The Guarantee Given by a Married Woman to Secure Her Husband's Debts

The case Jonah v White (2011) 45 Fam LR 460, was first brought forward by Ms Jonah, seeking her relationship with Mr White be recognised as de-facto in order to apply for a property

This function of the law, ensuring reasonable predictability in daily life, is challenged within this case. This is shown within the case, from the perspective of being the owners of

A writ of execution applies to a debtor’s nonexempt real or personal property wherever located.

In his article ‘Equitable Rights of Cohabitees’ Hayton suggested that the distinction between common intention constructive trusts and proprietary estoppel has, over time, come to be but illusory and goes on further to propose that since the general direction of the development of the law has been to embrace the principle of preventing and remedying unconscionable conduct regardless of whether the claim brought before them was originally brought under the concept of a constructive trust or proprietary

any other indebtedness or liability of the debtor to the secured party direct or indirect, absolute or contingent, due or to become due, now existing or hereafter arising, including all future advances or loans which may be made at the option of the secured party.

The defendants wanted to apply reasonable principles in search of specific performance of the contract. The disposition of the immediate motion for partial summary judgment and objection was controlled. “The court found that although the doctrine of mutuality of remedies may be alive and well in Virginia in actions at law for damages, that was not the case where, regardless of a lack of support of remedy at the time the contract was created, complete performance may, if revealed, afford a party specific performance of the contract for the sale of land.”

Coward v. Coward, 582 P.2d 834 (Or. Ct. App. 1978). In Coward, the parties had discussed the premarital agreement in advance, and the wife had refused the advice of her then-fiancé’s attorney to seek out counsel of her own before signing the agreement. Id. Further, in Coward the wife possessed knowledge of the quantity and value of her fiancé’s property interests. Id. In addition, the wife in Coward was deemed to have sufficient business acumen due to her years of business experience.

Family Law Act 1975, in the same year established the Family Court of Australia, and the Act focuses on issues as a result of martial breakdown, such as ‘no fault divorce’; best interest of children, equal valuation of partners contributions (breadwinner / homemaker), equal consideration of mother and father when assessing custody. The Act has been amended and evolved to include coverage for casual and de-facto relationships and ex-nuptial relationships, including distribution of debts and Superannuation as equal property, strengthening court process around domestic and family

Harding further asks us to confirm that the trial judge complied with the requirements of Md. Rule 14-305(e) when she ratified the foreclosure sale. Furthermore, Harding petitions us to subpoena certain phone calls made between her and M & T Bank officials. Harding’s requests, however, are not properly presented before this appellate court. Moreover, Harding has failed to present an argument that would overcome the presumption of legitimacy we afford to the ratification of a foreclosure sale.

Held: At least in relation to insurance policies, and almost certainly in relation to contract of indemnity generally, where the evidence is that third parties were in the contemplation of the principal, then those third parties can enforce the contract. That was the

The New South Wales Court of Appeal permitted the organisation 's appeal and reasoned that the spouse had gone about as the wife 's operators in the property 's exchange. The Court in this way held that both the

* Partners can remove their signatures from the lines of credit and thus, are no longer personally liable to the creditors

Equity has been described as a ‘mysterious creature’ that lies distinctly alongside the common law. In considering the statement, there is an almost linear reversal in which the remedies in equity procure a type of right not necessarily available in the common law. This peculiar jurisdiction has created consistent controversy especially in regards to the fusion of the common law and equity. To understand further, this essay will consider the relationship between equity and the common law. The development of equity alongside the common law through its history and intention, and application in case law will be imperative in the discussion of the statement. In conjunction with an analysis of fusion, it will become apparent that equitable damages were enlivened, separate to, in unfair circumstances where no rights/damages existed within the common law. In trying to tread the murky waters of the distinction yet the procedural fusion of equity and common law, the contention of this essay becomes apparent. Effectively, this essay aims to highlight that the history, intention, application and fusion fallacies regarding equity, all which point to an assertion that rights in equity are indeed the product of its remedies. Whether they are merely ‘two streams of jurisdiction, though they run in the same channel, run side by side and do not mingle their waters’, is yet to be seen.

The law of contract in many legal systems requires that parties should act in good faith. English law refuses to impose such a general doctrine of good faith in the field of contract law. However, despite not recognizing the principle, English contract law is still influenced by notions of good faith. As Lord Bingham affirmed, the law has developed numerous piecemeal solutions in response to problems of unfairness. This essay will seek to examine the current and future state of good faith in English contract law.

In Milroy, the deceased executed a deed, which used wrong formality, to set up a trust of shares in favour of his niece. The niece argued that