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Response to Terrorism: Military Vengeance or Positive Actions?

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Response to Terrorism: Military Vengeance or Positive Actions?



The issues raised by September 11 are less about constitutional war powers than about war wisdom. Under national and international law the President has legal authority to react in self-defense against this invasion of our territory. Even the most vigorous critics of executive power concede that under the Constitution the President is empowered, in Madison's words, to "repel sudden attacks." One might quibble over whether "repelling" an attack, which in the eighteenth century would have been a land or naval invasion by a foreign state, extends in this era to a military response outside the United States to an attack by unknown forces, but the principle …show more content…

Nevertheless, the trick is to fashion an attack or series of attacks on demonstrably relevant targets, without killing thousands of innocents and fueling even more hatred of America in the Islamic world. It is a challenge to this Government to use military force in ways that actually punish demonstrably responsible parties without in turn inciting more terrorist fervor and actually increasing the danger to the physical security of the country.



The most important, and most difficult, challenge for the country--Congress as well as the President--is to create an anti-terrorism coalition in Europe, Asia, and Africa, as well as the Middle East that will suppress terrorist conspiracies at their roots. This cannot be done by the United States and NATO from outside, but must be done internally through effective law-enforcement and education by governments, many of which we have been at odds with over a whole range of issues. To induce neutral, indifferent, and even traditionally hostile governments to effectively stop terrorist conspiracies, to deploy sufficient police effort to law-enforcement, to share intelligence information, and to cooperate securely in trans-border investigations, will require significant inducements. This will be the hard part.



First and most generally, the Administration will have to engage other nations, bilaterally and multilaterally, and regain that vague but critical quality of American

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