Personal Identity and Psychological Reductionism Essay

371). This responds to the objections raised by Thomas Reid in the 18th century (Shoemaker, 2008, p. 340), however, the Memory Theory did require a modification to include the possibility of temporarily forgetting the experiences of an earlier person-stage, “as long as one has the potentiality of remembering it” (Shoemaker, 2008, p. 340). In the conversations held by Gretchen Weirob, Sam Miller and Dave Cohen in Perry’s ‘Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality’ (Perry, 1977), this concept is addressed in depth. Miller relays a chapter written by Locke – “the relation between two person-stages or stretches of consciousness that makes them stages of a single person is just that the later one contains memories of an earlier one...I can remember only my past thoughts and feelings, and you only yours...take this relation as the source of identity” (Perry, 1977, p. 343). These concepts are logical possibilities in my opinion, and are far less unstable than those presented within the Body/Soul Theory, as these concepts do not require the senses of others, but the individual’s first person perception of their personal identity.

Who I am? Personally, I believe that a person’s identity can take only one of two routes. One, a person’s identity can change within that person’s life. Who I am now, is not necessarily who I was when I was younger. Experience can and will likely modify our identities. Therefore, experience can solidify our personal identification or it can weaken our personal identification. And as such, individuals and their perspectives are always evolving, or at the very least, they should evolve over time. Although there are some identities that evolve throughout one’s lifetime; there are some identities that remain consistent. Two, some identities cannot and will not change. So identities are socially and/or politically forces upon you, some identities are genetically assigned to you, and some you choose to keep. No matter the reason or reasons, these identities have been and will be consist within your lifespan. But, how you deal with them is up to you as an individual.

John Locke claims that memory is the key to identity, so “as far [as] someone’s memory goes, is so far the identity of the person.” (Campbell) First, Locke explains the concept of body swapping in terms of the prince and the cobbler: the “transfer of memories between the body of the prince and the body of the cobbler would mean the people have swapped bodies.” (Campbell) In this example, the

For in Descartes terms, it was plausible to doubt that one has a body, but impossible to doubt the existence of one’s mind; therefore “…self and mind must be identical” (Palmer 162).

The silhouette of a subject was drawn by a council of moments and David Hume named it an illusion, humanity named it the self. In the modern ages of philosophy while Rene Descartes’ affect still remains eminent, David Hume comes with an argument which kills the I Descartes created and lets it fly as a ghost in human perception. Not only in the case of the subject, the contrast between Hume’s and Descartes’ ideas can be seen in their search for a priori as well.

John Locke is very keen on personal identity. He believes that consciousness creates personal identity. The body isn’t essential, so when a person’s soul fleets to a different body, they are still the same person because their consciousness thrives: “Personal Identity is wherever the consciousness is” (John Locke’s pdf). In order to understand personal identity, he first identifies the concept of a person. A person comprises of a consciousness with experience, the ability to think for oneself, and awareness of the past and present, but not an actual physical presence.

Descartes uses the evidence of thought to prove the existence of ‘self’. This is highlighted when he said, “if I convinced myself of something then I certainly existed.” (Descartes, Descartes: Selected Philosophical Writings, 1988, p. 80). As the concept of thought requires a thinker, the presence of thoughts proves there to be a thinker, regardless of the accuracy of these thoughts (Descartes, Discourse , 2007, p. 15). However, with Descartes approach come serious objections. The most serious objection is the consequences of Descartes’ view of the indivisibility of the Soul, the issues of Descartes’ failure to present a continued personal identity over time. This objection can, however, be resolved by Hume’s scepticism.

