Marketing Theory http://mtq.sagepub.com/ The logical structure of the service-dominant logic of marketing
John Williams
Marketing Theory 2012 12: 471
DOI: 10.1177/1470593112457745
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In that rejoinder Lusch and Vargo caution against judging S-D logic by the original article alone and helpfully include a list of some of their relevant writing on the topic to date – 15 articles – as an appendix.
From the amount of misunderstanding about S-D logic, as evidenced by published articles as well as articles that I have reviewed and that did not get published, it seems as though it might be too much to ask some busy scholars to read in any great depth such a large volume of material.
Therefore it is one purpose of this paper to explain as simply as possible the core ideas of S-D logic.
As part of this endeavour, the ontological status of the core ideas, and the logical structure of the interrelationships between the 10 foundational premises (FPs) of S-D logic will be explained. This leads to the major purpose of the paper: as a result of this analysis, S-D logic can be made even more clear: by seeing what is fundamental versus what is of lesser importance and is possibly even distracting. This paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a summary of what S-D logic actually is, if such a large body of literature by theory creators and their commentators can be said to ‘actually’ be anything. The following sections provide a deconstruction of S-D logic with the aim of making it more simple and hence clear and
This web source is written by Gregg Mangan who is an author and historian who holds a PhD in
This article is not really a good source to use because it is not really relevant when it comes to understanding the main ideas of
Cite all of the resources used with in-text citations, using at least two sources from the Topic 3 readings. These will be included in the list of references at the end of the assignment.
In this paper, I will discuss the truth-belief-justification conceptual analysis of knowledge, which I will refer to as TBJ, Gettier cases, and an example that refutes TBJ. Conceptual analysis is an analysis of a proposition P with given premises to acquire knowledge of that P. The truth-belief-justification analysis of knowledge fails to provide sufficient conditions for someone to possess knowledge. For a condition to be necessary, it has to be satisfied to have knowledge of a proposition. If a condition is sufficient, then the person x will have some information to know something about proposition P. Jointly sufficient conditions are conditions that all need to be satisfied together to have knowledge about some P. They are necessary and supposedly jointly sufficient, but Gettier cases prove that extra conditions on top of TBJ are required to be jointly sufficient.
Throughout this paper I will discuss the argument of Anselms ontological argument for the existence of god. His basis of his argument being an analytical breakdown for the reason fot gods exsistence. While also establishing that Anselms inferences found with his use of deduction and logical means to prove the existence of a higher being are indeed true. In addition I will defend Anselms argument by depicting other people’s objections against his argument. Specifically the argument made by Gaunilo, who disagreed with Anselms argument and tried to use logical reasoning to prove him wrong. Essentially, Gaunilo stated that Anselms use of deduction could be altered and used to prove the existence of any concept by simply using the similar notion that Anselm used to prove the existence of god.
Other critics of the strong version of the ontological argument point out that though it is possible to understand the definition of god in the argument, it is inconceivable to conceive of something of which nothing greater can be conceived. However, Stroll [1] pointed out that it is not possible to prove his proposition against the ontological argument and same can be said about other critiques of this argument as well. Hence the issue of existence of God is still undecided based on the ontological argument.
Besides being a solution to the Gettier Problem, the No Essential False Lemmas is important because it eliminates the possibility of having a false foundation of knowledge. In selecting what is considered knowledge, it also seems
The epistemological
In this paper, first I am going to introduce the criterion of verifiability. With the help of the criterion of verifiability, Ayer is able to test whether any sentence has factual significance or not. He then concludes that metaphysical propositions lack factual significance because they fail to satisfy even the weaker sense of verifiability in principle. Ayer proceeds to argue that metaphysical propositions are nonsensical since they neither have factual significance nor belong to the category of a priori propositions. This argument is mainly successful as to eliminate metaphysics from sensible knowledge, except there are two parts susceptible to attack. One may argue that the process of applying the criterion of verifiability to
For this assignment I received a mark of 90%. My results showed that I displayed clear evidence of logical reasoning and I demonstrated exceptional
Epistemology, asks what do instances of knowledge have in common and what is the scope of knowledge? This group tries to differentiate beliefs from
Participants in the debate about `ontological commitment' would benefit from distinguishing two different ways of understanding the notion. If the question at issue is `what is said to be' by a theory or `what a theory says there is', we are debating `explicit' commitment, while if we ask about the ontological costs or preconditions of the truth of a theory, we enquire into `implicit' commitment. I defend a conception of ontological commitment as implicit commitment; I also develop and defend an account of existentially quantified idioms in natural language which sees them as implicitly, but not explicitly, committing. Finally, I use the distinction between two kinds of ontological commitment to diagnose a flaw in a widely-used argument
31-32). So, in this paper, identities will be called unqualified (or basic) primary truths, and definitions will be called qualified (or derivative) primary truths.
In the context of a metaphilosophical debate concerning the usefulness and meaning of truth, Anil Gupta writes that “the main problem with deflationism lies in the necessity of strong claims about the meaning of true and that to do so is highly problematic” (5). Therefore, he concludes, deflationism cannot work. The aim of my essay will be to challenge Gupta’s interpretation of the Deflationary Theory of Truth mainly using arguments found in Horwich’s Minimal Theory. After briefly explaining Deflationism and Minimalism, I will point out three main parts Gupta has contentions with and address them systematically. Firstly, his point about “affirming the universal” and “affirming all instances” is correct, however I will show Minimalism avoids that through____. Secondly, his objection about meaning is either fruitless against anti-realist or addressed directly by Horwich.
While there is little agreement over what theory is, there is however larger consensus on what theory is not. According to Bacharach (1989) there are three types of descriptions which must be differentiated from theory: Categories of raw data, typologies and metaphors. These sources do answer the ‘What’ of a theory whereas an all encompassing theory should in effect answer ‘How’ ‘When’ and ‘Why’ of a theory as well. The author elaborates on his idea stating that a theory contains constructs related to each other through propositions and variables related to each other by hypothesis. These hypothesis and propositions exist in a system restricted by theorists assumptions i.e. values, time and space. Well constructed hypothesis is essential to link data with theory, making logical representation of ideas and concepts, however still they do not constitute a theory. As (Dubin 1976) noted, "A theoretical model is not simply a statement of hypothesis." One must be very careful when constructing a hypothesis; it should clearly state what is likely to happen instead of logical assertions on why something happens. Moreover references, data, variables, diagrams, and hypotheses are not theory (Sutton & Staw,