Catherine Malabou and Levi Bryant: A critical comparison of materialisms
Speculative materialism arose in response to the post-Kantian philosophy of correlationism. Scholars have since debated the relationship of the perceived (object) and the perceiver (subject). Kant’s transcendental materialist philosophy supports what Quentin Meillassoux terms weak correlationism in that it allows for the thinking of the unknowable. However, strong correlationist (i.e. Heidegger and Hegel) refute that humans can escape their own thoughts, therefore making it impossible to know or even imagine that anything outside of the correlationist circle (objects in and of themselves) exists. Both Catherine Malabou and Levi Bryant can be seen as emphasizing speculative materialism in that they attempt to move beyond this subject-object correlate. While Malabou describes neuronal plasticity in What Should We Do With Our Brain, Bryant focuses on “machines” and their ontology in Onto-Cartography: An Ontology of Machines and Media. Malabou’s ultimate description of the resistance and contradiction between the brain and mind fails to be accounted for by Bryant’s ontology and conception of “machines”. Bryant’s object oriented ontology does little to explain the origin of freedom in his “machines” (whereby we can begin to take charge of society); however, Bryant does suggest the use of thermopolitics to attack institutions. Together, Malabou and Bryant’s philosophies provide new ways of thinking about
Mary MacKillop was born in Fitzroy, Melbourne on January the 15th 1842. She was the first child to Alexander MacKillop and Flora MacDonald. Mary was one child out of 8 and spent most of her childhood years looking after and acting like a second mother to her siblings. The MacKillop family were quite poor so at the young age of 14, Mary got herself a job as a governess and as teacher at a Portland school. All the money Mary earned went towards her families everyday living. While working as a governess, Mary met Father Julian Tension Woods. By the time Mary had reached the age of 15 she had decided that she wanted to be a nun. She also wanted to devote her life to the poor and less fortunate. So upon meeting Father Julian Tension Woods she
In this paper, I will examine the principal merits and challenges of René Descartes’ concept of dualism and then defend my preferred alternative among the options Paul M. Churchland discusses. After briefly defining Cartesian Dualism, I will show that its principal merits are that it is consistent with common sense and that it is able to explain phenomena that appear mental in nature. Next, I will show that its principal challenges are its failure to adequately explain how the mind and the body can causally interact, and its failure to respond to the observation that brain damage impairs the mind. Finally, I will explain why Functionalism is the best alternative to Cartesian Dualism.
The mind is a complex myriad of thoughts and psychological systems that even philosophers today cannot entirely grapple. It is composed of the senses, feelings, perceptions, and a whole series of other components. However, the mind is often believed to be similar or even the same as the brain. This gives rise to the mind-brain identity theory, and whether there exists a clear distinction between the physical world and the non-material mind. In this paper, I will delineate the similarities and differences between mind and brain, describe the relevant ideas such as functionalism and materialism, and provide explanations on how these theories crystallized. Further, I will discuss the differing views of this concept from multiple philosophers’ perspectives and highlight the significance of each. Ultimately, I will defend the view that the mind-brain identity theory is false by analyzing its errors and examining the invalid assumptions it makes about consciousness.
In David Armstrong’s thought-provoking work titled, The Nature of Mind, he explains that the most convincing way to make sense of the mind-body problem is to approach it in a materialistic way. Specifically, Armstrong shows that the science of physico-chemical processes of the brain is the best way to explain the nature of our mind. He goes on to explain traditional and dispositional behaviorism, and states his own materialistic take on behaviorism. His arguments throughout his paper are very logical, and though there have been arguments against his explanations, he effectively justifies the materialistic view of the mind.
“To be just is to be perceived”, or as Irish philosopher George Berkeley prefers to put it, “esse est percipi”. In this argument, Berkeley details extensively how material objects, as humans have come to know them, do not exist. Berkeley uses a series of premises to aid in the elimination of skepticism surrounding the existence of the world humans have come to know and grow fond of. At first read, Berkeley’s conclusion that the abstract ideas of substance, matter, or any physical objects simply are not real is very hard to grasp when humans have based their justifications on what is real versus not real on their own senses, and the validation of other people. However, Berkeley does an excellent job of making an argument one cannot refute.
Many people get a thrill out of reading horror stories and watching suspense movies, especially about kidnappings and abductions. However, kidnappings in stories and books are nothing like in real life. Mary Rowlandson and Jaycee Dugard are two real people that were abducted. Both ladies were taken away from their families against their will, but their stories are very different from each other in terms of the setting, their captors, and their children.
This essay assesses property dualism, a theory of mind. It proclaims the existence of a single, physical substance (unlike Cartesian dualism), but argues that this single substance has two potential properties: physical and mental states that are not reducible.
