Mission Success Requires Special Operations Force in The Ugly American by William Lederer

Per ADP 5-0, to understand something is to grasp its nature and significance. Understanding includes establishing context—the set of circumstances that surround a particular event or situation. ADRP 5-0 states that understanding is fundamental to the commander’s ability to establish a situation’s context. Information collection (to include reconnaissance and surveillance) is indispensable to building and improving the commander’s understanding. ADRP 3-0 states, the intelligence warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding the enemy, terrain, weather, civil considerations, and other significant aspects of the operations environment

In 1961 President Kennedy sent a group who’s mission was to report on conditions in the South and assess if the United States should continue to deploy troops to Vietnam -Brigham, 1. In 1962 there was a massive increase of United States troops in Vietnam –MacDonald, 626. The numbers grew so large that they almost tripled. This led for the South Vietnamese to be instructed by advisors, who were attachments in the field -MacDonald, 627. Army recruits in the Special Forces were brought in to train the tribesman in the highlands. They also assisted the South Vietnamese in some of the more remote regions of the country -MacDonald, 627. The Civilian Irregular Defense Groups accompanied the Special Forces advisors, and they were able to disrupt the flow of the North Vietnamese from the country of Laos into South Vietnam -MacDonald, 627. These men were in charge of most parts of the operation, in a country where leadership had never been encouraged -MacDonald, 628. The United States troops also had many problems directing the civilians because of the language barrier. At the same time the Special Force troops were frustrated in directing their tactics -MacDonald, 628.

To be sure, a surprise strategic Chinese attack is a valuable worst-case scenario to study, but protracted multi-dimensional U.S.-China competition for Pacific influence—akin to the contemporary era—is arguably more likely and, thus, a more sensible scenario against which to wargame. Also, despite its plausible portrayal of a localized insurgency, the novel stops short of depicting mass civil unrest elsewhere and social stability considerations that would almost certainly accompany a future world war. Nonetheless, Ghost Fleet’s technical narrative provides ample realistic content for today’s security and defense officials to balance and refine tomorrow’s warfare strategies. Singer and Cole’s near-future depiction of U.S. technological vulnerability in warfare should spur those officials to enable American innovation and adaptation in warfighting solutions well before the onset of strategic

When fighting the Vietnam War many did not think it possible for the United States to loose. Those fighting underestimated the power of the Viet Cong. With a foreign land and foreign customs Marines struggled to get accustomed to the way the war was fought. Philip Caputo addresses these learned lessons in A Rumor of War. Lessons that were learned in Vietnam also have relevance to the current war in Afghanistan. The men in both wars fought against an enemy that blends in with the locals. Philip Caputo’s first hand account of the Vietnam War shows the mistakes that were made and how those lessons taught the United States not to make the same mistakes in Afghanistan.

A) The title of the book is The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War and the author is Andrew Bacevich. The book was published in New York, New York by the publisher Oxford University Press in the year 2005. It is the first edition and contains 270 pages.

In the 1940’s a series of propaganda films titled Why We Fight were produced for the purpose of defining the enemies of World War 2 to justify the necessity of America’s involvement in war. Hitler needed to be defeated, Nazism had to be destroyed, and tyranny had to be stopped for the sake of the American way of life by any means necessary. How could society argue against America’s role in the world war when freedom was being threatened? As Martin Luther King Jr. said “Injustice anywhere is a threat to everywhere.” No questions asked, Americans mobilized in the name of liberty and freedom. However the 2005 documentary film Why We Fight directed by Eugene Jarecki is not a sequel or war propaganda. The film informs the audience and questions America 's military industrial complex that has since dictated policy since the victory of World War 2. With the help of narration, soundbites, and credible speakers Jarecki shines light on the pernicious impact of the armed industry on our government, army, and citizens.

