Summarise and explain: An impostor stole the driving license of a man named Mr Durlabh Patel. The impostor brought the driver license with him to the showrooms of a car dealer where he used the stolen driver license as a proof of identity and introduced himself as Mr Patel to the sales manager Mr Bailey. The impostor wanted to buy a car and they agreed a price for a hire-purchase agreement. The impostor filled out the hire-purchase agreement form produced by Mr Bailey by providing the name and address of Mr Patel and forged a signature matching that on the driving license. Mr. Bailey called the hire-purchase company Shogun Finance (the claimant) and gave them the details the impostor had provided to its relevant staff. Then he faxed to the …show more content…
Thus he argued that there is no offer and acceptance between Mr Patel and Shogun, and the contract is void. Therefore the rogue is not a debtor under the agreement and has never acquired the title of the vehicle. The Lord added that face-to-face principle does not apply here because none of the dealings between the fraudster and Shogun took place face to face, with the car dealer as a “mere facilitator” of communication (case, 21). Lord Walker agreed with Lord Hobhouse and added his own observations. He put forward a point that in such cases with two innocent parties the court is inclined to sympathise more with the private purchaser from the fraudster. He thinks that it may not be right to assume that one innocent party deserves more sympathy. Lord Philips found himself “attracted” by the face-to-face presumption put forward by Lord Nicholls and Lord Millett, but he was unable to adopt it. He echoed Lord Hobhouse and Lord Walker by recognizing the contract as a written document. He also considers the identity of the parties to the agreement as essential to its conclusion. Without Mr Patel (the hirer)’s authority, the contract was null. Lord Nicholls and Lord Millett hold dissenting opinions. Lord Nicholls believes that a contract exists as long as there is a meeting of minds and that fraud only negative rights and obligations flowing from an intention to
The particular focus of this essay is on how terms are implied. This is central because the courts intervene and impose implied terms when they believe that in addition to the terms the parties have expressly agreed on, other terms must be implied into the contract. Gillies argued that the courts have become more interventionist in protecting the rights of contracting parties thereby encroaching upon the notion of freedom of contract. The doctrine of freedom of contract is a prevailing philosophy which upholds the idea that parties to a contract should be at liberty to agree on their own terms without the interference of the courts or legislature. Implied terms can be viewed as a technique of construction or interpretation of contracts. It has been argued that the courts are interfering too much in their approach to determine and interpret the terms of a contract. The aim of this essay is to explore this argument further and in doing so consider whether freedom of contract is lost due to courts imposing implied terms. The essay will outline how the common law implies terms. The final part of the essay will examine whether Parliament, by means of a statute, or terms implied by custom restrict freedom in a contract. An overall conclusion on the issue will be reached.
15–1. Liquidated Damages. Carnack contracts to sell his house and lot to Willard for $100,000. The terms of the contract call for Willard to make a deposit of 10 percent of the purchase price as a down payment. The terms further stipulate that if the buyer breaches the contract, Carnack will retain the deposit as liquidated damages. Willard makes the deposit, but because her expected financing of the $90,000 balance falls through, she breaches the contract. Two weeks later, Carnack sells the house and lot to Balkova for $105,000. Willard demands her $10,000 back, but Carnack refuses, claiming that Willard’s breach and the contract terms entitle him to keep the deposit. Discuss who is correct. (See Damages.)
[Analysis/Application] Like the cited cases above, our case of Vivian v. Bernie lacks mutuality of consideration. The reason being, Bernie never bound himself to the contract signed by both parties. When Bernie wrote “In the event that the seller breaches this agreement, the seller must refund the purchaser's deposit, but the parties shall be limited to this remedy and only this remedy” He freed himself of any duty of having to perform his part of the contract.
7. Smith was approached by a man who introduced himself as Brown of Brown & Co. Brown was not known to Smith, but Smith asked Dun & Bradstreet for a credit report and obtained a very favorable report on Brown. He thereupon sold Brown some expensive gems and billed Brown & Co. ‘‘Brown’’ turned out to be a clever jewel thief, who later sold the gems to Brown & Co. for valuable consideration. Brown & Co. was unaware of ‘‘Brown’s’’ transaction with Smith. Can Smith successfully sue Brown & Co. for either the return of the gems or the price as billed to Brown & Co.?
