Operation Hucky Case Study

There were great strides made in the development for better, more mobile Field Artillery during World War II. There was a great need for troops behind enemy lines which led to the use of a new, untested method known as Airborne Artillery. The ability to deploy Artillery units behind enemy lines changed the battlefield and set the tempo for the remainder of the battle. Operation Husky was a key campaign in World War II where the Allied Forces took Sicily from the Axis Powers. The German and Italian forces thought that they had predicted what the Allied Forces would attempt. The Axis Powers were actually take by surprise. The United States and Great Britain were the leading Allied Forces during World War II. The Invasion of Sicily was a large scale amphibious and airborne operation was followed by nearly six weeks of land combat and launched the Italian Campaign.

At first Operation Overlord was suppose to occur in May (Stagg 12),yet due to weather forecasts the plan was pushed back to June. Another problem was that every branch of the military wanted “quiet weather”. This entailed low tides so that the underwater obstacles could be seen, the low tide needed to be around mid morning so that they could bomb the defenses and so that a second low tide could roll in before darkness set in(Miller 171). The Air troops wanted no ground fog or heavy mist, no more than 6/10th of the sky be clouded, and a cloud base at least 3,000 feet above ground level.To ensure that the troops were not too widely spread to the wind speed would need to be 20 mph. With no gusts at the ground more than 30 mph(Stagg 13). The demands of the Air troopers were reasonable especially since they were going to be the first ones to land in the middle of the night and start the offensive. But, because of the weather many of the paratroopers missed their target and were separated from their group. The infamous 101st airborne was the only group that was able to stay together and suffer the least amount of casualties( in the book Band of Brothers one soldier not in their platoon asks “ Where the hell am I” (Ambrose 75). Indicates the unorganized drops). After weekly updates( Eisenhower requested that the meteorologists give him detailed updates of the weather since January 1944) the operation was planned to go off on June 4, 1944. However, the sky began to seem ominous, and the meteorologist had to warn Eisenhower that “ a cold front that was expected to pass through Channel about Wednesday, would now be pushed forward earlier-24 or 36 hours earlier” ( Stagg 102). With moments the operation was suspended. One day later on June 5,1944 paratroopers and bombers were able to go across the skies with almost clear skies ( other parts of the skies

In the winter of 1944, Allied forces in Europe found themselves at the mercy of a massive German offensive. It only took days for the thirteen divisions of German armor to push the allies into such a retreat that contemporary press named the battle after the “bulge” that appeared in the Allied lines. Initially, German soldiers outnumbered the Allies 2:1, while their tanks, the Panzer IV and the Tiger II, completely outclassed their allied counterparts. However, within the weeks, the offensive collapsed. The tanks were out of gas. There was not even enough aviation fuel for the Luftwaffe to cover the retreat (Cole).

Airborne infantry tactics were still for the most part untested during this time frame so many senior leaders desired to use the airborne units such as the 82nd as regular ground infantry units which they were extremely capable of. Gen Mathew Ridgeway found himself every bit of a politician as the commander of the 82nd. He was an advocate for the techniques of placing large infantry units behind enemy lines. He found himself regularly having to engage higher commands in attempts to maintain control of his unit as a whole. Through Arlington National Cemetery?s website (2015) we can see why after the first airborne operation in support of the D-day invasions of Sicily this was so difficult, ?Both enemy and Allied antiaircraft gunners shot down more than a dozen of the 82nd?s transport planes. These and other losses resulted from staff failure, mistaken instructions and the newness of such an operation. As a result, he, along with other Airborne commanders like Maxwell D. Taylor and James M. Gavin, had difficult time persuading higher command of the ultimate effectiveness of landing soldiers and equipment by parachute and gliders? (para.10). With these difficulties in mind the leaders of the Division focused on the outcomes of the overall D-day invasion and the

This paper evaluates General Eisenhower’s decision making process in resolving the Major General Fredendall situation during the aftermath of the German offensive in Tunisia in 1943. It describes and contrasts the Polis and the Incremental Decision Making Models. It applies each model to Eisenhower’s decision making process, and concludes with the logic as to why the Incremental Model best describes Eisenhower’s actions in relieving Frendendall.

“Show me a completely smooth operation and I'll show you someone who's covering mistakes. Real boats rock.” (Herbert, 1985) Operation Torch was a prime example of mistakes were made yet were not exploited by the enemy. The Algerian-French-Morocco Campaign specifically Operation Torch is by far one of the most forgotten and rarely talked about operations during World War II (WW2). Operation Torch paved the way for a multi-national amphibious landing in Northern Africa, opening up a second front in the west giving Soviet Union Troops relief on the eastern front. The Algerian-French-Morocco Campaign became a massive testing ground for tactics, techniques and procedures that resulted in future successes during the Normandy invasion (Howe, 1993).

