Introduction to promissory estoppel
The principle behind estoppel is to prevent injustice owing to inconsistency or fraud. There are two general types of estoppel: promissory (or equitable) and legal. Promissory estoppel means where the representator induces the relying party to believe that whatever rights within their contracts are not be enforced. Promissory estoppel is the principle of Justice and equity. Estoppel occurs when a party reasonably relies on the promise of another party, or to prevent someone from arguing something in contrary to claim act performed by other person. An estoppel is not a remedy "at law" in common law jurisdictions, but based on principles of equity. In the majority of cases, it is only a defence and it works by prevention from enforcing established legal rights, or from relying on a set of facts that would give rise to enforceable rights (e.g. words said or actions performed) if that enforcement or reliance would be unfair to the defendant. Its effect is to defeat generally enforceable legal rights, the scope of the remedy is often very limited. Promisors - one who makes a promise and another is promisee - one to whom promises have been made. The doctrine of promissory estoppel considers the circumstances in which one party to the contract shows the other party that made without consideration when the reliance on the promise was reasonable, and the promise relied to one’s detriment (impairment). It
Proprietary estoppel, on the other hand, is a “legal bar preventing a (first) party from denying another (second) party's right in first party's property where the second party has incurred costs in that property to its detriment”. Proprietary estoppel, like other types of estoppel, is not a remedy in itself but a tool to raise “estoppel equity”, on the basis of which the court is able to decide on the type of remedy that this equity will satisfy. Similarly to the need for the element of common intention for the purpose of establishing a constructive trust, there is a need for the establishment of an active or passive assurance on the part of the defendant that leads to some form of consequential detriment on the part of the claimant when acting in reliance on that assurance. Thus, there must be a causal connection between the actions undertaken by the claimant and the initial assurance on the part of the defendant. The extent and the nature of the detriment suffered by the claimant, however, appears to be substantially more flexible than that necessary to find the existence of a constructive trust. For example, in Inwards v Baker [1965], such detriment amounted to the improvement of the defendant’s land, while in Gillett v Holt [2001] it was manifested in both financial and personal detriment. Yet unlike in most cases involving common intention constructive trusts, in neither of
In the case of Sam vs. Quinn, his landlord, and the national chain store. Sam is who is working on a great innovation, a device that sounds like a barking dog that will help assist in the safety and welfare of others. Several months ago, Sam hit the jackpot that would change his life and landed in a verbal contract to sell 1000 units to a national chain store. However, this young inventor has been mass producing this product from his place of residence, his apartment, own by Mr. Quinn. Sam arrives home one day to find two letters, one from the chain store demanding the 1000 units be delivered immediately. The other was an eviction notice from Mr. Quinn stating that his barking machine has been pestering the other tenants and that Sam was not supposed to be conducting business from his apartment. Sam is furious at both situations and decides to pro-sue the matters. Therefore, before the court can rule on these cases, the court should determine the various elements whether there is a valid contract, a quasi-contract exists, a promissory estoppel, and the rights an obligation of a tenant would prevail on Sam’s claims.
breach of express and implied contracts based on the theory of promoter liability. The courts
The following case American Agricultural Chemical Co. v. Kennedy & Crawford, 103 Va. 171 (Va.1904) it is expressed that; where the consideration for the promise of one party is the promise of the other party, there must be absolute mutuality of engagement, so that each party has the right to hold the other to a positive agreement. Both parties must be bound or neither is bound. A party making a promise is bound to nothing until a promisee, within a reasonable time, engages to do, or else do or begins to do, the thing which is the condition of the first promise. Until such engagement or such doing, the promisor may withdraw his promise, because there is no mutuality, and therefore no consideration for it.
The equitable doctrine of implied-in-law contract, a quasi-contract, would have allowed the court to award monetary damages to a plaintiff for providing work or services to a defendant even though no actual contract existed between the parties (Cheeseman, 2015, p. 195). This would apply to the situation in which Sam received some form of payment for his units before he shipped the units to the store. In this case, Sam would have been under the legal obligation to send the units to the chain store. Promissory estoppel (or detrimental reliance) is an equity doctrine that permits a court to order enforcement of a contract that lacks consideration (Cheeseman, 2015, p. 220). Promissory estoppel is used to avoid injustice. The elements of the promissory estoppel include the promisor making a promise, the promiseé replying to the promise, the promiseé taking action on the promise, and experiencing injustice when the promise was not enforced. The promissory estoppel in this case is invalid because there was no discussion about the compensation in return for the 1,000 units, no action based on the promise, and no injustice suffered as a result of fulfilling a
However, because Harry detrimentally relied on Tom’s promise by building a 2000 sq. ft room onto his house to make room for the trains, he should be able make a claim of promissory estoppel. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is an exception to the classical elements of a contract. The courts should allow a contract to be enforced albeit it lacks consideration by allowing detrimental reliance to substitute for consideration.
1.2.1. Justices Mason, Brennan, Deane, and Dawson in Khoury v. Government Insurance Office of NSW states that the discovery of a breach that is serious or of an essential term creates paths available for the innocent party in which they are ‘…confronted by two truly alternative rights … the right to avoid or terminate a contract and the right to affirm it and insist on performance…’ They continue by quoting Lord Diplock’s judgment in Kammins Ballrooms Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd , that if the plaintiff follows through on either path ‘…may lose one of [the rights] by acting "in a manner which is consistent only with his having chosen to rely on [the opposing right]"’
When a condition is breached by either of the parties would result in the other party to either terminate the contract or proceed with suing for the damages caused.
Detrimental Reliance occurs when someone takes action or fails to take action because of what appeared to be a promise made by another individual, without knowing if true or untrue. It is very similar to Promissory Estoppel in that the other party is "estopped" or legally prevented from denying liability, even though no formal contract was formed, because of its promise. An estoppel by representation [of fact] will arise between A and B if the following elements are made out. First, A makes a false representation of fact to B or to a group of which B was a member. [It is not necessary to demonstrate A knew that the representation was untrue.] Second, in making the representation, A intended or [in the
In other words, if the fundamental reason for the contracting parties in deciding the quantum of liability for breach is not to approximate the possible loss of the injured promisee, instead of this to prevent the promisor from defaulting on his undertaking and/or to penalize him, then the agreement will to this extent be void.
The party making false representation has made it either purposely or negligently just to mislead the other party. The aggrieved party, relied on the statement, believing it to be true and acted upon it, this may became a cause of loss to the aggrieved party. In addition, the representation of the fact must be made before the conclusion of the agreement.
-Court must be convinced that failure to comply with an agreement will lead to one of the parties to suffer prejudice. Court will protect innocent party, will provide remedy
The damages must be uncertain at the time the contract is made that such clause will likely save both parties the future difficulty of estimates
In this essay, I will discuss that in contract law, bilateral contracts epitomizes the notion of promises for promises as the grounds for contractual obligations. I will examine how damages are recovered in reliance interest when a party fails to uphold their contractual obligations to another party. Finally, I will discuss why I agree that damages should reflect the promises made between two
The principle of uberrima fides in the insurance contract has been traced back to Lord Mansfield in Carter v Boehm, with the first judicial attempt to set out the duty. He based the duty of disclosure on the fact that ‘insurance is a contract upon speculation’, highlighting the imbalance of information between the insurer and the assured. The contingency is calculated on facts which are generally only known to the assured. This was regarded by Lord