There is no obligation within the English contract law to act in good faith ‘in keeping with the principles of freedom of contract and the binding force of contract’. Richard Stone and James Devenney identified two of the reasons why this is so, ‘freedom of contract’ as one of the reasons because a ‘positive obligation would have not sat easily with the archetype of a contract’ where two parties ‘of equal bargaining power’ where free to ask whichever questions seemed important. The argument is that if one of the parties wants to ask something relevant to negotiations then they have the freedom to and the party cannot lie; however the
Mutual assent and consideration go together so this paper will argue against them together. Mutual assent is the idea that all the parties in a contract know what they are contracting to and agree to it. As defined in Charles S. Knapp, Nathan M. Crystal, and Harry G. Prince’s Problems in
Lord Denning holds the opinion that “…it is a mistake to think that all contracts can be analyzed into the form of offer and acceptance…” He gives his support of the statement above and echoes these sentiments in the case of Butler v. Ex-Cell-O Corporation (England) Ltd (1979). He believes that the “…better way is to look at all the documents passing between the parties and glean from them or from the conduct of the
This essay will discuss the Supreme Court decision in FHR European Ventures LLP and others v Cedar Capital Partners LLC (Cedar) . The issue in this case was whether a bribe or secret commission accepted by an agent is held on constructive trust for his principal. This topic is a “relentless and seemingly endless debate” , as Sir Terence Etherton described, and that the “remedy awarded has vacillated for the last 200-odd years” . The major reason for the debate is because the principal will have propriety claim as opposed to a mere equitable compensation, if the bribe or commission is held on a constructive trust . The principal will be in a much more advantageous position if he was held to have propriety
The law of contract in many legal systems requires that parties should act in good faith. English law refuses to impose such a general doctrine of good faith in the field of contract law. However, despite not recognizing the principle, English contract law is still influenced by notions of good faith. As Lord Bingham affirmed, the law has developed numerous piecemeal solutions in response to problems of unfairness. This essay will seek to examine the current and future state of good faith in English contract law.
The doctrine of consideration is one of the most established doctrines within the common law of contract. This essay will discuss the impact of Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd [1989] EWCA Civ 5 on the doctrine of consideration. It will shed light on the rules of consideration, ways to avoid consideration, application of the rules in the specific circumstance of performance of an existing duty in cases. Evidently an alteration to the rules and practices would be displayed. Courts today need to make a distinction between everyday social agreements and legally binding contracts, this is where the doctrine of consideration manifests. This case introduces the practical benefit rule needed for consideration however, this case did not alter set legislation formed from the case Stilk v Myric[1809]. As it was held in the Court of Appeal and not seen or upheld by the House of Lords.
A Contract requires several elements in order to be considered enforceable. However for the purpose of this essay we would explore one of these elements in order to effectively understand the controversial cases of Williams v Roffey Brothers and Nicholls (contractors) Ltd (1990) and Stilk v Myrick (1804). Before going any further one should briefly understand the doctrine of Consideration. Despite the vast amount of content written, the doctrine of consideration is still to this day unclear due to the inconsistency of the courts and its application of necessary rules. Consideration refers to that which the law deems as valuable in that the promisor receives from the promise that which was promised. In other words, it is the exchange of something of value between the parties in a contract. One should be mindful that in English law, every promise may not be legally enforceable; it requires the court to distinguish between are enforceable and non-enforceable obligations. This brings us to the controversial cases of Stilk v Myrick and Williams v the Roffery brothers. Many argue that that the case of Williams was wrongly decided leading to impairments in the rule initially established in Stilk v Myrick. This essay seek to analyse and critique the cases of Stilk v Myrick and Williams v Roffey Brothers and also highlight whether or not the new rule of Practical benefit lead to serious impairments in later cases.
If parties enter into a contract that is reflective or derives from a mistake, under common law the contract may be void or voidable. The basis of this decision depends on the type of mistake. Shogun Finance Ltd v Hudson presented a unilateral mistake, in which only one party is mistaken, and in this case, a mistake as to the identity. The difficulty lies when judges must decide whether a contract is void or voidable, which will only protect one of the two arguably innocent parties, the original property owner or the bona fide purchaser. However, the approaches previously taken by the Courts have led to a lack of certainty and coherence in the interests of commercial transactions, and so the Shogun case presented an opportunity for clarification. I am going to raise the argument that the law of mistake is in need of a reform, by following Lord Millett’s proposal to no longer follow the cases Cundy v Lindsay and Ingram v Little. The reasoning within this argument will establish that the cases are inconsistent, lack support for third parties and fail to establish the authority of creditworthiness over identity in commercial contracts. Alternatively, the cases Phillips v Brooks and Lewis v Averay should be used to create a clear established line of case law which can be seen as a fair and practical approach towards mistake and protecting the bona fide purchaser.
Conceptually, reasonable expectations of honest men and sanctity of contract are not in conflict. Indeed, they often point to the same direction – it is the reasonable expectation of an honest man that an agreement should be executed. Although it is observed that the two themes usually work side by side, this essay argues that in regards to the rules of acceptance of unilateral contracts, the English courts place more emphasis on reasonable expectations when making decisions.
Perhaps the greatest insight provided by my colleague's discussion is the deconstruction of the process by which the concept of negligence did ultimately emerge as a new tort standard. Here, the discussion illustrates the challenge before a judicial body when a legal conflict appears to bring about a new and previously unforeseen point of contention. In this case, as my colleague highlights so effectively, the charge of fraud would be the only theretofore existent way of legally addressing liability for a business or organization such as the defendant in this case. The great insight provided by my colleague is in acknowledgement of the exhaustive review of existing legal documents engaged by the ruling parties and arguing parties. This process demonstrates well that even where no precedent existing for what would become the charge of negligence,
Lewis sold his car to a man who claimed to be Richard Greene, a popular star. The man paid by cheque, providing a film studio pass as a proof of his identity. He sold the car to Avery. The cheque had been taken from a stolen cheque book and was later dishonoured. Lewis sued Avery to recover his car. It was held that this contract cannot be voided as the plaintiff cannot show the importance of identity. The mistaken belief to the credibility of act is not sufficient.