The Mind : Paper Two

(1) The first question is dealing with the causal or functional role of phenomenal qualities: Under the assumption that seeing is based on cortical information-processing, the question arises, whether the phenomenal qualities of visual perceptions have a function with regard to this processing, in the sense that the intentional content of visual perceptions depends not only on their intentional, but also on their phenomenal qualities. Is it true, as among other authors Frank Jackson and Steven Pinker claim, that phenomenal qualities are only epiphenomena, not having any function for information-processing? (1)

In the paper "Epiphenomenal Qualia," Frank Jackson presents the concept of Qualia and the knowledge argument in order to prove physicalism false. Jackson 's knowledge argument introduces a thought experiment about a neuroscientist called Mary. His thought experiment is designed to refute physicalism by showing that there is non-physical knowledge in the world. However, there are many flaws in Jackson 's thought experiment that lead to its ultimate failure in proving that physicalism is wrong, such as its appeal to a misleading intuition, the ambiguity of its premises, and the assumption that it is possible to gain all physical knowledge of color from a colorless room.

also see, smell, taste, and feel things that are not there. Disorganized speech is when the

Universals seek to answer the question of “One Over Many,” that is, how we identify and name two different objects or concepts. While real universals are useful to explain how we use words to describe complex sensual experiences, the argument has been made against the validity of universals. In this essay we will explore these arguments and the possibility of language functioning without them.

Humans have five basic senses, Each sense is responsible for processing different information such as taste, touch, sound, smell, and sight. However, when the brain doesn’t process this information correctly it can result in the senses mixing information. This condition is called synesthesia, “Synesthesia is an anomalous blending of the senses in which the stimulation of one modality simultaneously produces the sensation in a different modality involuntarily”. People that have synesthesia have the ability to hear colors, feel sounds, taste shapes and combinations of other senses. People may think that this is something that is made up as anyone can make something up and no one will know if they are lying, however, a response from a synesthete is always the same. As an

In this paper, I will consider whether experiences of secondary qualities can fit into the theoretical framework of functionalism. I will begin this discussion by thoroughly explicating functionalism and the threat posed to it by secondary qualities. I will then consider Nida-Rümelin’s inverted qualia argument and will contend that it employs a false conception of color perception. Finally, I will argue that experiences of secondary qualities may be analyzed through the functionalist model only after Lewis’ stipulation of the appropriate population is redefined.

“b) (2 points) Why (at the computational level) might we experience this illu-sion/interpretation? What implicit assumption about the world is made by your brain? What is a benefit of this illusion/interpretation?”

The Qualia objection in philosophy helps justify my answer by explaining the idea of the mind-body problem. The term Qualia is used through experiences. For instance, I believe Helen cannot see accurate colors like I can because I have seen them before and she has not. In the Qualia objection, it helps prove my answer by stating that it is through first hand experience and through actually visualizing an object that you can then visualize the object in your mind because you

The purpose of this paper is to explain the mind-body problem. I will be describing the basic concept of the mind-body problem with the five basic problems that are categorized with it. I will also be taking a stand in property dualist view while offering a counter argument and then a reply to that argument.

Regardless of whether a thought may be defined as so-- a sensation, not a string

In this paper, I will address three propositions that surface in philosophy. The three are: (a) the physical is causally closed, (b) Mary learns a new fact when she leaves her room, and (c) qualia causes behavior. With these three theses, one can accept only two of these. I will examine the three views one gets if accepts two and denies the third. I will specifically argue that qualia causes behavior, with the view Interactionist qualia dualism is the most plausible of the three views.

It has been established that the basis of synesthesia resides in biology, the condition results from our genes and manifests itself in our brain which causes unique perceptual connections. However, from that point on, both learning and cognition play a great role in determining other factors of an individual’s synesthesia as well as how we think about the condition. The role of cognition in synesthesia will now be discussed.

The computational theory of mind explains that our brains are made of information processors. Every part of brain—neuron’s axon and molecules, all these nerve cell’s propose is to be an information carrier. The neurons are like sophisticated chips and with billion of neurons, you ended up with one powerful computational device, which is brain. Brain is one hunk of matter that is intelligent things that allows human beings to have cognitive equipment to processes of human perception, problem solving, and decision making. The “demons” is a system that contains a memory and reflexes. These demons are triggered by information and connected to sense. The mind is a product of natural selection and in that sense, the mind is our ancestor’s past. Our ancestor’s beliefs and desires are information, as part of our brain. The computational theory of mind allows us to keep this information (beliefs and desires) in our explanations of behavior. By doing this, the meaning ended up to cause and be cause. Steven Pinker believed that computational theory of mind came about through natural selection in order for our ancestors to solve and problems with the new conditions such as figuring out of how to defeat the plants’ and animals’ defenses before they counteract. The software that we inherited from our ancestor has ability of natural computation due to the goals and desires that are preprogrammed. Our minds are calculating the costs and benefits of decisions with our ancestor’s past

The effort to explain this phenomenon has met unique difficulties, and from this apparent difficulty arises the Explanatory Gap. Equipped with some physical theory about what those subjective qualia are, there is the formidable problem that any such explanation seems to leave something out- namely the what it is like of the experience. We can explain many qualities of things in the world if we learn the science that sufficiently describes the quality(2). The wetness of water and the hardness of diamonds may require some mental exercise but do not exceed one's ability to explain. Furthermore, there are levels of explanation about each phenomenon, and the debate over primacy may ensue(3), but at some level humans succeed in explaining many previous mysteries.

In Frank Jackson’s paper, “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” Jackson rejects physicalism, a philosophical theory that states that everything in the world that exists, including all that is mental, is physical. Additionally, physicalists believe that everything in the world can be explained through the laws of fundamental physics. Furthermore, Jackson uses thought experiments such as Mary’s room, in order to demonstrate the non-physical nature that certain experiences can create. Rather, Jackson believes that these non-physical experiences can be explained by information known as “epiphenomenal qualia.” In this paper, I argue that Jackson successfully introduces epiphenomenalism and proves his theory that physicalism is false, since there are certain experiences, or “qualia”, that we have that can’t simply be explained through physical notions.