Lyndon Johnson and the Tonkin Gulf Resolution
The official rhetoric of Lyndon Johnson’s administration portrayed the Gulf of Tonkin incident as an unprovoked and malicious attack on U.S. ships by the armed forces of North Vietnam, as a result of which the President needed the power to deal militarily with the North Vietnamese. The Gulf of Tonkin incident explicitly encompasses military actions on August 2, and alleged actions on
August 4, 1964, between North Vietnamese torpedo patrol boats and
United States destroyers and aircraft off the coast of North Vietnam.
President Johnson and many top administration officials declared that the United States was innocent of any aggressive offensive maneuvers against the North
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In addition, this paper will argue that the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution itself and the rhetoric of President Johnson and his advisers show that the top officials in the U.S. government had an attitude of insincerity toward South Vietnam as an independent country. The stepping-up of military efforts by the U.S. in the first nine months of Lyndon Johnson’s presidency was motivated by a self-serving sentiment, which was to show the world the United States’ political resolve with regard to the spread of Communism.
In essence, the passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution enabled President Johnson to use whatever means necessary to do what he wanted to do, or felt he needed to do, in Southeast Asia. Immediately after what has become known as the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the
President asked Congress for the power to use overt military force in
Vietnam without the declaration of war. At the time, however, it was extremely unclear exactly what had taken place in the Gulf and whether or not the Resolution asked for was legitimate and just.
The revelation that the Gulf of Tonkin incident was a charade is presented by many ... [Even] George Ball, who was the
Undersecretary of State under Johnson, spoke to Hendrickson about the “Gulf of Tonkin charade.”2 The Undersecretary of State’s calling the Gulf of Tonkin incident a “charade” is very strong wording, as he
was
In her book The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990, author Marilyn Young examines the series of political and military struggles between the United States and Vietnam, a nation that has been distinctively separated as the South and the North. Young chooses to express the daily, weekly, monthly progresses of the affairs collectively called the Vietnam Wars, focusing on the American interventions in the foreign soil. She seeks to provide an answer to a question that has haunted the world for years: What was the reason behind the United States interfering in the internal affairs of a foreign country in which it had no claims at all? Young discloses the overt as well as covert actions undertaken by the U.S. government officials regarding the foreign affairs with Vietnam and the true nature of the multifaceted objectives of each and every person that’s involved had.
During the Lyndon Baines Johnson presidential administration, both those policy makers who supported America’s involvement in Vietnam and those who opposed the war were part of the “containment generation.” They had reached political maturity during World War II and the early years of the Cold War and had experienced the intense anticommunism of the McCarthy era of the early 1950s. These leaders understood and applied the lessons of American nationalism, which had the primary message that the U.S. was the dominating nation that had to embrace its responsibility to aid and improve nations in America’s image. Therefore, when they saw that there was a threat of the spread of communism to areas of Southeast Asia, a majority of the
Upon the French’s exit, the American involvement and commitment escalated with the use of the political establishments in South Vietnam to assist in the curbing the spread of Communism. This presented America an opportunity for them to significantly integrate themselves in the South Vietnamese government to further delay the reunification election from taking place in 1954. The attacks on the US naval vessels during the Gulf of Tonkin incident provided the U.S, under the Johnson administration, another justification for the escalated involvement of the conflict in Vietnam. In which, the U.S responded with the Gulf of Tonkin resolution to launch a full-scale military effort towards the North until their withdrawal from Vietnam in 1969. The desolate gradual departure of America in Vietnam was summarised by Senator James Buckley as “that damning silence of those who cannot find even a single word of compassion for those under Communist tyranny”. It can be inferred from this context that as the situations in Vietnam continue to evolve, the American’s participation also varied to align with these conditions.
“In August of 1964, in response to the American and GVN espionage along its coast, the DRV launched a local and controlled attack against C. Turner Joy and the U.S.S. Maddox , two American ships on call in the Gulf of Tonkin” (Brigham 2). This resulted in the United States government giving Lyndon Johnson the ability to make war under the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. President Johnson then gave orders to perform air raids on Northern Vietnam pushing the United States further into the war. Compared to 1962 when only 9,000 soldiers supported the South Vietnamese, by June 1965 82,000 soldiers occupied the country. The number only continued to rise exponentially, and by 1966 370,000 soldiers had been sent in to prop their South Vietnam allies. President Richard Nixon withdrew American soldiers from Vietnam and as part of the “vietnamization” of the war. Over and 60,000 American soldiers had been lost in a war to preserve the status quo, not to win.
