Moral Reasoning And Moral Judgments

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Over the last decades, research in moral psychology was dominated by the role of reasoning in making moral judgments (Kohlberg, 1969; Turiel, 1983), while a more recent research emphasizes the role of automatic emotional processes (Blair, 1995; Haidt, 2001; Pizzaro & Salovey, 2002). Therefore, there has been a great tension to whether intuitions or reasons play critical role in making moral judgments. Haidt (2001) argues moral reasoning involves a conscious process, which means that the process is slower, effortful, deliberate, and controllable, while moral intuition process occurs unconsciously and thus, the process is faster, automatic and effortlessly. Thereby, Haidt (2001) contends reasoning still play a role in moral judgments, nevertheless, it is most likely as a post hoc attempt to justify one’s intuition-driven moral judgments. However, there are still some studies maintaining reasons as the master in making moral judgments (Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1983; Kuhn, 1991). Kuhn (1991) describes people still follow their reasoning to make judgments even though it might contradicts with their initial intuitions. Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, and Cohen (2001) propose dual-process theory in order to consolidate these two approaches. They explain that both reasons and intuitions run in parallel or mutually competitive roles in making moral judgments. They further describe that intuitions or known as automatic emotional responses drive deontological judgments, while
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