In 1943 the British and American Allies shared a common language, common enemy, but they disagreed on the war’s grand strategy and struggled building mutual trust in each others’ motives and capabilities. (site) These differences and struggles culminated in the Sicily Campaign, Operation Husky, which provides a luminous and cautionary example of the pitfalls of joint warfare. At the heart of Husky’s struggles stood the Allied dysfunctional Mission Command war-fighting function and it’s inability to coordinate joint FIRES and Sustainment war-fighting function. The Allied Mission Command function failed to ensure all senior commanders understood Commander’s intent and the problem (and opportunity) present in Sicily, and most importantly, they

Allied land component integration struggles hindered operational progression throughout the Sicilian Campaign. Initial planning and operations for Sicily revealed, General Alexander’s lack of experience and effective leadership resulting in granting General’s Montgomery and Patton too much latitude in operational decision-making. [Swanson, p. 58] In essence, General Alexander’s lack of command guidance and restructuring Allied land force boundaries allowed the General Patton to divert forces toward Western Sicily and away from operational objectives of meeting the German Army. [Swanson, p. 58] Among other things, poor weather, lack of experience and absence of inter-service joint training encumbered integrated Allied airborne operations, subjecting

The problem preventing Allied forces from changing the current M/NATO theater-level environment to their desired campaign end state is their inability to seize and exploit the initiative. The Allies’ limited foot print in Egypt coupled with the Axis’ control of the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and most of North Africa makes holding/protecting the Suez Canal, rather than aggressive offensive operations, a primary objective. This is necessary to both deny Axis forces access to the canal and to maintain sea lines of communication (SLOC).

While We have the benefit of historical analysis, there are several operation design elements that could have used more careful consideration: Effect, Decisive Point, Line of Effort, Line of Operation, and Culmination. The “Broad Front Strategies” rapid advance drove the Allies over 300 days ahead of their operational plan. This outstripped their logistics chain and drove a shift to the defense. Clearly Operational Reach should have received more attention in the planning process.

On July 10, 1943, U.S. and British forces began Operation Husky, an invasion of the island using troops deployed by gliders, parachutes, and boats. Many of these landings were disrupted by high winds, making it difficult for Allied troops to regroup once on the ground. During the first few days, the invaders encountered significant resistance around Sicily’s main airfield, but it was quickly overcome. On July 22, the Sicilian capital of Palermo fell to the Allies, and Sicily was secured.

Air Supremacy was crucial for supporting the invasion and confusing the germans. It was something the Allies needed to have a successful invasion. Before dawn on the 6th of June 1944, paratroopers and gliders were deployed inland above Normandy. Only a few hours later the beach landings arrived which totally confused

Operation Husky marked the first time that the United States Army utilized Airborne Infantry units in an active military operation. The 82nd Airborne Division formed the backbone of the American airborne operations during this campaign. Initially, the 82nd’s role in this operation was to land three of its regiments, the 504th, 505th and 325th, behind enemy lines to provide assistance to the allied forces that were taking part in the amphibious assault on the coast of Sicily. This plan was to be implemented in three separate lifts, or successively, over the course of a few days. However, due to poor coordination and weather during the first lift and friendly fire during the second lift, the third lift was cancelled. Despite the initial phases of this operation being plagued by improper preparation and poor coordination during execution, the American paratroopers created positive effects on the German and Italian forces by creating confusion and attacking critical points of Axis infrastructure. Of these

The Anglo-American invasion of Sicily in July 1943 was to date the biggest amphibious operation conducted in World War II. Operation HUSKY involved the U.S. 7th Army and the British 8th Army to make up the 15th Army Group. This was Anglo-American forces’ second problematic attempt to implement Eisenhower’s unyielding vision that the only way to conquer the Germans, “would be won by the Americans and Britons fighting together.” Although a moderate success, Operation HUSKY exposed serious issues including imperfections in dealing with mission command and the integration of Joint Forces at the operational level of war, which severely crippled the overall effectiveness of Operation HUSKY. This essay will evaluate coalition warfare and the chaos alliances partake on command-and-control due to cultural dissimilarities, trust issues, understanding concepts, and doctrinal differences; however, commander’s diplomacy and building alliances

During OPERATION TORCH the Allied Center of Gravity was their naval forces. The naval forces were critical to the transporting combat forces, logistical support, and securing the sea lines of communication throughout North Africa. The ability for the Allies to insert ground forces in and around the Mediterranean was a critical capability they possessed. The ability to do enabled the joint force to create a tactical advantage over the German Afrika Korps. Without this ability, it would hinder all phases of Operation TORCH and the Allies goal of defeating the Axis. The critical requirements needed to support the Allies began with the Allies security of the Straits of Gibraltar. This task was important in order to begin OPERATION TORCH,