The Gulf of Tonkin incident was a series of reported confrontations between the USS Maddox on August 2nd and August 4th, 1964. The second of the two confrontations, on August 4th, was later proven to have never happened, and the legitimacy of the first confrontation on August 2nd is in question. The USS Maddox reported that on August 2nd, while patrolling in international waters, it was attacked by three North Vietnamese Torpedo Boats. President Johnson went on live television on August 4th saying that the USS Maddox and the USS Turner Joy were attacked again by Vietnamese boats. He used these attacks as reason to pass the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution that granted him the use of conventional military force in Southeast Asia without a formal
The Vietnam War lasted longer, bloodier, and more hostile than any U.S. President or American citizen imagined. Lyndon Johnson faced many other enemies during the war such as the duration, the immense number of deaths, and for the first time in most American’s history, failure. Through deep evaluation of Lyndon B. Johnson’s foreign policies as President during the Vietnam war, failure was a recurring outcome, as he faced military and political difficulties over having complete authority over political decisions made leading to the misuse of his respective power, receiving split support through torn Americans at home, and his accord to deport so many troops into combat in Vietnam.
A North Vietnamese civilian said, “The Americans thought that the more bombs they dropped, the quicker we would fall to our knees and surrender. But the bombs heightened rather than dampened our spirit.” This shows that congress was not correct in approving the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution because the results were war, bombing, and deaths.
The Cold War era proxy war known as the Vietnam War wrecked global havoc during 1955-1975. Although the destruction on the ground occurred in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, the bloodshed of the war was just one part of a much larger worldwide communism versus capitalism battle headed by the United States and the Soviet Union. For the U.S., diplomatic and military policies had never before been so tightly intertwined with domestic policies. The war in Vietnam had such an impact on the home front in America that the term, “The Vietnam Syndrome” is still repeated to this day. The war, which is sometimes seen as a part of the larger anti-communist policy of ‘containment’, is largely to blame for the near destruction of three presidencies, as well as causing numerous political and social divides, a detrimental effect on the U.S. economy, and a credibility gap that caused distrust between government and the people. The focus on the war meant that many domestic issues such as the civil rights movement, the war on poverty, and Johnson’s ideology of the ‘Great Society’, were neglected by the government and therefore limited in their progress. The overall domestic impact of the war in Vietnam was largely negative and extremely divisive.
On the 7th of April 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower gave one historic press conference [1]. In that conference, he announced his so called “Domino Theory”. It was a substantial aspect of the US involvement in the Vietnam War, involvement in terms of its military support and methods used in Vietnam. Even though it was greatly enhanced by other factors, such as the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, it was the trigger, and therefore the source of all US involvement in the Vietnam War. The main rationale of the theory was that if one country fell down to communism, all the surrounding countries would do the same, hence why it was called the ‘Domino’ Theory. Eisenhower thought that Vietnam’s fall to communism would lead to consequential communist uprisings in neighboring countries, such as Laos, Cambodia and Thailand. He also that that it could possibly extend as far as India, Japan, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Australia and New Zealand -[1]. This gave The US enough motivation, and more importantly, justification as to why they greatly increased military presence in Vietnam. Eisenhower said, “The possible consequences of the loss [of Indochina] are just incalculable to the free world.” [2]. Even though the theory was imprecise, and only Laos and Cambodia joined communism after the US lost the war, it was significant as the foundation of the US involvement in the conflict.
The Gulf of Tonkin was known as the USS Maddox incident. It happened on August 2, 1964. It was the international confrontation that led to the United States engaging more directly in the Vietnam War. The original American report blamed North Vietnam for both incidents. It became very controversial with widespread claim that either one or both incidents were false.
Those attacks, and the ensuing naval actions, known as the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, were used by President Lyndon Johnson to get congressional enactment of the Southeast Asia Resolution (better known as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution) on August
The Gulf of Tonkin Incident is also called the USS Maddox Incident. The North Vietnamese torpedo boats besieged the USS Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin, where it all occurred. The North Vietnamese government had administered further attacks against the United States naval vessels. The United States now conducted air attacks on the Vietnamese naval vessels. This air action now carried out with considerable damage to the boats and facilities that were against the United States naval vessels. These actions in the North Vietnamese government had given a new and dull turn to the already severe situation. The United States 's engagements in that area were widely known by the the United States Congress. They were all determined in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO) that was approved in 1955 by the Senate. This Treaty with its
The investigation assesses the level of success President Richard Nixon’s Vietnamization policy attained during the Vietnam War to end U.S. involvement in the war. In the strive to evaluate the level of success this policy demonstrated, the investigation evaluates the ability of the policy to equip, expand, and train Southern Vietnamese forces and allocate them to a substantial combat position, all while simultaneously reducing the quantity of U.S. combat troops in a steady manner. The Vietnamization policy is investigated and analyzed by both its causes and effects. The motivation that led to Nixon’s creation of this
The United States issued the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964. It said that Congress empowered the President, as Command in Chief, "to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the U.S. and to prevent further aggression." Most importantly, the memorandum gave the President the permission to retaliate North Vietnam's threats to international peace, as the attacks were reason enough for further American involvement in Vietnam, as well as an escalation of military forces.
The Vietnam conflict was a ruthless and long war that had serious consequences for everyone involved and would prove to be a shameful and infamous snapshot of American foreign policy at work. This paper will highlight the geo-political relationship of the United States and South Vietnam, focusing on events taking place after the Geneva accords of 1954, in the attempts to insure a non-communist Vietnam.