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Physical Objects Without Temporal Parts Analysis

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Simplicity and Explanation: Physical Objects without Temporal Parts Philosophers debate over how to resolve the Problem of Change. The Problem of Change identifies a challenge for philosophers accounting for object persistence. To account for how an object persists, the Problem of Change bring up disagreements over the existence of temporal parts. In this paper, I present and explain a view wherein an object persists through change without positing the existence of temporal parts. As an adequate and simpler theory, it remains the perdurantists to raise further objections. Until such time, the endurantist account of change continues to provide the best explanation of object’s persistence through time. Views debating the existence of temporal …show more content…

They insist everyday physical objects have both spatial and temporal parts. Inwagen writes, “Persisting objects are extended in time as well as in space and consist of temporal parts” (Inwagen 2000). Another philosopher, Theodore Sider shares there view and captures it in his piece “Four-Dimensionalism.” Sider claims that, “Persistence through time is like extension through space” (Sider 1997). He describes the analogy by comparing subregions or space to subregions of time. A subregion of space extends some, but not all of the available space. Similarly, subregions of time have extensions, which like spatial extension, span portions of …show more content…

This position involves specifying the properties an object has at a particular time. The parts of x at t uniquely share all of the spatial properties of x at t. Endurantists need not give up Leibniz’s Law. Endurantists whom maintain y’s properties are discernable from x’s need not reject Leibniz’s Law. In fact, many hold Leibniz’s Law applies to enduring objects. Moreover, the law may help endurantists explain change. A non-temporal parts theorist distinguishes between x at t and y at t’. Endurantist typically employ said law to argue that a single object persists at time t and also at t’. The object at time t has the property being-at-t, and that very object can change so that at t’ it no longer has being-at-t. Objections to endurantists’ explanation of change similarly challenge the perdurantists’ notion of objects having parts which are temporal slices of the object. According to Lowe, spatial parts bare a relation to each other. He argues changes across spatial parts change their relation to one another (Lowe). The relationships, which are not themselves parts of the object, can be pointed at to pick out an object at one

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