The book The Ugly American clearly demonstrates several of the established Special Operations Force (SOF) imperatives outlined in ADRP 6-22. As a Special Forces soldier I can relate these imperatives to stories illustrated in the book and apply them to real life situations that I have experienced in the field. The Ugly American is a goldmine of wisdom and a handbook for special warfare. All Special Operations soldiers should read it.

The USA was extremely vain when going to war in Vietnam. They had extreme firepower. With a few weeks notice at the time, had the power to turn Vietnam into a region of radioactive glass. The US’s strategy of search and destroy conflicted directly with the Vietnamese’s strategy of hanging onto their belts (caplan,2012). Unlike previous American victories against

In Lederer’s and Burdick’s book, the day-by-day business of American policy implementation and foreign aid to other countries is described. Central to The Ugly American is the historical reality of

Special Forces soldiers work in foreign lands with situations which are not always completely clear from its beginning. The Special Operation Imperatives serve as the base for success by providing the framework to develop and assist the host nation in achieving their desired goals. Through this essay I will use the novel “The Ugly American” (William J. Lederer & Eugene Burdick) to provide context to the benefits of applying such imperatives and the consequences of improper application. I will bring to light the actions of the characters and depict the reasons why the application of the imperative made the character succeed or fail in his desired goal.

Deceased philosopher Bertrand Russell once said, “War does not determine who is right- only who is left”. Those left are the soldiers of the 1-502nd, specifically Bravo Company 1st plt, and the Janabi family and to a greater extent, the ever-changing global world we all live in today. The tragic events that conspired in a small Iraqi village became a microcosm of how leadership failures at every level shaped the actions of a few soldiers who committed atrocious acts. One can also see how a high operational tempo, along with prolonged violence and death, has on a person’s psyche. It is the ugly side of war that the average American citizen may not want to hear or talk about. For a soldier, it is inevitably what they train their

The notion of an American way of war informs how scholars, policymakers, and strategists understand how Americans fight. A way of war—defined as a society’s cultural preferences for waging war—is not static. Change can occur as a result of important cultural events, often in the form of traumatic experiences or major social transformations. A way of war is therefore the malleable product of culturally significant past experiences. Reflecting several underlying cultural ideals, the current American way of war consists of three primary tenets—the desire for moral clarity, the primacy of technology, and the centrality of scientific management systems—which combine to create a preference for decisive, large-scale conventional wars with clear objectives and an aversion to morally ambiguous low-intensity conflicts that is relevant to planners because it helps them address American strategic vulnerabilities.

Diplomacy is the art of dealing with foreign countries and their people in a sensitive and effective way. The ability to influence people and situations contributes to effective American diplomacy. In The Ugly American William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick comment on the nature of American diplomacy in 1950s Southeast Asia. They identify the characteristics and effects of both inept and skilled diplomacy. The book highlights knowledge of language, history, and culture as critical components to the ability to influence indigenous populations. In many ways the situations and characters described in the book mirror situations and challenges faced by Special Operations Forces (SOF) today. Special Operations Imperatives are a planning tool that SOF use to influence people and situations they encounter. In order to understand the influence and effects of proper application of the Special Operations Imperatives the stories of Homer Atkins, Colonel Hillandale and Solomon Asch provide a setting to compare and contrast with my own experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq and Jordan.

In the year 1965, American government announced, with public support, that America is going to win the guerilla war and defeat the “global communist conspiracy”. It also promised to build free institutions in South-East Asia. Two years later, in the year 1967, the same affair was considered not only as unsuccessful, but also as a gruesome action of the politicians.

“The USSF began over half a millennia ago it was founded mostly by what was The United States on Earth. It’s purpose is to protect all from destruction and or death, but mainly destruction. That’s it’s purpose is to keep the numerous solar systems united. If the time comes The USSF will use violence to end it. It’s vast armies will be on your planet within a day whether it's a threat of war, destruction, death, anything that can leave to damage to a colonization, the planet, or the well-being of the universe the USSF will be there to ensure that even though peace may not be achieved the conflict will subside. That’s the brief history of our organization, any questions?” The commander questioned.