In David M. Armstrong’s “The Nature of Mind”, Armstrong praises the field of science and seeks to put the concept of mind into terms that agree with science’s definition of minds. His interest is in the physico-chemical, materialist view of man. Armstrong considers science to be the authority over other disciplines because of its reliability and result in consensus over disputed questions.
OCD is “a phrase that gets to the existential core of worry, a clenched, demonic doubting that overrides evidence, empiricism, plain common sense” (Slater234). The meme theory states that a meme consists of “everything that is passed from person to person” (Blackmore 37). In “Strange Creatures” by Susan Blackmore and “Who Holds the Clicker?” by Lauren Slater both authors discuss the control humans have over their minds. In “Who Holds the Clicker” Lauren Slater discusses DBS (deep brain simulation), which is a type of psychosurgery in which electrical impulses are sent to certain portions of the brain to control and change the emotions one feels. She discusses both the positive and negatives of deep brain simulation through a specific patient named Mario and also presents the control DBS can have over one’s mind. Similarly, Blackmore in “Strange Creatures” discusses the meme theory, which consists of any idea that is passed down from person to person. Both authors provide information that allows people to draw conclusions relating to why people do not have control over their minds. Even though some people believe that humans do have control over their minds, Blackmore and Slater both successfully portray that in actuality humans do not have any control over their minds because human thoughts and ideas are unoriginal products of external forces, many human thoughts occur at deeper level of consciousness, and
Summary: The problem of the soul continues as Descartes suggested that the human is composed of two completely different substances; a physical body which Descartes compares with a machine, and a non-physical mind, related to the soul, that allows humans to think and feel even if it has no “measurable dimensions” (67). But Elizabeth put in doubt his ideologies when she realized that a non-physical thing doesn’t have the strength to push and move the body. This led to several questions unanswered and also let space for other materialist theories such as behaviorism, mind-brain identity, and functionalism, which also fail in offering an explicit solution.
There are two main theories that make up the knowledge argument. The first is Physicalism, (or better known as materialism) which is the thesis that “All facts are dependent upon physical processes.”(Smart) The other main stance taken is property dualism. The thesis of property dualism states that there are “Non-physical properties of physical substances” (Calef) or that there are physical and mental properties. In this article, I will defend the stance of property dualism by acknowledging objections and replying to these objections to show why the argument for property dualism works.
I am faced with the philosophical task of defending either dualism or materialism, depending on which one is most attractive to me. So either I support the theory of dualism, which is the belief that there is both a physical and a spiritual state, or I believe in materialism, which is the belief that everything that exists is material or physical. Although I believe materialism to be easier to prove, I find dualism more attractive to believe. Throughout the following, I will attempt to build a case for the theory of dualism giving insights both documented and personal. I will also shed light on the theory of materialism and the proofs that support this theory; showing that
Functionalism, one of the most influential and widespread theories of mind of our day, proposes a model of human behaviour based on the way certain inputs are processed when the mind is in a given state, to yield certain outputs. This theory concerns itself only what mental states do, rather than the substance with which they are made, or whether they exist at all; this is called ‘multiple realizability’. In other words, the theory is ontologically modest, or flexible, and this enables functionalism to stay compatible with Cartesian dualism or monisms like materialism, an advantage when other theories lose followers due to their ontological preconceptions. The other notable strength functionalism claims is that it avoids some of the pitfalls of its counterpart theory, behaviourism. However each of these apparent strengths has flaws, both in and of themselves and in comparison to other theories of mind. These strengths and their flaws will be assessed in this essay, but allow me first to outline what the functionalist theory of mind proposes.
The mind-body problem is an age-old topic in philosophy that questions the relationship between the mental aspect of life, such as the field of beliefs, pains, and emotions, and the physical side of life which deals with matter, atoms, and neurons. There are four concepts that each argue their respective sides. For example, Physicalism is the belief that humans only have a physical brain along with other physical structures, whereas Idealism argues that everything is mind-based. Furthermore, Materialism argues that the whole universe is purely physical. However, the strongest case that answers the commonly asked questions such as “Does the mind exist?” and “Is the mind your brain?” is Dualism.
What is being contested in the new posthuman turns to matter cited earlier is the Kantian idea that there is a mute, inert and meaningless life upon which a human subject imposes his self-originating thought (systematizing and categorising). For education researchers, such as Snaza and Weaver, agency is given to matter and a student is no longer a unique entity standing apart, but is now no more than just one among the many different and mutually entangled unique organisms and things. “There are experiences happening all the time, all over the school, independent of humans. There are always interactions between humans and nonhuman sentient beings and humans and non sentient objects, such as computers, doors, playgrounds, hallways, utensils, trays, balls, windows, desks, and so on” (Snaza & Weaver, 2014, p. 9).