The Position Of Director Of National Intelligence

In the intelligence community, there are some collection challenges, redundancy is one of the issues always to be mentioned. Redundancy can affect the core of the intelligence work ethics, resources management, budging, work force, future planning, and development methods. Also, the capability of the intelligence agencies and departments to predict attacks, analyze the indications and warning (I&W). The congress oversight of the intelligence community and the operations of the sixteen agencies imbedded in the community, to regulate the funds and allocate proper budget, also to monitor that the rights of US person are not violated in any collection method.

The intelligence budget is comprised of the NIP and the MIP funding. The NIP is made up of programs that support across agencies or are nondefense related and covers the programs, projects, and activities of the intelligence community oriented towards the strategic needs of decision makers (e.g., National Counterterrorism Program, Consolidated Cryptographic Program, National Geospatial Intelligence Program, INR, etc.). The MIP funds defense intelligence activities and intended to support tactical military operations and priorities (e.g., Air Force, Army Navy, Marine, Special Operations, and other defense related programs). The GDIP is funded by the NIP budget.

Perhaps the most important change in how the federal government was reorganized after September 11th is the creation of both the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) position and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) in 2004 with the passage of the same IRTPA that created TSA. This concept had been first suggested in 1955 after a study by Congress then and was recommended time and again but only became a reality after the September 11th attacks drove the need for major intelligence reform home and the 9/11 Commission continued the push for the creation of such a position (ODNI, n.d., paras. 1-5). As one can see from the mission and vision of the ODNI, the importance cannot be overstated. The mission includes leading intelligence integration while having the IC produce the most insightful intelligence products possible and the vision is fully integrating the IC thus making the nation more secure (ODNI, n.d., paras. 1-2).

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks was among the agencies that associated the 9/11 attacks with lack of coordination among agencies (Best, 2015). This prompted the Congress to enact a legislation that established a centralized intelligence leadership, popular as the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). However, the legislation only helped to increase tension between different agencies, especially on how to approach funding. The legislation was not clear regarding the boundaries between the activities of the DNI, and their interaction with the mainstream intelligence agencies. The congress debated these concerns and later established the framework for the working of the DNI and relationship with different intelligence agencies. Most importantly, this legislation focused on one element of reorganization, which was enhancing coordination of activities between different

Since 9/11, the intelligence community has improved greatly. It is not that they have been reconstructed from the ground up, or that their mission has completely changed, it is, in the community’s eye anyway, that they now all share information, no matter how important or how small. This information sharing now even includes all the way down to local and tribal authorities. The reasoning is that, even if it might be small or seem insignificant to you at your level, it may be the piece someone somewhere else in the country needs.

DNI Negroponte stated “The aim was to direct the required changes in intelligence practices but to accomplish that goal by empowering the intelligence agencies themselves to help lead the reform agenda.” Taking this approach Negroponte was able to mitigate the inherent weakness of his position by reaching out to the various agencies and getting them to advance his agenda. One of the ways he did this was by overhauling the President’s Daily Brief (PDB), the DNI “changed the process to ensure multiple intelligence agencies contributed to the PDB, which fostered collaboration, distributed the daily production burden, and encouraged agencies not accustomed to writing for the Oval Office to improve the quality of their product.” Moreover, Negroponte leveraged his direct access to the president in the PDB to continue to effect reform in the IC. “All of these meetings with the President reinforced and often drove the DNI’s intelligence reform

In 1947, President Harry S. Truman created the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A) with the signing of the National Security Act. When this act was created it also created a head of the Central Intelligence Agency. This role was know as the Director of Central Intelligence (D.C.I.). Later, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 provided a Director of National Intelligence who took on some of the roles done by the D.C.I.

The “need to know” system is an outdated and inefficient way of sharing information, both within a single agency and when it comes to interagency cooperation. The “need to share” system is a much more logical way to go about disseminating intelligence of all variations. The “need to share” system theoretically mandates the interagency sharing of information that is pertinent to national security , and operational success, thus paving the way for much more efficient operations between the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as well as other federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. If I were in charge of the DHS I would put into effect a long term interagency liaison program, that would be aimed at the sharing

This Act also requires the Director to ensure that all National intelligence-based information is passed on to, first the President; all heads of departments and agencies of the executive branch; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior military commanders; and the Senate and House of Representatives and congressional committees. The Director of the Intelligence National Investigation has an office-specific for him full of employees and staff members to help and discover the information needed to make the decisions regarding any and all terrorist attacks. The staff, in general, includes the Community Management Staff; Co-Location is not allowed to locate anywhere else with any other intelligence agencies; Deputy Directors assists the Director and is next in line if the Director is not able to fulfill their duties; National Intelligence Council is established by the Office of the Director; General Counsel. The Director can also establish the General Counsel, Civil Liberties Protection Offices, Director of Science and Technology, National Counterintelligence Executives, and Inspector Generals. The Director has the authority to assign these positions as well as take them away as long as the individual is Senate-approved.

Understanding the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) priorities are necessary to recommend any initiatives that will have the most value to the intelligence community (IC). The DNI fully identifies to the IC what his mission, vision, and goals are. The DNI uses the National Intelligence Strategy (NIS) to explain the objectives and the priorities for the IC. There are a few areas, which if made a priority would have a beneficial impact on the IC. These recommendations would not require a lot of resources. They include adapting one overall IC vision, enhancing current agency-to-agency communication, and furthering foreign relations within the IC.

The CIA had a big impact on America's modern intelligence. Foreign intelligence had been important to the U.S. for a long time, but during World War II, such efforts had been coordinated on a government-wide level. President Roosevelt was concerned about America’s intelligence efforts mostly about the State Department and War Department. They needed to cooperate better and adopt a more strategic view of operation. With that in mind, Roosevelt hires some people to draft a plan for a new intelligence service.

6) What DNI organization serves as the IC’s center for long-term strategic analysis? What are the most authoritative reports by which the DNI conveys to senior national security leaders the judgments of the IC on strategic national security issues called?

David L. Kirp, a professor of public policy at the University of California, Berkeley, wrote a New York Times article in April 2016 regarding one of America’s leading problems. The purpose of this final essay is to summarize the article, critique it, analyze the article using the definition of “successful intelligence” as the analytical tool, and finally conclude by answering the “so what” question.

intelligence, he briefs the President, has authority to develop the budget for the national intelligence effort and manage appropriations made by Congress, and, to some extent, can transfer personnel and funds from one agency to another.3 I believe that the creation of the DNI position had been on the table for a few years, but the intelligence failures of communication between the agencies and being able to connect the dots to see the events leading up to 9/11 was the last drop in the bucket. I do not think that this organization has worked out all there kinks along with the other organizations in the Intelligence Community completely being open with them, however, I do feel that their roles and placement in the chain is a much needed

In most cases these INTs community compete among each other to provide needed intelligence information to policy makers to justify their budgetary allocations (Lowenthal, 2014). However, intelligence collection can be divided into five main categories referred to as “intelligence collection disciplines” or the “INTs”. These include Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Signals Intelligence