Since Descartes was able to think, he knew that he existed ultimately. With this in mind, Descartes reckoned that a person 's "self" illustrates their identity. Descartes states: “that he possesses a body intimately conjoined... and that he has a clear and distinct idea of himself, inasmuch...it is certain that this I [that is to say, my soul by which I am what I am], is entirely and absolutely distinct from my body, and can exist without it" (Descartes, Meditations On First Philosophy, pg.29). In fact, Descartes proposes that the body connects dually with the mind, which he believes the body is "divisible", and the mind as "indivisible", but he also informs the readers that he knows certainly who he is. Not only did Descartes deem this information as true, but he was adamant about the possibility of living without a soul. In particular, Descartes depicts a vivid picture of how the

Descartes makes a categorical distinction between a thinking thing (res cogitans) and a corporal substance (res extensa). According to him, the mind is a conscious, unextended substance and the body is an unconscious, extending substance. The material body keeps on constantly changing, while the soul remains unchanged over time. Hence, none of the physical attributes of the body can be used to define our identity. Thus, no statement assigning a physical attribute can be known with absolute certainty. Only the unchanging, unextended soul can be the source of our identity. The only attribute that provides one with certainty of existence is the ability to think. Thus, a simple criterion for personal identity exists; same mind, same person. Hence,

The problem is he does not prove it. As an empiricist, he should have to be able to prove personal identity through experience, but what we are left with is Descartes “I think, therefore I am.” Locke’s answer does not solve the problem of what makes me who I am. In the other hand, Hume essentially acknowledges that we cannot prove personal identity, that there is no possible way to prove identity empirically. Since we connect facts because of socialization and information from memory and senses (22), we can only infer that we have an identity. The big problem is that empiricists believe that we can prove everything through experience. However, whose experience of senses should I take as evidence for my identity? Mine or how other people experience me? Empiricism has the fundamental issue of contradicting experiences resulting in some questions left

In his work, Meditations on First Philosophy, René Descartes writes to rid pre-conceptions, and disprove all belief in thoughts that are not certain, accepting only what can be known for sure. In his Meditation VI: Of the Existence of Material Things, and the Real Distinction between the Mind and Body of Man, he discusses his belief that the mind and body are two separate substances, claiming that the nonmaterial mind and the material body, while being ontologically distinct substances, causally interact; a belief called Cartesian dualism.

What is the “self” is always a topic which worthy of thinking deeply. I have had such an experience: someone wants to convey this information to me “I am that kind of person”, but what I am thinking is “that is not him or her”. In this case, I deny what I see or hear based on my senses. We think our body is ourselves because it is the most familiar part for us, but it does not like what Descartes wants to show in his second Meditation: things through our senses are fictitious. In his second Meditation, Descartes first defines himself as a man who is composed of body and soul, but after thinking, he describes himself just a “thinking thing”. The most important question is: what if one day we lose one part of our body, are we

“Forgive me, sir, but I must point out that when you contend that there is nothing in the soul of which it is not aware, you are begging the question … it is impossible that we should always reflect explicitly on all our thoughts; for if we did, the mind would reflect on each reflection, ad infinitum, without ever being able to move on to a new thought. For example, in being aware of some present feeling, I should have always to think that I think about that feeling, and further to think that I think of thinking about it, and so on ad infinitum. It must be that I stop reflecting on all these reflections, and that eventually some thought is allowed to occur without being thought about; otherwise I would dwell for ever on the same thing.”

Personal Identity or ‘Self’ has been a very important topic for philosophers for many years. Personal identity is how you describe or think of being which is derived from memories that have taken place over the years. John Locke was a philosopher who believed that your ‘Self’ or personal identity come from memory which is also referred to as consciousness in Locke’s writings. Locke believed that you are who you are, because your thoughts are yours alone no matter the vessel. However, in this paper we will go over a few instances where Locke’s theory on Personal Identity poses a few concerns and why those concerns prove his theory to be invalid.

In trying to define what is self or if there even is a self, Hume asserts personal identity is a mere illusion and instead the self is a classification of the process of our mutable parts. On the other hand, in Descartes’ dissertation he defines self as a “rational soul” (pg33) or an essence unique to humans, held constant in the container of the human body. Hume’s and Descartes’ definition of self therefore is an all or nothing assumption; either the self is nonexistent dependent on the presence of an infinite constant, or the self does exist but is immutable and “entirely independent of the body.” (pg33) None of these theses satisfy what the self is. By definition, self is the composition of our physical and mental parts that in turn creates a unique process that can be identified as our self or soul. Therefore it cannot be delineated as an inner immaterial substance like a soul nor can it be claimed simply to be an illusion, self is the cohesion between these two theories.