The First Division Of The Battle Of Little Round Top

He positioned his trained infantrymen on top of the first hill as the last line of defense. The militia was placed in front of the hill and the sharpshooters were place in front of the militia. The militia was the first line of defense and Morgan ordered his sharpshooter to target specifically the officers and cavalry and fall back in the line of militia before they get in firing range of the redcoats. Once the sharpshooter gets in position with the militia the British army advanced the attack the militia. The militia’s duties were to engage the redcoats for a short amount of then run away to the right side of the side of the hill. Tarleton expected the militia to run away. He sent one infantry unit and one cavalry unit after the militia. However, waiting behind the second hill was Lieutenant Colonel William Washington and his dragoon unit. The British cavalry didn’t expect to encounter another cavalry unit. Washington wiped out the Tarleton’s cavalry then flanked the right of Tarleton’s main element. Simultaneously, the militia ran around the hills to flank the left side. Tarleton found himself in a double envelopment. Tarleton receives 110 casualties, 229 wounded and 829 captured or missing, meanwhile Morgan suffered 25 casualties and 124

This paper will examine the British and American Southern Loyalist defeat in the Battle of Kings Mountain and discuss the assumptions the British made including loyalist support, logistic support, and terrain advantage.

Despite this, the Rebel’s morale remained optimistic as they initiated the fighting on the following morning (King 18). Union forces retaliated and saved their position until one of General Meade’s commanders staged his own offensive battle (Appleby, Joyce 486; King 22). This Union general was Dan Sickles. By moving his position without consulting General Meade, a “bulge” was created. This foolish mistake allowed 1,600 Confederate soldiers to rush the Union line to overtake Peach Orchard, capturing 1,000 Yankee prisoners (King 22). Another Union Army general, G.K. Warren, secured and protected a hill called Little Round Top before Confederates claimed it which helped combat the loss from Sickle’s blunder (“American Civil War”).

The types of challenges that the Generals have faced during The Battle of Gettysburg are, location, following orders, and the weaponry. In a life or death situation, the position of where your men are stationed is crucial due to the fact if the opposite army crawls up behind or has the higher ground then there is a greater chance of getting murdered. General’s must accept the system that a more experienced General has stated and to not promote their individual procedures. Finally, the rifles, pistols, muskets, cannons and other artillery the Generals had to work with may have been difficult to shield or perform with. In conclusion, the Generals faced many complications when battling in the Battle of

Doing so assisted in a combined fire action with Woodruff’s guns to slow the Union advance long enough to stabilize the situation on Bloody Hill. (George E. Knapp, 1953).

They realized they had a problem since no other units were up to the line with them; they had to wait this out. They were ordered to lie down in the tall grass. The fighting started to break out in front of them at a small skirmish line. Many of the men had never seen battle, so some of the men stood up to watch what was going on. Maj. John D. Musser of the 143rd wrote: "… a few shells came booming over our heads, making many of the uninitiated dodge muchly and now and then a wounded skirmisher was brought in from the skirmish line and taken to the rear, all of which had a tendency to make us nervous and uneasy…" (Tomasak,

Late in the day, Major. General Ambrose Burnside’s corps pushed across a bullet-strewn stone bridge over Antietam Creek and with some difficulty managed to imperil the Confederate right. At a crucial moment, A.P. Hill’s division arrived from Harpers Ferry, and counterattacked, driving back Burnside and saving the day for the Army of Northern Virginia.

Mckim provides the most compelling account of the civil war. “In moving to the attack we were exposed to enfilading fire from the woods on our left flank, besides the

The soldiers participating in Pickett’s Charge had started out with optimism and feelings that they would be a huge part in American history, but as things turned to chaos causing a domino effect, in which the whole charge was compromised. The Union artillery fire was devastating to the Confederates. It reduced their morale and quickly depleted their numbers. Those soldiers that did reach Union lines, were faced with intense musket fire. After all that destruction, it was imperative that the Confederates retreat, or risk having many more casualties. Fortunately, for the Confederates, the Union forces did not chase after them. The results would have been much more disastrous if that was the case.

