The case in question concerns Romanian nationals who were refused a grant of benefits by way of basic provision by Jobcenter Leipzig on 28 September 2011. After they were refused a second time they lodged an administrative objection which was dismissed. On 1 July 2012 Ms Dano and her son challenged that decision before the Sozialgericht Leipzig .
The Court of Justice of the European Union decided that Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 must be construed as meaning that ‘special non-contributory cash benefits’ fall within the scope of Article 4 of the regulation . Also, Article 24(I) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 should be understood as not precluding legislation of a Member State whereby nationals of other
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The requirement that economically inactive Union citizens must have sufficient resources for themselves and their family members is included there. Therefore, Article 7(1)(b) of Directive 2004/38 seeks to stop economically inactive Union citizens from becoming unreasonable burdens on the state welfare system. As a result, a member state can refuse to grant social benefits to economically inactive Union citizens who use their right to free movement to take advantage of another Member State’s social assistance when they do not have sufficient resources to claim a right of residence. The applicants lacked the sufficient resources to claim a right of residence and so could not invoke the principle of non-discrimination in Article 24(1) of the directive . The reasoning behind the fourth question was that Member States are not implementing EU Law when laying down the conditions for the grant of special non-contributory cash benefits
For the Court to have decided that Ms Dano should be allowed to claim special non-contributory cash benefits would allow economically inactive migrants to take advantage of the welfare system of the Member State they have migrated to putting an unreasonable burden on the Member State to provide for these migrants who do not have sufficient funds. The
Judge Tracey also quoted Wu Yu Fang & 117 Ors v The Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs & Anor and Onea,
Manifesto sees the decision of the supreme court as “clear abuse of judicial power” (1).
“This case presents a constitutional question never addressed by this Court: whether a statutory scheme
It is interesting to see what peoples’ thoughts and opinions are, because this piece was written before there was even a case. This article shows what citizens’ concerns are, and it is only focused on what is currently happening and recent, similar cases. I think this article also helps the reader connect more with problem at hand for the students, because in the article they mention the students more and how this is a loss for
Key question raised in the court in regards to this appeal is the United Nations convention on the treatment of children which the country is in agreement with but such was not incorporated in the legal system as regards to detention and deportation of children. It has gone to exposes the lapses and eventually reinforce the need for children to be treated
The Decision of the Court: Found in favor of petitioners. Opinion given by Judge Fortas
The Court found that this argument is contrary to the applicant’s ultimate interests, because they were only seeking to restore the IFHP to the pre 2012 system, and not wanting the government to spend more money. The prerogative of the Crown can only be abolished or extinguished if there are clear words in a statute. Under s. 17 of the Interpretation Act, it defines how the Crown’s prerogative can be interpreted only in a statute. The OIC merely adopts some terms, like refugee, from the IRPA. It does not
This tribunal is granted the power to decide in “any decisions an administrator affecting eligibility for or the amount of basic financial assistance, other than a decision
It prevents an asylum seeker applying for asylum in multiple member states and reduces the number of ‘’orbiting’’ asylum seekers.
Treaty of Lisbon has provided that Union should uphold the representative democracy and thus, the legislative power is divided between the European Commission (‘the Commission’) which represents the interest of the European Union as a whole, the Council of Ministers (‘the Council’) which represents the Member States’ interests or their citizens and the European Parliament which represents its citizens’ interests. However, only 34% turned out to vote at the last EU election which implied a growing dissent in Europe. The EU is described as “undemocratic from the start”. The gist of the question is whether the EU law-making process is sufficiently democratic. EU’s democratic performance should be judged on the basis of subsidiarity, representativeness, accountability and engagement.
Under Art. 267, only ‘court or tribunal’ of a member state may initiate preliminary reference to the ECJ, however through succeeding case law this has been expanded by allowing entities whose members may not be judges, ‘provided that those entities have the power to adjudicate disputes’12. This concept of a court or tribunal has been interpreted widely as it is a matter of union law13. The Advocate-General in De Coster14 criticised the court’s approach and criteria to the interpretation as he deemed it confusing. The court in this instance accepted the reference, as ‘it was a permanent body established in law, that it gives legal rulings and that the jurisdiction is compulsory’15. The court in further cases has treated tribunals as not only tax appeal like in the case above but also; customs, social security and immigration.
Roles of the European Court of Justice ‘The European Court of Justice played a decisive role in the
Additionally, in regards to direct concern, the regulatory clause (Art 263 TFEU) is also a third condition which can seen in the Inuit and Microban case, the definition of ‘direct concern’ is still to be determined. Therefore the non – privileged applicant’s locus standi would most probably have impact on possibilities to challenge Commission regulations, as large part of them should fall under the concept of a ‘regulatory act’. Best Beer would only need to show direct concern, and no implementing measures would be entailed. However, referring back to the Inuit and Microban cases, the General Court found that implementing measure in relation to intervention by the Commission or other Member States would mean remove the right to challenge. If this route was to be
Brussels I Regulation, where stipulates the exclusive jurisdiction for the designated court in the choice-of-court agreement .
Ms. Förster brought an action before Alkmaar District Court. That action was held to be unfounded on two grounds. First, Ms. Förster could no longer be regarded as a worker since she had not had any real and genuine employment during that time period. Second, Ms. Förster could not claim entitlement to a maintenance grant because she had not been integrated into Dutch society. Ms. Förster appealed against that judgement before the Centrale Raad van Beroep. She claimed that she was already sufficiently integrated into Dutch society to be able to claim a maintenance grant. In the alternative, she submitted that she