Stare decisis. Making decisions according to precedent helps achieve two objectives. Initially it aids to maintain a system of stable laws which gives predictability to the law and affords a degree of safety for individual rights. Moreover, it ensures that the law progresses only in accordance with the developing perceptions of the community. Therefore, it more accurately mirrors the morals and prospects of the community that we live in.

Critically assess the applicability of this statement as an analysis of the current approach of the judiciary to statutory interpretation in Australia.

The Human Rights Act 1998 (also known as the Act or the HRA) came into force in the United Kingdom in October 2000. It is composed of a series of sections that have the effect of codifying the protections in the European Convention on Human Rights into UK law. All public bodies (such as courts, police, local governments, hospitals, publicly funded schools, and others) and other bodies carrying out public functions have to comply with the Convention rights. The Human Rights Act protects individuals from torture (mental, physical or both), inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment and deportation or extradition (being sent to another country to face criminal charges) if there is a real risk that they will face

In the dissenting judgment made by Callinan J in the landmark New South Wales v Commonwealth (“Workchoices’ Case”), a strong criticism was mounted against constitutional interpretation methods employed in the judicial forum. Explicitly, this conjecture was focused at Isaacs J’s judgement in Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (“Engineers’ Case”), where a textualism approach to constitutional interpretation was adopted. Callinan J expressed the Engineers’ Case as “less than satisfactory”, using “detached language” to discredit its literal methodology of interpreting the constitution.

In 1966 the House of Lords announced that it would in future be prepared to depart from a former decision by the House when it appeared right to do so . It is vital that the judges update the law according to the society and values today. An example of this case of R v R where a man was charged for raping his wife. This matter was brought up to the House of Lords, the judges pointed out that the ‘status of a married woman in our law have changed quite dramatically. A husband and wife are now for all practical purposes equal partners in marriage.’ They also highlighted that the common law is ‘capable of evolving in the light of changing social, economic and cultural developments.’ This implied that judges (House of Lords) can change the law only if it is a necessity.

This paper will critically analyze the approach taken by the courts to apply the provisions of the Equality Act 2010 in cases where the protection is given to religious and other beliefs conflicts with the protection rights of others.

The reform of the Human Rights Act can illustrate that the constitutional reform did not go far enough. In 1998, the Blair government announced that the citizens ' rights would be safeguarded and strengthened through incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights into UK law. However, this created a problem as the UK now has two sets of rights – those built up under Common Law and those in the Human Rights Act. These two sets of rights may conflict and, in addition, cases can be taken using these rights to both the UK Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights (which is the supreme court for the European Convention on Human Rights). The UK judiciary is divided on how to resolve this issue.

The UK’s unwritten constitution, formed of Acts of Parliament [AoP], Royal Prerogative [RP], Constitutional Convention [CC] and Case Law [CL], prompts much debate about the ease of which constitutional change can be introduced. A written constitution is, by definition and practice, hard to alter however it remains to be seen whether it is any easier to change an unwritten

Section 3 of the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998 provides that primary and subordinate legislation “must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with Convention rights”. This provides judges the power to interpret and amend legislation so far as it is possible so that it is in accordance with Convention rights. There is no need for ambiguity in wording of the act to use section 3 and it does not affect the validity of the Act notwithstanding the Act being incompatible with Convention rights. There are limits on judges’ ability to use section 3 which restrict cases in which it can be used. First, section 3 cannot go against the grain of the fundamental purpose of the legislation in question. Second, judges can only go “so far as possible” when interpreting legislation. The means that judges are restrained by the plain words of the provision and cannot stray from it’s meaning so far as to completely amend it.

Some judges in their obiter dicta have declared their inclination to disregard the Parliament’s legislative objectives, and therefore limit parliamentary sovereignty if the rule of law is vulnerable or if the circumstances demand “a principle established on a different hypothesis of constitutionalism” . They have also suggested that, while the British Constitution is dominated by parliamentary sovereignty, “The rule of law enforced by the courts is the ultimate controlling factor on which our constitution is based” . This represents a possibility of stretching the dominance of the rule of law in constitutional law so that it becomes more powerful than parliamentary sovereignty in the British Constitution .

The Human Rights Act (1998) consists of sixteen fundamental rights that everybody is entitled to from birth or since the act was put into place. These sixteen rights are set out as ‘Articles’ and along with these Articles there are also ‘Protocols’ to extend and adapt new rights into the Human Rights Act. There are three main effects of the HRA: Firstly, it has subsumed the rights set out by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into British national law; if in any given situation there is a breach of rights, this allows people to take their cases to British courts instead of seeking justice from the European Court of

If the judiciary are intentionally straying into matters of governmental policy then they as unelected, impartial adjudicators should only do so when cases arise that call for such action, potentially when governmental action threatens the rule of law – a right afforded to them as a constitutional check on governmental power. While the judiciary can be viewed as in a constant skirmish with the Legislature and the Executive much of the judiciary’s power to interoperate statutes liberally comes from powers delegated to it by parliament .