I. 9 U.S.C. § 202 Requires the Court to Submit This Matter to Arbitration.
The thrust of Plaintiffs’ opposition is couched on the premise that the Plaintiffs “cannot be forced to submit to arbitration because it did not agree to arbitrate claims arising out of HK’s overarching fraud encompassing the entire business relationship between the two entities.” (Dk. 13, at p. 13.) Stated differently, Plaintiffs assert that they “cannot be compelled to arbitration, because Plaintiffs did not agree to arbitrate claims arising out of the parties’ business relationship as a whole.” (Dk. 13, at p. 2). To the contrary, however, the Plaintiffs did expressly agree to arbitrate any claim that “arise[s] out of or releat[es] to” the supply agreement.” …show more content…
(Dk. 13, p. 14); and 2) the allegations in the complaint fall outside of the scope of the arbitration clause. (Dk. 13, p. 16). Neither position is availing.
In support of their position, Plaintiffs reach the ipsi dixit conclusion that in determining the application of the arbitration provision at issue, the applicability of the Convention of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards is irrelevant. (Dk. 13, p. 13). This position belies mandatory authority applied in this Circuit—and indeed, this Court—that expressly sets forth the standard to be applied when determine the threshold question of arbitrability. See Aggarao v. MOL Ship Mgmt. Co., LTD., 675 F.3d 355, 366 (2012); In re Titanium Dioxide Antitrust Litig., 962 F. Supp. 2d 840, 849 (D. Md. 2013) (quoting Aggarao). Indeed, Aggarao, expressly sets forth the standard to be applied in determining the arbitrability of a dispute, or what the Plaintiff deem the “first principle.” As such:
In deciding whether to enforce a foreign arbitration clause implicating the Convention Act, courts have emphasized four jurisdictional factors: that (1) there is an agreement in writing within the meaning of the Convention; (2) the agreement provides for arbitration in the territory of a signatory of the Convention; (3) the agreement arises out of a legal relationship, whether contractual or not, which is considered commercial; and (4) a party to the agreement is not an
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Parties to the Case, Facts of the Case, and Business Reasons for the Dispute (30 points)
The Court should not hear Mr. Compton’s case because the arbitration agreement that he acknowledged was in effect at the time of his termination. The binding arbitration agreement that Mr. Compton signed is also binding to the defendant, Merlotte. The termination case should be taken to the third party arbitrator to settle out of court. This is the reason for the arbitration agreement to save expenses on litigation for parties, the employee and the company.
Facts: The plaintiffs (Imburgia, Greiner) filed a class action lawsuit against the defendant (Directv) for allegedly charging early termination fees improperly. The defendant was unsure about the application of state vs. federal law and put forth a motion to stay or dismiss the case in preference of arbitration, which was denied by the trial court. The court of appeals affirmed by stating that the state law precedent applies and the arbitration clause was unenforceable.
Faced with this evidence, the trial court denied Westlake’s Motion to Compel Arbitration. The court noted that while Westlake’s Spanish version of the contract contained an arbitration provision; Ramos’
Date Taken: Time Spent: Points Received: Question Type: # Of Questions: # Correct: True/False 25 25 Multiple Choice 25 25 Grade Details - All Questions 1. Question : After having signed a contract with a binding arbitration clause in it, an employer is legally bound to accept an arbitrator's decision on a particular issue even if they disagree with that decision. Student
On June 23, 2008, Formula One Racing Group (referred to herein as “FORG”) solicited bids for the building of a parts warehouse at its facility located at 1265 E. 20th Street in Chico, California. General Contracting Associates (referred to herein as “GCA”) entered into a contract with FORG to build the aforementioned warehouse. At the time of the signing of the contract, FORG and GCA were bound in privity. In this case GCA had asserted five claims for breaches of contract by the defendant FORG.
Since November 2015, after Justice Marks vacated the RSDCs previous decision, the Nationals have attempted to compel MASN to return to arbitration before the RSDC. The Nationals claimed that a footnote in the Justice’ decision meant that MASN needed to submit to arbitration if the Nationals just changed their lawyers. On the other hand, MASN felt that the sides should agree to submit this case before a different arbitral body and thereby avoid the appeals process. Failing this, MASN wanted its appeal to be heard before a second arbitration case would be heard before the RSDC.