At dawn, the Marine 1st Battalion, 5th Marines—commanded by Major Julius Turrill—was to attack Hill 142, but only two companies were in position. The Marines advanced in waves with bayonets fixed across an open wheat field that was swept with German machine gun and artillery fire, and many Marines were cut down.[9][10] Captain Crowther commanding the 67th Company was killed almost immediately. Captain Hamilton and the 49th Company fought from wood to wood, fighting the entrenched Germans and overrunning their objective by 6 yards (5.5 m). At this point, Hamilton had lost all five junior officers, while the 67th had only one commissioned officer alive. Hamilton reorganized the two companies, establishing strong points and a defensive line.[11]

As commanders understand the operational environment and the problem, they can begin visualizing the desired end state and solutions to solving the problem.6 After noticing that Confederate artillery fire had slackened, COL Chamberlain’s experience told him that Confederate troops were coming and quickly began to envision an operational approach that would achieve his desired end state to hold his position on the far left of Little Round Top. Through his critical and creative thinking, COL Chamberlain showed a skill common within good tactical leaders. He mentally visualized possible countermoves against imagined threats to his unit. While analyzing the terrain he could see that the 83rd Pennsylvania was forming on his right but there was nothing at all on his left. COL Chamberlain could see a dark bulk of a larger hill to the left of his men and determined that if the Confederates got an artillery battery on its crest the Confederates could take Little Round Top and subsequently drive off the Union Army. Visualizing how this could affect his desired end state, COL Chamberlain decided that he would send a company to the 20th Maine’s

“In response, Harbord directed his reserve, consisting of the US 23rd Infantry Regiment, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, and elements of the 6th Machinegun Battalion, to march ten miles to plug the gap in the French line.” The direction that BG Harbord gave was not the vision from the French XXI Corps Commander, BG Jean Marie J. Degoutte. Nevertheless, BG Harbord’s intent and vision was clear, he wanted to have offensive maneuvers in order to fight against the counterattacks from the Germans. He foresaw that the Germans would come through the woods as it provided concealment and able to move large group of troops. The German infantry was already on the offensive in Belleau Wood when the 4th BDE were given orders to take Hill 142. Through BG Harbord’s vision, the 1/5 took the hill but had many losses. The next day, Harbord had the 2/6 enter the woods and take the village of Bouresches, which was achieved with the unit losing 50 percent of its men. At this point Harbord realized that he had to change his tactics in order to reduce the loss of men and penetrate in through the woods.

On the evening of June 29, Meade’s Army of the Potomac was encamped in northern Maryland on a line extending roughly from Emmitsburg to Manchester. On the following day, Meade sent out various dispatches and orders that indicated his knowledge of the enemy’s location. Specifically, Meade knew that the Confederate infantry corps, commanded by generals James Longstreet and A. P. Hill, were at Chambersburg with, in the words of his assistant adjutant general, “evident disposition to advance from Chambersburg to Gettysburg.” He also indicated in the same correspondence that Richard Ewell’s corps was at Carlisle

“Send in a much smaller division straight to the front lines.” He instructed. “Then, when those Nartian fools think they have us beaten, send in two of the largest divisions possible from the sides. Slaughter every last one of them! Have no mercy and leave no man standing!” He

The carnage at St. Francis deserves a brunt of the detail. It was now good marching ground and the men pressed on with celerity till on the 22nd day after their departure from Crown Point, one of them, by climbing a tree, discovered the village of St. Francis at three miles distance, when the party were ordered to halt and refresh themselves. At eight o'clock in the evening, Major Rogers, Lieut. Turner and Ensign Avery left the company and went forward for the purpose of reconnoitering the place. They found the Indians engaged in a dance, evidently entertaining no apprehensions of an enemy in the vicinity. They returned about two o'clock in the morning and at three o'clock, Rogers advanced with the whole party, within three hundred yards of the village, where the men were lightened of their packs and formed for action. About an hour after this, the Indians broke up their dances and retired to their cabins for repose; and soon the whole village was asleep, the more oblivious from the weariness induced by their late diversion. About half an hour before dawn, the troops, having been arranged in three divisions for the purpose of making simultaneous attacks, in as many directions, were ordered to advance. Never was a place more completely surprised, nor in a condition less capable of making any sort of