The Third Circuit erred in finding VHI have third-party standing, and his lower court’s decision should be reversed. In general, litigants do not have a standing to assert the rights of others, unless the litigant meet the constitutional and prudential requirement of third party standing. Litigants does not meet constitutional limitation of third party standing unless they sustain or will sustain injury that is actual and imminent. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 108 (1998). Moreover, Litigants does not meet prudential requirement of third party standing unless litigants share a close relationship with the right holders, or unless the right holders have a genuine obstacle to sue by their own. Amato v. Wilentz, 952 F.2d 742, 749 (3rd Cir. 1991). Under this analysis, VHI does not have a third party standing because VHI does not meet either constitutional or prudential requirement of third party standing.
Brewster Heights Packing, the buyer entered a contract with the seller for the purchase of apple packing machinery. The district court entered judg-ment in favor of the seller on its breach of contract claim. On appeal, the court af-firmed. The buyer contended that both it and the seller intended at the time of their con-tract to be bound by their written agreement and to prior oral discussions. The buyer contended that the largest portion of its damages stemmed from the loss of an orally bargained-for system. The court held that a clause in the parties’ contract prohibited the inclusion of any understandings or representations not expressly included in the con-tract. It appeared that the buyer intended to use the parol evidence not to explain or to supplement the contract, but rather to contradict the limitation of warranties contained in the contract. The court concluded that the buyer’s counterclaims of fraud and viola-tion of the Washington Consumer Protection Act failed because they did not give rise to the independent tort of fraud and there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate an ef-fect on other consumers or a real and substantial potential for repetition of unfair con-duct.
In determining its jurisdiction, the Court found that Allstate was not “present’ in the State, and that did not have “minimum contacts” with the forum because it was a foreign corporation that did not reside in the State, and because the contract in which the cause of action was based was entered by the parties in the State of Tennessee. As result, the Court’s arrived to the conclusion that its personal jurisdiction over the Defendant was not justified and didn’t meet the standard of due process. It is our opinion that the trial Court incorrectly applied the “Long Arm Statute (LAS).” The same only applies to individuals or corporations who were no present in the State at the time the cause of action occurred, and in consequence it has to be served of process out of state. As established by Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), every state possesses exclusive jurisdiction over persons and property in its territory within the limits imposed by the due process. In order to exercise personal jurisdiction over the Defendant the same has to be present in the State (nexus), and has to be served (notice) while in the State. There is evidence in this case that Allstate was present in the State of Georgia at the time of the cause of
Statement of Facts: Vincent and Liza Concepcion had an agreement with AT&T for the sale of cellular telephones; the contract provided for arbitration of all disputes between the two parties. Vincent and Liza Concepcion filed a suit against AT&T for deceptive advertising. The Concepcions found that they had to pay for tax on phones that were being advertised as free by AT&T. The contract stated that AT&T must “pay all costs for non-frivolous claims,” and that the arbitration must take place in the county the customer was billed in (1). AT&T moved the court to compel arbitration under the terms of the contract. The District Court denied this motion. The Ninth Circuit affirmed this motion and AT&T appealed to the Supreme Court.
Facts: To resolve a conflict that arose from a computer system installation, Plaintiff Cunard (P) sought to sue Defendant Abney, dba Coopers (D). P filed relying on the court’s diversity jurisdiction. P was a British corporation. D, in response, challenged on jurisdictional grounds because, as it alleged, the partners to D were alien and the D corporation was alien with respect to the court altogether. Thereby, D made a motion to dismiss.
One of the foundations of arbitration is that awards rendered are final and not subject to appeal before the courts. In this respect, Article 5 of the UNCITRAL Model Law provides for minimal intervention, and says, “In matters governed by this Law, no court shall intervene except where so provided in this Law“. As a result, the grounds upon which a court may set aside an award or refuse to recognize and enforce the same are limited. Article 34 of the Model Law and Article V of the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards provide the restrictive grounds for such relief.
v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., the court was tasked to decide if the post-closing price dispute provision controlled the seller’s objections or if the objections fell under the indemnification arbitration provision. The court reasoned that since the post-closing price dispute provision clearly set forth that the expert accountants shall “determine on the basis of Accounting Principles whether and to what extent, if any, the CNOAS requires adjustment,” the dispute provisions applied to the seller’s objections, which claimed incorrectly recorded values on the CNOAS. The court went on to find that even though the language of the post-closing price dispute provision did not refer to the expert accountant procedure as a valuation or appraisal, the agreement clearly provided for a third party to determine the controversy via a specific procedure which is allowed under N.Y. CPLR §
Firstly, the choice of law applicable to the substance of the dispute which the parties have made can be either express or implied and if such choice took place the arbitrators have to apply it. Without any indications concerning choice of applicable law, an arbitral tribunal has to determine such law through the searching of proper